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FOREWORD
It is a great pleasure for us to present the proceedings of the South-Eastern Europe 
Regional Ministerial Conference on “Eﬀective democratic governance at local and 
regional level”, which was held in Zagreb from 25–26 October 2004 and organised 
jointly by the Council of Europe, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and the 
Government of Croatia.
The purpose of this Conference was to review the current state of local government 
in the Stability Pact beneﬁciary countries, to elicit commitments to promoting local 
democracy, decentralisation and capacity-building, and to encourage partnerships 
between state authorities at the central and local levels and the respective associations 
of local authorities.
For many countries in South-Eastern Europe, the ﬁrst priority after the collapse 
of totalitarian regimes was to build strong and eﬀective democratic states at the 
central level. Local self-government was only introduced—or ‘re-introduced’—later 
but, perhaps contrary to expectations, it proved to be a long process rather than an 
instant, ‘big-bang’ type of event. The transfer of competences, staﬀ and resources 
from the state budgets to local budgets, ﬁscal decentralisation, the reform of territorial 
boundaries and the introduction of new tiers of government were slow, sometimes 
painful and controversial. This brought with it the risk that citizens would lose faith 
in democracy.
The Council of Europe’s Charter of Local Self-Government proved invaluable in 
identifying the main features of democratic local government and setting a framework 
for the implementation of European standards of local democracy. However, what 
was still needed was suﬃcient political will and a clear acknowledgment that local 
self-government is not an ‘optional’ feature of democratic states but an essential 
component of eﬀective democratic governance.
The Zagreb Conference provided precisely that: a recognition by both central 
governments and local authorities that while the former must create the environment 
in which local authorities can carry out their responsibilities eﬀectively, the latter also 
have to be strong enough to push forward the economic, social and environmental 
development of their communities.
In the run-up to the conference, special attention was paid to the dialogue 
between ministries and associations of local authorities in order to agree on common 
platforms for local government reform. The Congress of Local and Regional 
•
•
•
 
 
 
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
d
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
i
c
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
l
o
c
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
 
l
e
v
e
l
6 • • •
Authorities of the Council of Europe and the Network of Associations of Local 
Authorities of South-East Europe (NALAS) played a very constructive role in this 
respect. At the conference itself, ministers, associations of local authorities and the 
donor community engaged in a dialogue leading to the signature by the ministers 
of a Memorandum of Understanding on commitments to local government reform. 
Based on a common template, Work Programmes for Better Local Government—
drafts of which were presented to the conference—will set out objectives and 
priorities for action at national level. At regional level, these Programmes will provide 
a useful tool for assessing common needs and inspiring concerted action by both 
governments and the international community.
We believe that the Zagreb Conference was a remarkable opportunity for the 
countries concerned and the international community to fully gauge the importance 
of democratic local government for the stability and prosperity of the region, and 
therefore for the stability of Europe as a whole. The fact that a stocktaking conference 
will be held in Skopje in 2006 conﬁrms the seriousness of the commitment of 
governments and associations alike for local government reform and its practical 
implementation to be the centrepiece of the democratic consolidation of South-
Eastern Europe. In this way the states of the region will also be complying with the 
undertakings they made when they joined the Council of Europe.
 
Terry Davis Erhard Busek Antun Palarić
Secretary General 
of the Council of Europe
Special Coordinator
of the Stability Pact 
for South-Eastern Europe
State Secretary 
Central State 
Administrative Oﬃce 
for Public Administration 
of the Republic 
of Croatia
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POLICY ENVIRONMENT
Local Democracy—But Only So Far
It is right that, in the early phases of transition, the emphasis is on the creation of 
a strong national government. This is necessary not only to build the appropriate 
organs of State in a new political, economic and social environment but also to 
manage the pressures for and against change. Early priorities must be to establish 
the rule of law, judicial reform, eﬀective public administration, human rights and an 
eﬀective Parliament.
But once the national government is established, the development of local 
democracy is essential to avoid tendencies to authoritarianism and to better meet 
the real needs of local people. Eﬀective, democratic local government both delivers 
better local public services and gives local people a real say in the services they receive 
and in the way they are governed. It means that people in power locally become 
accountable to the people they serve, rather than to central government.
However, in a number of transition countries, the development of local democracy 
has only gone so far. Competences have been transferred, but in some cases not 
suﬃciently or without suﬃcient resources. Public services are being provided, but 
not always to the standards to which local people are entitled. Local leadership is 
there, but not always sensitive to the needs of local people. Local people may vote, 
but they may not do much more than that. 
A Vision of Local Democracy
The development of eﬀective, democratic local government is a fundamental change 
from the old ways of governing. To go down this path, people need a vision of what 
real local democracy might be. 
Local democracy means that local authorities provide eﬀective leadership for 
their communities. They work with civil society to introduce joint projects, to 
develop longer term plans for their community, to meet the challenges of the future. 
They focus on delivering results that improve the quality of life for local people. They 
provide public services that meet recognised standards and respond to the needs of 
local people. 
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8 • • •
Local democracy means that local people are engaged with their local authority 
not only through elections but in the setting of priorities, in the design of public 
services and in the decisions that aﬀect those services.  Local people understand 
their local authority’s plans and celebrate their achievements. They are able to hold 
the local authority to account in the delivery of those plans and in the use of 
resources. 
Local democracy means that local people need to be represented by men and 
women who themselves aspire to this vision, who understand how national and local 
government work, who care about the needs of the people who elect them, who 
communicate well and who encourage wider democratic participation.
Local authorities need to be staﬀed by professional men and women who take 
pride in their work of public service, who are trained to do a competent job and who 
look to an attractive career in the public sector.
Ministers and civil servants also need to share this vision. Their will and their 
competence determine the quality of the legislative framework and the constructiveness 
of their working relationship with local authorities and their associations.
This vision of local democracy should be set out in a strategy to which the 
government and its partners are seriously committed.
Role of the International Community
How does the international community help member states bring this vision about? 
The Council of Europe is well known for establishing the standards agreed by 
the member states. The European Charter of Local Self-Government sets out the 
principles that underpin local democracy. There are numerous Council of Europe 
Ministerial recommendations that establish complementary standards. 
But the journey from these principles and standards to the full ﬂowering of local 
democracy is long and beset with diﬃculty. The Council of Europe is developing 
programmes to help member states and national associations of local authorities to 
move along this road.
Many international and national organisations have provided assistance in their 
own way. Each of them in their turn has moved the development of local democracy 
forward. They have helped strengthen local authorities; they have introduced 
programmes that have brought improvement to local public services; they have 
created examples of excellence. 
The challenge is to build on what these organisations have achieved, to learn from 
good practice, to develop standardised approaches, to reach out to all local authorities 
and to ensure longer-term sustainability when external funding is reduced. 
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Legislative Framework
The Council of Europe and other organisations have assisted member states with 
the development of the necessary local government legislation. The Congress of 
Local and Regional Authorities has monitored the implementation of the European 
Charter and other standards. 
Reports of the Congress and other organisations have helped identify the issues, 
but this has not necessarily led to their resolution.
In some member states, the legislation is good but falls short on implementation. 
In other member states, advice from the Council of Europe may have been ignored 
for one reason or another, and the legislation remains weak or incomplete. The will 
and capacity of governments and their parliaments to fully transfer competences and 
resources to local government has fallen short of the expectations of the international 
community.
Capacity-building
But there is another dimension to creating the necessary framework for eﬀective, 
democratic local government. The will and capacity of central government may be 
there. But that is not enough. 
A frequent reason given for the delay in transferring competences and resources, 
even when the legislation is in place, is the inability of local authorities to manage 
such responsibilities. Where are the trained staﬀ to do the work? How well do the 
national associations help local authorities strengthen their own capacities to deliver 
good public services? How well do national associations stand up for strong local 
government in the national debate?
Central government concerns about the lack of local capacity may be justiﬁed. 
They need the conﬁdence that local government will work well. They need to be sure 
that basic standards will be achieved, that public money will be properly accounted 
for. For that reason, capacity-building programmes are essential. They are the other 
side of the coin to the legislative framework. 
National associations need the capacity to deliver eﬀective support to their 
members. 
Local authorities need the capacity to attract committed elected representatives 
and a cadre of competent staﬀ and train them to deliver good local public services, 
to become organisations that foster good leadership and management, that engage 
local people and that meet high standards of public service. 
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Two Sides of the Same Coin
Legislation sets the framework for local government; capacity-building programmes 
build the institutions needed for eﬀective local government. There can be good 
legislation but, without capacity-building programmes, poor local government. But 
capacity-building programmes cannot make up for weak legislation. Legislation and 
capacity-building programmes are two sides of the same coin.
Training is a key part of capacity-building programmes. But if local authorities do 
not have the legal competences or public resources to deliver local services properly, 
training will be without purpose. If staﬀ fear they will lose their job when the next 
mayor is elected because they have no legal protection, training will be ineﬃcient. If 
staﬀ are recruited without suﬃcient basic understanding and skills because there are 
no proper entry requirements into the public service, training will be wasted. 
Other capacity-building programmes can complement training. Local public 
services can be improved by learning from best practice and by using techniques 
like fundamental performance reviews. Local leadership can be improved through 
peer assessment against a leadership benchmark. Community participation can be 
improved through networking. Performance management programmes can be used 
to introduce the discipline of continuous improvement in service delivery.
Good legislation and capacity-building together are key elements in the way 
ministries of local government and the national associations can support the local 
authorities themselves and their elected representatives and staﬀ. 
Ministries can ensure that the legislation reﬂects the principles of the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government and the standards of the Council of Europe. They 
can work with other ministries to ensure the proper transfer of competences and 
resources and in the development of good legislation on public service.
National associations can seek to ensure that the legislation responds to the 
needs of local authorities; they can also provide a wide range of capacity-building 
programmes to local authorities to help them deliver local leadership and local public 
services to high standards. 
With such support, local authorities themselves—their staﬀ and elected 
representatives—will develop their own capacities to provide good local government 
and make best use of the services provided by national associations and other national 
and international organisations. 
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A Shared Endeavour Over Time …
The development of eﬀective, democratic local government is not something done 
by governments alone. It is a shared endeavour. It is about national governments and 
national associations of local authorities working to plan and implement the process 
together. It is about other national and international organisations supporting this 
endeavour.
The development of local democracy is not something done in one go. It takes 
time; it evolves. Further competences can be devolved as local authority capacity 
develops. Whereas a typical member state in SE Europe might now be spending 
around 5 per cent of its total public expenditure through local authorities, other 
member states of the Council of Europe may be spending 25 per cent. 
Nor does the development of local democracy mean that the central government 
no longer has a stake in local government. Central government will have an interest 
in a number of local authority functions, such as the standards achieved by children 
at school. They will want to express that interest by establishing standards and targets 
and by monitoring performance and encouraging improvement.
…with Immediate Priorities…
The development of eﬀective, democratic local government may take time, but there 
are always immediate priorities. In post-conﬂict areas, for example, community 
groups need to both live and work together. Local democracy means that all groups 
participate in community aﬀairs. Women and young people have key roles to play. 
Where they are excluded, local democracy is less democratic.
Working together is much more diﬃcult where there may be unemployment 
levels reaching 50 per cent. Unemployed people feel they have no function in modern 
society. There is little income for the family. Anti-social behaviour feeds on bored 
young people. Unemployed people lose conﬁdence in the authorities.
But it does not have to be like that. Creating jobs can be a real priority. 
Governments and local authorities—with international support as necessary—
can focus on local economic development programmes. Business training, micro-
credit and other local initiatives allow people to get a foot on, or move up, the 
enterprise ladder. Cross-border co-operation increases the size of the local market 
and the opportunities for trading. Municipal development programmes allow local 
authorities to exploit local job opportunities. Public works programmes provide low 
cost jobs and create community beneﬁt. Programmes that attract inward investment 
introduce new ideas and increase both job opportunities and levels of conﬁdence.
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To promote such programmes, central and local authorities need to work together 
in partnership. Central authorities need to review their spending priorities to assess 
how eﬀectively they are meeting the real needs of their people. They need to remove 
administrative and legal ‘red tape’ so that they can respond promptly to such needs 
and release the necessary resources. They need to give local authorities powers to 
develop their own resource base.
Local government needs the capacity to act as an eﬀective partner to central 
government, to design and implement local economic development programmes, 
to harness support from local organisations and tgo bring the various groups in 
the community together in a common endeavour. Where this happens, this is local 
democracy ‘made good’.
…Based on Understanding and Professionalism
The development of eﬀective, democratic local government starts with a clear 
understanding of the value of local democracy. Strong local government is not a 
threat to central government. Rather it reinforces central government by enabling 
local people to participate more closely in government and by providing local public 
services more eﬃciently and eﬀectively. It allows central government to focus on its 
priorities, while local authorities focus on what they do best.
To do this, central governments need to understand that local authorities need 
the competences, staﬀ, ﬁnance and assets to be eﬀective.  
National associations need to be strong enough to work in partnership with 
central government and to provide valued services to local authorities. Local 
authorities need to build their capacity so that they can properly carry out the tasks 
entrusted to them. Elected members need to have suﬃcient vision and competence 
to fully serve the needs of local people. Local authority staﬀ need a professional 
structure so that public service becomes an attractive career, and they develop the 
motivation, understanding and skills to deliver high quality local public services.
The S tate 
of Loc al and Regional 
Democracy 
in South-E astern Europe*
• Gérard Marcou •
* Prepared by Professor Gérard Marcou, Professor at the University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 
Director of GRALE (Groupement de Recherches sur l’Administration locale en Europe) at the 
request of the Council of Europe. 
The opinions expressed in this Report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the 
views of the Council of Europe, the Open Society Institute, the Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe or the contributors of the country studies.
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Introduction
This report deals with the situation of local and regional democracy in the “Stability 
Pact Countries” of South-Eastern Europe: Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Moldova, Romania, the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro and “the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”.
This group of countries is characteristically heterogeneous. Each country was 
subject to socialist rule until the 1990s; each is oriented toward European integration—
ﬁrst, into the Council of Europe, and later, upon fulﬁlling accession conditions, into 
the European Union. Summarised as such, it would appear as though members of 
this group do not diﬀer dramatically from the most recent enlargement countries, 
now new member states of the European Union (EU). 
However, this comparison is valid only for two of the Stability Pact Countries 
(hereinafter, SPCs): Bulgaria and Romania. Both countries were involved in the same 
accession process as the eight Central European states recently admitted to the EU. 
However, their membership was delayed, owing to their slower and more diﬃcult 
reform course. These two countries existed before, during and after state socialism, 
maintaining the same territory (though with signiﬁcant border changes for Romania 
in 1945).
The situations of the six other countries of South-Eastern Europe are far more 
complex.
Four were components of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia 
(fSFRY). With the collapse of the fSFRY, and in response to a series of wars that erupted 
for the purpose of forming political communities based on ethnic homogeneity, these 
states sought independence. The late intervention of the international community 
imposed peace; yet, this intervention to a large extent recognised the ethnicisation of 
state building, based on the ethnicisation of settlements.
This is reﬂected in the international agreements that still provide the framework 
for domestic constitutional rules.1 As such, the major issue facing these countries 
1 e.g.: The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, part of the Dayton Agreement; Serbia, where 
Kosovo is still under UN administration; and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, 
although to a lesser extent, with the Ohrid Peace Framework Agreement of August 2001. 
Furthermore, Croatia is also aﬀected by the Dayton Agreement, regarding the return of refugees 
and judicial co-operation with the Hague war crimes tribunal.
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is state building. Some of the most signiﬁcant problems observed concerning the 
implementation of local self-government stem from the present organisation of the 
state, which itself is a consequence of arrangements guaranteed by the international 
community.
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that local self-government is always linked to 
international arrangements, and progress made in local self-government in terms 
of new state structures may be attributable to international guarantees. As well, 
dissimilarities among these countries appear to be increasing. It is expected that the 
current rate of progress in Croatia should enable the country to join the accession 
agenda predicted for Bulgaria and Romania between 2007 and 2009. Prospects seem 
less favourable, however, for the other three countries.
Since before state socialism, the territory of Albania has remained unchanged. 
Thus, its current situation basically resembles that of Bulgaria and Romania. Sizeable 
populations of Albanian origin, however, reside in neighbouring countries of the 
region.
Lastly, Moldova struggles with numerous diﬃculties. A republic of the former 
Soviet Union, it is now a small country squeezed between Ukraine and Romania. 
Moldova is a new state on the international scene: an independent Moldovan state 
ceased to existed after the sixteenth century; from the 1880s, Romania shared the 
province with the Russian Empire—and later, the USSR. In part of the territory, the 
authority of the central government continues to be challenged.
We can infer from these diﬀerent backgrounds that local government issues must 
be handled in light of the state building needs of at least ﬁve of the SPCs; particular 
attention should be paid to local self-government to help consolidate new democratic 
state structures.
Another factor to be considered is the sizes of the SPCs, as these countries diﬀer 
in terms of area and population. Population and area should be taken into account 
when discussing territorial reforms.
When taking stock of the current situations of the states of the region, and 
particularly in regard to local government, we must depart from any political or 
ideological approach on democracy and autonomy. 
First, local or regional democracy should not be misunderstood. It is not a 
special type of democracy: democracy is a complex network of institutions, rights 
and behaviours implemented at all levels of government. Democracy at the local 
level cannot be isolated from its realisation at the national level. A key challenge in 
building constitutional democracy in the SPCs is to recompose the need to ensure 
citizens’ rights, which are individual in nature, with the protection of minorities’ 
rights, at the national and local levels. Local self-government has a special relevance 
to confronting this challenge.
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Second, local self-government must be considered as part of the entire government 
system. It is necessary for developing better government, increased democracy, 
greater accountability and more responsiveness in managing public aﬀairs. It should 
not, meanwhile, be in opposition to central or national government. The central 
government should consider decentralisation as an option in diﬀerent public policies; 
as the purpose of government is to serve civil society and citizens, the distribution 
of responsibilities and powers among diﬀerent government levels must strive toward 
meeting functional needs. These functional needs may diﬀer—not only from country 
to country, but also within a country, from region to region and according to public 
policies and time periods.
In the last few years, most countries have adopted numerous pieces of legislation, 
and ongoing reforms are often prepared with international support. Generally 
speaking, the countries of the region are striving to implement the standards expressed 
in the European Charter of Local Self-Government, which they all have ratiﬁed. All 
Constitutions recognise and guarantee local self-government at least at the municipal 
level, and the basic legislation on institutions and responsibilities has been adopted 
in line with the requirements of the European Charter of Local Self-Government.
However, some signiﬁcant problems arise in connection with the implementation 
of local self-government. In view of this, we will focus on the following three issues: 
(1) territorial reform and the government levels; (2) relationships between government 
levels and the distribution of responsibilities; and (3) the level of democracy in local 
institutions.
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I .
Territorial patterns 
and government levels
A ﬁrst necessary step of the analysis is to take stock of the present territorial pattern 
in the SPCs. Subsequently, reforms and reform projects regarding the municipal 
and ‘regional’ levels must be scrutinized. Lastly, cross-border co-operation should be 
considered as an opportunity to rebuild links between and among neighbours. 
A Review of Territorial Patterns
The following table will try to summarise the number and types of territorial units, 
and to distinguish local self-government services from central government local 
services (deconcentration). Territorial units are referred to by the area and population 
of a country; when necessary, the international status is also noted.
The classiﬁcation of the table is based not on geographical but legal criteria. 
Column 2 presents those countries that are comprised of a loose association of quasi-
state governments (Bosnia and Herzegovina; Serbia and Montenegro). Column 
3 lists federal entities or regional autonomies, identiﬁed by the devolution of 
legislative power. Column 4 is for wider meso-level units; the ﬁfth column shows 
supra-municipal units with a functional character; and the ﬁnal column presents 
municipalities and their institutions for co-operation or local participation.
Central governments and local self-governments are listed in bold letters, 
local agencies of central government (deconcentrated authorities) are in ordinary 
letters, and co-operative eﬀorts between local self-governments and infra-municipal 
institutions are in italics. Where the capital city has the status of a territorial unit of 
the upper level, this is mentioned in the corresponding column. Data on municipal 
self-governments reﬂect the distinctions made by domestic law among several 
categories of municipal self-governments.
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These territorial patterns are partly attributable to the former regimes, and 
partly the result of reforms introduced or changes that have occurred during the 
last few years. The table makes it possible to draw out several basic features of local 
government across these countries.
First, no country suﬀers from excessive municipal fragmentation, compared 
with the average situation elsewhere in Europe (and especially in Western Europe). 
This holds even when France, which has the highest number of small municipalities 
in Europe, is excluded from the comparison. Certainly, this does not mean that 
no reform should be made; rather, reforms cannot be justiﬁed only on the basis of 
municipality size, and the purpose of any territorial reform must be clearly stated.
Second, a federalist state structure and autonomous regions exist largely as a result 
of the wars that have followed the collapse of the fSFRY, the ensuing international 
agreements and ethnic divisions (Moldova). Other countries have kept unitary state 
structures, which have determined the type of regional level they implement. 
Third, territorial authorities exist at the meso level2 in all countries except for 
Montenegro and Republika Srpska. In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
cantons, as very small federative entities, present a very particular type of meso level. 
Elsewhere, in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and “the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, there is a deconcentrated state authority and, 
at the same level, a local self-government, with the exception of Bulgaria, Serbia 
and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. In Moldova, the meso level is 
organised into rather small units (on average, 1,100 km²): districts, designed for 
services and functions, which need to be organised on an inter-municipal basis. 
These districts closely resemble the former raion. In “the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia”, the meso level corresponds to the former municipalities. The capital 
city may be subject to a special law.
Fourth, there is little or no co-operation between neighbouring local governments 
within the respective countries, or between cantons within the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The exaggerated devolution of powers to the cantons in the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has fostered economic fragmentation, making 
the development of initiatives more diﬃcult.3
2 Meso level: Jim Sharpe uses the expression “meso-government” to designate institutions at the 
intermediate (meso) level of territorial government organisation, beyond their diﬀerences. He 
distinguishes between institutions subordinated to central government and those vested with some 
autonomy. He considers that the rise of the meso-government is based on the development of the 
latter. J.L. Sharpe, “The European Meso: An Appraisal”, The rise of meso-government in Europe, 
London: Sage, 1993, pp.1 and sq.
3 See the speech of the High Representative Paddy Ashdown on 14 June 2002 in Banja Luka for “a 
single economic space” in Bosnia and Herzegovina: “successful decentralised countries (…) never 
confuse political devolution with economic fragmentation”.
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Reforms at the Municipal Level
Among SPCs, Croatia and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” are the 
only countries where the municipal territorial pattern has changed drastically. As in 
Slovenia, post-socialist transition has led to the division of the large municipalities, 
characteristic of the previous regime.
In Croatia, reforms multiplied the number of municipalities ﬁvefold (101 muni-
cipalities with uniform status in 1989; 547 municipal entities currently). Munici-
palities still have uniform status since the implementation of the local government 
act of 2001 (No. 33), and the qualiﬁcation as “city” is of no legal consequence. The 
Constitution enables larger cities to have conferred on them the authority of a county 
by law (art. 133), but no application has been made to date of this provision.
In “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, the present organisation—
with 123 municipalities and the city of Skopje—was established under the reform of 
1996. Previously, there existed only 34 municipalities, and these constituencies still 
exist for state territorial oﬃces. The territorial reform adopted on 12 August 2004, 
following the Ohrid Agreement of 2001, provides for larger municipalities (80). As 
a consequence, it also provides for power sharing with the minority Albanians at 
the local level, with special rights (use of the native language, etc.) for community 
members when their portion of the population exceeds 20 per cent. Expectedly, this 
reform faces strong opposition. Local elections, held in November 2004, should 
establish the councils of the new municipalities; new laws on Skopje and on ﬁnancing 
municipalities should be adopted during the same session. 
Several countries have adopted special legislation for the capital city, due to its 
demographic weight and to its functions: Tirana, Soﬁa, Zagreb, Bucharest, Belgrade 
and lastly Skopje. Such legislation is currently under discussion in Montenegro. 
These subdivisions are vested with local self-government institutions; however, in 
Soﬁa, district mayors are elected by the municipal council.
In the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, established 
after the cease-ﬁre and following several adjustments, raises very diﬃcult problems of 
government. Namely, a signiﬁcant part of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
separates the north and south of Republika Srpska. Numerous municipalities are 
also divided by this line. Numerous small municipalities have formed as a result, 
especially in Republika Srpska. Co-operation between municipalities on both sides 
is impeded by distrust, and there is still a tendency to divide cities along ethnic 
lines. In the case of Mostar, the High Representative has been obliged to support the 
unity of the city administration; yet, the city is divided into several municipalities of 
diﬀerent ethnic majorities. In Sarajevo, with four very autonomous municipalities, 
the situation is similar. 
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To sum up, the governments of the region pursued or are contemplating very dif-
ferent policies. Croatia and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” have split 
large municipalities inherited from the Yugoslav period into smaller entities, while 
Serbia has not. Municipalities remain in Montenegro, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herze-
govina, but according to the Inter-Entity Boundary Line. Albania is contemplating 
merging smaller municipalities into larger ones; “the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia” is considering rebuilding larger municipalities as well. Bulgaria has kept 
large municipalities, but has increased inner-municipality decentralisation. 
These observations suggest two general comments. First, merging or splitting 
municipalities should not be the only remedies to respond to functional diﬃculties 
or democratic demands. Second, general reorganisation brings about administrative 
costs and political tensions; therefore, reforms must be well founded and well pre-
pared, in order for central governments to undertake them. 
Other reform possibilities could be explored. Territorial reorganisation involving 
the merging of municipalities could be limited to situations in which excessive 
fragmentation results in the lack of ﬁnancial and human resources. It could also be 
pursued step by step, on the basis of local considerations (for instance, the experience 
of the Netherlands). Co-operation between municipalities might be a response to 
functional needs through the delegation of competences to the inter-municipal level 
(by law or/and inter-municipal agreement); smaller communities could then remain 
as long as enjoy support from the people (for instance, as practised in France, with 
positive results). Meanwhile, inner-municipal decentralisation, with elected organs 
and responsibilities delegated upon them, could respond to democratic demands 
of the population, while keeping the functional advantage of larger municipalities. 
Several countries of the region have developed infra-municipal decentralisation: 
in 2003, Bulgaria increased the number of settlements (with a minimum of 250 
inhabitants) governed by an elected mayor. Other countries have followed this path 
as well, including Croatia, Serbia, Portugal and Poland.
Reforms at the Meso Level
There is much confusion over the meaning of “meso level”, especially with the in-
creasing use of the term “region” to distinguish it. In fact, institutional and political 
realities vary tremendously from one country to another. In the case of the SPCs, the 
notion “meso level” appears to be especially inadequate. However, the organisation 
of this level is under discussion in most of these countries.
For the purpose of clariﬁcation, it is essential to parse out various interpretations 
of “region”.
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The most general interpretation refers to an intermediate level of government 
with an elected council and self-government rights. The region is thus understood 
as an extension of self-government to the upper level of the territorial organisation 
of the state.
A more restricted interpretation refers to the increasing importance of territorial 
economic patterns in light of ongoing economic reforms—in particular, regarding 
openness. This interpretation supports the claim for stronger institutions, capable 
of implementing their own development policies. This vision is supported by the 
European Union regional policy, which is part of its economic and social cohesion 
policy.
A third vision of “region” is based on the revival of identities based on history, 
local languages and ethnicity; it mobilises in this way political loyalties rooted in “the 
region”, as opposed to the state or central government. This vision, therefore, has 
more to do with regionalism as a form of nationalism, rather than regionalisation as 
a functional adaptation of state structures to new challenges.
As it appears, although the word “region” is often understood as suggesting a 
wide geographical area with relatively large autonomous powers, what is called a 
“region” is neither necessarily wide nor inevitably vested with large autonomous 
powers. However, size is relevant with regard to the type of functions to be performed 
at that level. Furthermore, some countries have adopted forms of administrative 
regionalisation, whereby authority at the regional level is appointed by the central 
government, with the duty to implement a regional development policy involving 
municipalities (for example, Portugal, Greece, Bulgaria and Lithuania).
Turning to the SPCs, it is apparent that the meso level is a major issue for 
state building, for democracy and for development. Diﬀerent situations must be 
distinguished and considered. 
In Bulgaria, Serbia and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, the 
meso level consists solely of a state authority. In “the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia”, the state territorial oﬃces have kept numerous tasks considered to be 
within the state competence at the seat of the former larger socialist municipalities 
(as in Slovenia). In Bulgaria, the oblast (region) is a rather small, multifunctional 
level, which is traditional. Additionally, there are six regional units of the Ministry 
for Regional Development (NUTS II level), with a committee of economic and 
social cohesion. While districts did not exist in the fSFRY, they were created in Serbia 
in 1992, instead of regions (regioni) that had been constituencies of co-operation 
between municipalities. These districts took over a number of tasks previously carried 
out by municipalities. By contrast, Montenegro has no meso level.
In Albania, Croatia, Moldova and Romania, local self-government institutions 
exist at the meso level. Their basic role is to perform administrative functions of 
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a rather local scope, but of a far broader scope than at the municipal level. Other 
functions are performed directly by central government ﬁeld services covering more 
or less the same territory. Previously, Moldova was divided into 10 judete, according 
to the Romanian example in the reform of 1998. Law No. 764-XV of 27 December 
2001 restored a form of territorial organisation closer to that of the former Soviet 
Union—with 32 districts (raioni) and two cities with district rights (Chisinau and 
Balti). Local state functions are performed in 25 territorial oﬃces of government 
(following Government Decision No. 735 of 16 June 2003). In Romania, there are 
wider territorial units that may be compared to French departments, with an elected 
council, executive and prefect appointed by the central government. 
The structure of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the State Union 
of Serbia and Montenegro cannot be analysed in terms of meso level institutions. 
These states are loose unions of political entities vested with main state prerogatives, 
except for international personality. The Constitution of the State of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina reserves very limited powers to the central authority, and the entities 
have their own armies (Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
art. III.1; Constitution of Republika Srpska: art. 68, 104–107). In the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, Montenegro grew increasingly autonomous of Belgrade; this 
was recognised by the Constitutional Charter of 2003.
In the Republic of Serbia and in Moldova, there are regional self-governments 
(respectively, Vojvodina and Gagaouzia), which reﬂect the third meaning of “region” 
mentioned earlier, although according to speciﬁc conditions. 
In Serbia, the Constitution provides for autonomous provinces based on 
national, cultural and other characteristics. As Kosovo remains under the jurisdiction 
of UNMIK, its future status is open and will be decided by the United Nations 
Security Council.
The constitutional status of “autonomous province” is applicable to Vojvodina. 
The new draft statute prepared by the provincial assembly is indeed a proposal for 
wider autonomy, with its own legislative power, and with the competence to organise 
a judiciary. Furthermore, the draft provides for a parliament with two chambers, one 
of which should be elected by the respective ethnic communities. This house would 
participate in elections of the government. 
In Moldova, the Constitution was amended in 2002 to consolidate and guarantee 
the autonomy of Gagaouzia. Gagaouzia qualiﬁes as an “autonomous entity,” with a 
special status established by an organic law adopted by at least three-ﬁfths of the 
members of Parliament of the Republic (art. 111-1). Furthermore, according to 
new constitutional provisions, “speciﬁc forms and conditions of autonomy may be 
granted” to localities of the left bank of the Dniestr, according to a special organic 
law (art. 110). The de facto autonomy of the area called Transdniestria is based much 
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less on ethnic division than on economic interest; the area can now be organised 
on the basis of the Constitution and integrated into the territorial organisation of 
Moldova.
Discussions on the regional level are currently underway in several SPCs, 
especially in those countries which are close to accession to the EU. In Bulgaria, 
the government is committed to further decentralisation to a second level of self-
government. In Croatia, the reinforcement of counties (županije) by a revision of the 
territorial structure was contemplated; at present, the government position is to keep 
the current territorial structure. In Romania, in addition to the professionalisation 
of prefects, the reform of the second level on the basis of existing judete or through 
the creation of a new regional level is being debated. In Albania, the focus is on the 
election and the responsibilities of the recently created regions.
Such reforms will have to take into account the need to guarantee the stability 
of the state and to preserve the self-government rights of municipalities. In smaller 
countries, it is doubtful that regional development policies call for a new regional 
authority; central government in these countries is in fact on the scale of regional 
governments in larger European countries.
Cross-Border Co-operation
In all countries, cross-border co-operation has become part of the European dimension 
of local self-government. For several South-Eastern European countries, the issue of 
cross-border co-operation is a consequence of newly drawn international boundaries 
between countries that belonged previously to the same state. In a number of cases, 
new borders have divided existing municipalities. In this context, cross-border co-
operation may be a way to restore links and trust between communities by the 
realisation of mutually beneﬁcial projects.
At present, however, cross-border co-operation is very limited at the city level, 
which is precisely where its impact might be most noticeable. In a number of 
countries, this is the consequence not only of distrust, but also of the limits of local 
self-government itself: little autonomy with regard to the centre, lack of resources, 
and unclear responsibilities. The progress of decentralisation should naturally support 
co-operation among municipalities of neighbouring countries.
A more general impediment to cross-border co-operation is the lack of a legal 
framework. The Madrid Convention of the Council of Europe on cross-border co-
operation developed such a framework; however, several countries of the region yet 
to ratify this convention (“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, the Union 
of Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina).
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The development of Euroregions has been successful, involving institutions as 
well as representatives of civil society. There exist at least 10 Euroregions in which 
SPCs are involved. These regions have been created as a response by local authorities 
to the lack of co-operation between neighbouring countries. Euroregions have no 
legal power and are limited by the scope of the competence of their members, but they 
can promote common projects to improve living conditions in the ﬁelds of health, 
education and training, transport, tourism and co-operation in the case of natural 
disaster. Their levels of activity range widely, with some limited to consultations, and 
others able to carry out concrete projects.
According to the report of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the 
Council of Europe on local democracy in the region, a limit to the development of 
cross-border co-operation results from the fear that this opportunity will be misused to 
establish co-operation based (solely) on ethnicity or kinship. A response to overcome 
this obstacle would be to develop agreements between the states concerned, which 
would specify the matters and the purpose of cross-border co-operation between 
local self-governments.4
4 Stefan Soﬁanski (Rapporteur), Les enjeux de la démocratie locale en Europe du Sud-est, Congrès 
des Pouvoirs locaux et régionaux, 11e session, CG(11)7, partie II, 28 Avril 2004.
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I I .
Relationships between Government Levels 
and the Distribution of Responsibilities 
The development of local self-government and the decentralisation of responsibilities 
require a central government strategy and dialogue with representatives of self-
governments. In general, necessary institutions (local government associations) do 
exist. However, they must be established in some countries and their co-operation 
often must be improved. 
Regarding the decentralisation of responsibilities to local self-governments, 
diﬀerent models are possible, as reﬂected by the SPCs. In recent years, several 
countries of the region have improved their legislation. However, much remains to 
be done to achieve a clear and sound distribution of responsibilities, and to assign the 
necessary resources to local self-governments. 
Central Government Support to Decentralisation and
Associations of Self-Government Units 
In Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Serbia, there is a central government 
department (rather recently created, in some) in charge of local government and 
decentralisation. For example, in Croatia, the responsibility for local and regional 
administration was transferred at the end of 2003 from the Department of Justice to 
a newly created Central State Oﬃce for Public Administration, in charge of the local 
government reform. Serbia has also a Ministry for State Administration and Local 
Self-Government. In Romania, the Ministry of Administration and the Interior is in 
charge of local government matters. Albania and “the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia” maintain a Ministry for Local Self-Government. In Moldova, however, 
there is no central government organisation in charge of local government and 
decentralisation; these issues are handled directly by the government and the head 
of the government. In the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, local government is the 
responsibility of the government of Republika Srpska (there is a Ministry of Local 
Self-Government); in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is a responsibility 
shared by cantons and the Ministry of Justice. 
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In all countries of the region, local self-governments and councillors are free 
to create associations to represent their interests. In “the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia”, municipalities must be members of the national association; such 
an obligation is controversial with regard to article 10 of the European Charter 
of Local Self-Government. Local government associations have developed in all 
SPCs, and consultation with the central government is a common practice. Usually, 
distinct associations exist for the respective local government levels. In Romania, the 
four associations of local self-governments have decided to organise one common 
association. In Moldova, meanwhile, there are two associations of councillors (one 
for municipalities and one for districts) and an association of local and regional 
powers, representing municipalities, districts and so forth. 
Local government representatives are involved in major policy choices regarding 
local government. In Serbia, although there is a Standing Conference of cities and 
municipalities (an association of local self-governments), apparently no consultation 
has taken place since March 2004 on current issues. Moreover, the Standing 
Conference has not yet been heard in preparatory works for the future Constitution 
of Serbia. In Moldova, “there is a continuing lack of an eﬀective and institutionalised 
dialogue between central and local authorities”.5 In the State of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, suﬃcient information on present practices does not exist. Elsewhere, 
regular consultations on major issues, legislation and ﬁnance regarding local self-
government are reported. These practices include participation in working groups 
for the drafting of reforms and formal consultations for government projects. In 
some countries, the rights of associations of local self-governments are established in 
legislation on local government (Bulgaria, Romania).
At the same time, associations must develop their independent activities vis-à-vis 
their members, in order not only to consolidate their representativeness, but also to 
cope with their tasks. Some associations are already very active in this regard.
Diﬀerent Models of Responsibility Assignment
A ﬁrst distinction should be made between general competence to deal with public 
aﬀairs of local scope and assigned responsibilities.
The general competence to deal with public aﬀairs of local scope is a general 
European standard, reﬂected in article 4.2 of the European Charter of Local Self-
5 V. Popa and V. Furdui, General report on the situation of local autonomy in the Republic of 
Moldova, Conseil de l’Europe, Institute for Development and Social Initiatives “Viitorul”, 
Chisinau, June 2004, p.16.
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Government. It is important as a self-government right for local councils. Surprisingly, 
this right is not clearly recognised in the SPC’s legislation, except in Romania and 
“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. In Serbia, the law can be read in 
favour of this right, but the application of the law is based on the interpretation that 
local authorities may perform only the tasks devolved to them by law. The legislation 
should evolve in this respect to be more in line with European standards.
Regarding assigned responsibilities, a great diversity of systems is possible. How-
ever, responsibilities of local government cannot be analysed without reference to 
the past, which was marked by a distinction between the Soviet model and the 
Yugoslav model. In the Soviet system, local councils were organs of state power. 
As such, they performed numerous administrative tasks, but were not in charge of 
local interests; as such, there was no concept of local self-government. The situation 
was similar in socialist Albania. In Yugoslavia, however, municipalities performed 
a wide range of duties with their own resources and with extensive managerial 
autonomy, as an expression of the self-management ideology, but again without any 
distinction between state and local government functions. 
Conversely, local self-government, as practised in European countries and as 
reﬂected in the European Charter, is based on a distinction between state (or central) 
and local government. The latter is supposed to promote local interests within the 
framework of the law. This implies deﬁning and implementing a concept of local 
self-government responsibilities.
Regarding the present state of the law in the SPCs on the distribution of 
responsibilities, and without going into the details of the countries surveyed, several 
common issues exist beyond legitimate diﬀerences of approach. The idea of “own 
responsibilities” remains unclear. There is a discrepancy between the local government 
legislation and sectoral legislation, the result of which is to impede local self-
government in the exercise of its responsibilities. There are diﬃculties in deﬁning the 
functions of the meso level with respect to the state and to the municipal level. 
The idea of “own responsibilities” means that a number of tasks are performed 
by local authorities under their own (primary or sole) responsibility and, as a con-
sequence, with some discretion, within the framework of the law. This does not 
preclude the possibility that they also perform delegated tasks—such as tasks carried 
out by local authorities as agents of the central government.
However, the conditions under which certain tasks are discharged are not always 
taken into account in their characterisation as ‘own’ or ‘delegated’ responsibility. As 
a consequence, local authorities may have very limited discretion, if any, within the 
scope of their so-called ‘own’ competences. Examples of this are provided below, as 
well as some clariﬁcations recently introduced in legislation.
The ﬁrst example concerns the management of education personnel. Often, this 
is considered a local responsibility. However, the development of education on which 
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the personnel structure depends cannot be decided locally, and salary norms are ﬁxed 
by the central government. The local authority, in such instances, is actually an agent 
of the central government; education is not its own responsibility.
In Albania, for instance, wages in education and healthcare were previously part of 
the conditional budget. Now, they are ﬁnanced through ministry budgets, although 
they are serviced by local governments. Education and health in this instance are 
considered as “joint functions” in the Local Government Act No. 8652 of 31 July 
2000. However, the responsibility may be considered as ‘delegated’ in relation to 
personnel matters, and a Law on the State Budget for 2003 redeﬁned educational 
facilities and primary healthcare as delegated functions.
This explains why in Bulgaria, an increasing part of education expenditure 
is carried out directly by the state and social assistance and healthcare are direct 
responsibilities of the state, whereas until 2003, they were ﬁnanced through municipal 
budgets. In other SPCs, teachers’ salaries are usually paid directly by the state budget 
(known as the “entity budget” in the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina).
The new law of Moldova on municipal public administration (Law No. 123-XV 
of 18 March 2003) is based on a clear distinction between own and delegated res-
ponsibilities, for both the municipal and district levels of self-government, even 
though the qualiﬁcation of some responsibilities may raise doubt. Both categories 
of responsibilities are subject to diﬀerent supervisory regimes: limited supervision 
for the legality of own responsibilities, and extended supervision for delegated 
responsibilities.
The diﬀerentiation between state and local government functions is essential, 
and results in a more limited scope of local government own responsibilities. It is 
proper that these responsibilities confer a certain amount of discretion on local self-
government for policy making and management choices, albeit within the framework 
established by law. But, this diﬀerentiation is also essential for political accountability: 
for delegated functions, accountability is attributed to central government, whereas 
for own functions, it is attributed to the local authority. 
Another issue is the relationship between general local government legislation 
and sectoral legislation. Usually, local government legislation provides lists of matters 
falling within the responsibilities of local authorities. However, sectoral laws regulate a 
variety of functions, and may give a very narrow interpretation of a local government 
responsibility, or even ignore the distribution of responsibilities. 
An extreme case of such a discrepancy can be observed in “the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia”. According to the Local Government Act of 2002, the 
responsibilities of the municipalities newly established by the territorial reform 
of 1996 are fairly comprehensive, and include social welfare services, education, 
healthcare, urban planning and so on. Municipalities historically did not perform 
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these functions. As such, these broad-ranging responsibilities have had to be devolved 
by numerous speciﬁc laws (more than 80) that are still pending. As a result, municipal 
responsibilities are quite limited in reality, and they comprise only urban planning 
and the maintenance of some local services and infrastructure (local roads, drinking 
water, parks and so on). Other devolved functions are in fact performed by the 
current state administration at the district level. In February 2003, the government 
adopted the Operational Programme of Decentralisation for 2003–2004, and the 
transfer of responsibilities should take place together with ﬁscal decentralisation by 
the beginning of 2005. 
In other countries, sectoral legislation has been recently adopted in order to 
give substance and an adequate legal framework to the devolved responsibilities. For 
example, from 2003 to 2004, Albania adopted a new law on the local police, and 
policy papers were approved on water supply and sewerage, on primary and secondary 
education, on healthcare services, and on social services and assistance. In Romania, 
new laws were adopted on urban and spatial planning (Law No. 350/2001), on 
local public services (Law No. 326/2001), on hospitals (Law No. 270/2003), and 
on public healthcare units of local and judete interest (Law No. 99/2004), among 
others. In Croatia, numerous recent laws regulate the responsibilities of local self-
government units in the ﬁelds of environment protection (Narodne novine, Law No. 
128/1999), waste management (Law No. 151/2003), physical planning (Law No. 
32/2002), publicly funded housing (Law No. 82/2004), municipal services (Law 
No. 26/2003, consolidated text), roads (Law No. 65/2002) and waterway ports (Law 
No. 65/2002), or transfer new tasks to them in the ﬁelds of healthcare (Law No. 
121/2003), primary and secondary education (Law No. 59/2001), agricultural land 
(Laws No. 66/2001 and No. 87/2002). Of course, these pieces of legislation should 
be assessed with respect to the objective of consolidating local self-government.
A last general issue, inﬂuenced by the size of the SPCs, concerns the functions 
of the meso level.
Uncertainties persist as to which tasks the central government should transfer to 
the meso level, and how the latter should relate to the municipal level. A ﬁrst option 
is to keep a purely state authority, subordinated to the central government (Bulgaria, 
“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Serbia). If this solution is adopted, 
it is essential for the state authority to be staﬀed by civil service professionals (career 
civil servants), and for the municipal level to be given stronger powers to perform 
local government tasks, including through co-operation. Otherwise, there would be 
an imbalance between the requirements of central government policies and the re-
presentation of legitimate local interests, which is a raison d’être of local self-government.
Other countries have established local self-government at the meso level. This 
is the case in Albania, Croatia, Moldova and Romania, although state authority is 
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maintained. This option has the advantage of enabling the further decentralisation of 
functions that clearly exceed municipal capacities, and which are clearly related to a 
particular territory. Eﬃcient co-operation among municipalities, meanwhile, is en-
hanced through state authority and through the territorial concentration of admin-
istrative capacities. In small countries, functions delegated to the meso level are 
necessarily limited, since otherwise they would infringe upon municipal responsibilities.
The provisions adopted in Albania and Moldova contrast strongly. In Albania, 
no single, clear responsibility has been assigned to the new regions: the law is 
drafted in general terms. For instance, mention is made of the “construction and 
implementation of regional policies”, but the purpose of such policies is not speciﬁed; 
new regions are assigned “every other function given by the law”, broadly including 
functions delegated by constituent municipalities and by central governments (Local 
Government Act, art. 13).
In the case of Moldova, on the contrary, there are precise lists of responsibilities 
for both levels. However, one matter can be listed for both levels, without speciﬁcation 
of how it is shared: this is the case for social assistance (art. 10[1]e and 11[1]e). 
Furthermore, the district budget includes municipal budgets and must ﬁx the share 
of the constituent municipalities from state revenues and from the share of the 
property tax allocated to local government (see Law on Local Public Finance, 
No. 397-XV of 16 October 2003, art. 2[1] and 21[2]). This means that district 
councils have a leading role in relation to municipalities, since they are responsible 
for adapting their resources to estimated needs. 
However, examples from other small countries suggest that local self-government 
at the meso level may be useful when specialised. Among functions that can be 
appropriate for that level, the experience of these small countries displays: planning 
functions; public transport within the regional area; healthcare services available for a 
wider population basin; speciﬁc training and cultural institutions of a similar nature; 
and support to smaller municipalities in discharging their own responsibilities.
In sum, the transfer of service provision tasks to a meso level self-government 
is justiﬁed when it allows for overcoming spillover eﬀects and internalising costs. 
As a result, a functional analysis has to be made before planning the devolution of 
responsibilities. The experience of the meso level in countries such as the Netherlands, 
Denmark or Hungary would be relevant for most SPCs. 
A diﬀerent case is the claiming of responsibilities on the basis of a regional 
autonomy programme. As illustrated by the case of Gagaouzia or by claims formulated 
in Vojvodina, the purpose is not functional, but political. Claiming responsibilities 
in this way can lead to diﬃculties of another kind, in relation to state governability 
and solidarity within the state, by bringing about a fragmentation of major state 
functions.
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In the SPCs, regionalisation should take place in the state building process. 
Political claims should be balanced by a functional approach deemed to improve the 
provision of services to the population. This approach must use available resources 
eﬃciently, and move beyond the inward-looking claims of communities.
Financing Local Government Responsibilities
Local government ﬁnance is a major issue in the relationships between central and 
local government. There is no decentralisation without adequate funding. Whereas it 
is generally admitted in the SPCs that delegated tasks must be ﬁnanced in totality by 
resources transferred from the central budget (at least in principle), the conception 
of the ﬁnancing of other tasks is not so clear. There are also ambiguities regarding 
the characterisation of a range of resources, as is the case for the various types of 
expenditure (cf. supra). 
The major observation regarding ﬁnancing can be summarised as follows: with 
the exception of Serbia, ﬁnancial decentralisation is limited. Local budgets are usually 
funded from tax shares and direct budgetary transfers, and local councils have little 
inﬂuence over their current revenues. Municipal property still must be established or 
protected in several countries; however, recent reforms have improved the ﬁnancial 
situation of local governments.
“The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” certainly has the lowest level of 
ﬁnancial decentralisation, with a level of local municipal expenditure below two per 
cent of GDP, and a system of capping when more local resources are collected than 
planned. 
In other countries, municipal budgets are dependent on the budget of the 
higher level. In Albania, pass-through transfers for the payment of wages in the pre-
university education and primary healthcare sectors and for social beneﬁts to poor 
families represent close to 50 per cent of local government budgets (2003). This is, 
however, a major improvement in local self-government compared to the situation 
before 2000. At that time, the “conditional budget” formed more than 90 per cent of 
the local government budget, as an aggregate of expenditures included in the budgets 
of several ministries. Currently, only pass-through transfers are included in respective 
ministries’ budgets, but increasing discretion has been given to local governments 
since 2000. Local councils dispose freely of about 50 per cent of the total local 
budget, and the share of own tax revenues jumped from three per cent of total local 
government revenues in 2002 to 12.2 per cent in 2003. 
In Moldova, ﬁnancial decentralisation is based on the district level. Municipal 
budgets depend to a large extent on the district budget, which decides on their 
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participation in the share of general state revenues allocated to the district, and on 
their share in the property tax, including additionally own budgetary transfers to 
municipal budgets (Law No. 397-XV of 16 October 2003, art. 4). In Moldova, 
ﬁnancial decentralisation seems to be limited at the district level.
In 2003, Bulgaria introduced a new ﬁnancial system (in 2002, several amendments 
were made to the 1998 law on municipal budgets and to the 1997 law on local taxes 
and fees), similar to that implemented in Albania. Tasks delegated by the state are 
ﬁnanced through resources allocated by the state: a percentage of the local yield of 
the personal income tax and a state grant to equalise revenues to meet expenditure 
needs. Local tasks, however, are ﬁnanced by local revenues. The main diﬃculty of the 
new system is that the potential of local resources is not in line with the dynamics 
of expenditure, termed “expenditure standards”. As well, for many municipalities, 
the equalisation grant is too small to compensate for the low level of own resources. 
However, several functions considered to be of national scope have been taken over 
by the state budget (in the ﬁelds of health, social assistance and education). As a 
result, the share of local government expenditure has decreased (8.1 per cent GDP in 
2000; 6.5 per cent in 2003). Local revenues now represent 32.1 per cent of the total 
municipal revenues, of which local taxes and local fees represented 21.1 per cent in 
2003—compared to 11 per cent in 2000.
In Romania, the level of municipal expenditure increased signiﬁcantly from 
4.1 per cent GDP in 1999 to 8.5 per cent in 2003. Most budget-funded tasks are 
covered directly by the state budget and by tax shares. It is reported that following 
recent reforms the degree of ﬁnancial autonomy of local authorities increased from 
20 per cent to 50 per cent. Indeed, a major reform has been the introduction of a 
general personal income tax in 2000, the main part of which (63 per cent and later 
on 100 per cent) is assigned to municipal and judete budgets. However, there is no 
local tax power on the personal income tax. Tax collection has been transferred to 
local authorities as well, with the result that the tax collection rate has increased. This 
is only a temporary gain; on the whole, genuine own revenues can be raised from 
numerous taxes (namely, a property tax, which is increasing) and fees, upon which 
local governments wield rate-setting power.
Not surprisingly, the ﬁnancial systems of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro and “the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia” remain quite similar. Although these systems are diverging, 
the basis of municipal ﬁnance in each is a basket of shared taxes. Grants play a very 
small role.
The ﬁnancial system of Croatia diﬀers most dramatically—ﬁrst, because of the 
creation of counties, for which resources are necessary. Most tax revenues stem from 
tax shares, and the transfer of new responsibilities to cities has been ﬁnanced by the 
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concession of an additional share of the local yield of the income tax. As a result, 
the share of central government in personal income tax revenues has decreased from 
60 per cent down to 25.6 per cent. Local taxes and other own revenues provide 
only a small part of local government revenues. However, municipalities do have the 
possibility to levy a surtax on the income tax, a possibility that is initially reserved 
to larger cities; 12 cities used this possibility up to the end of 2003. Nevertheless, 
the very unequal ﬁnancial situation of municipalities, cities and counties suggests 
that the equalisation is not suﬃciently developed. At present, it is based on annual 
decisions about minimum ﬁnancial standards for each decentralised function, and 
a government decision on the mode of calculation of the amounts of equalisation 
functions for the coming year. A more stable system with clear criteria set out by law 
is desirable.
Tax and ﬁnancial systems in the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina diﬀer between 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. Financial data 
reﬂect the weak position of the state: only 1.3 per cent of the total expenditure 
is ﬁnanced by contributions from the Entities. In the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, there is a federal law on the allocation of public revenues among 
cantons, and each canton must adopt a law on the allocation of public revenues 
among municipalities. Otherwise, the ﬁnancing of local governments is very similar 
in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Republika Srpska. The whole 
allocation system is based on tax sharing applied to a basket of taxes, with a speciﬁc 
tax share for each tax. There is no grant system, and sharing rates are subject to 
discretionary variations in both entities and in each canton of the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are a few local taxes, over which municipalities 
have some discretionary powers, representing on average 10 per cent of municipal 
revenues. Non-tax revenues may be signiﬁcant in urban areas. As a result, the system 
does not allow municipalities to make forecasts regarding the development of their 
revenues, and there are considerable ﬁscal disparities between municipalities in both 
Entities. With the introduction of VAT, planned in 2006, and the replacement of the 
sales tax, the derivation system will no longer be maintainable, and the whole ﬁnance 
system will require reconsideration.
In Serbia, the budget of Vojvodina is ﬁnanced by transfers based on the cost of 
the services transferred from the state to the province (10.4 billion dinars in 2003), 
and by tax shares (income tax and property tax, 3.1 billion dinars); there are no own 
revenues. As regards municipalities, the local ﬁnance system of Serbia seems to be 
quite sound compared to other SPCs. The level of municipal expenditure, at 5.6 
per cent GDP, seems to be adequate for their tasks, considering the expenditures 
directly ﬁnanced by the central budget (teachers’ salaries, primary healthcare). 
Municipalities also have an unusual rate of investment expenditure (24 per cent 
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of the total expenditure of municipalities). With the reform introduced in 2002, 
municipal revenues increased considerably across Serbia: from 34.3 billion dinars in 
2000 to 66.6 billion dinars in 2003 (revised budget of the Republic in 2002, 217.7 
billion dinars). Until recently, the level of ﬁnancial decentralisation in Serbia was 
also unusually high, with municipalities receiving 41 per cent of their total revenues 
(without debt) from their own revenues. These revenues consisted mainly of their 
own taxes, over which municipal councils had the power to vary rates. The reform 
of 2001–2002 gave municipalities greater control over fee rates. Municipalities may 
use the self-imposed contribution, which is a tax that municipalities may impose 
on their citizens through referendums, for speciﬁc investment programmes. This is 
widely used (71 per cent of municipalities in 2002), although the total yield is under 
two per cent of the total revenue of municipalities. Additionally, municipalities are 
ﬁnanced by tax shares from a tax basket (43 per cent of the total municipal revenue). 
Municipalities receive the remainder of their revenues from the so-called “limited 
shared taxes”, which are additional tax shares allocated yearly on the basis of needs 
criteria, and which are designed to achieve a certain equalisation. There is no grant 
system in Serbia, and equalisation is controversial because of the lack of clarity of the 
needs criteria. Local government ﬁnance in Serbia as it existed until 2003 shows that 
a certain ﬁscal decentralisation is also possible in diﬃcult economic conditions. 
This system is now under review because of radical changes to the tax system. 
With the introduction of VAT, which replaces the sales tax, the tax share of the sales 
tax will be replaced by a state grant based on 2002 revenues with corrections. Voting 
on this law was scheduled for July 2004. More importantly, the payroll tax, paid by 
companies at a rate voted by municipalities, was abolished on 1 July 2004 by a state 
budget law of 2004. (All municipalities voted for the maximum rate of 3.5 per cent; 
the yield was expected to be 20 per cent of the total municipal revenue in 2003). 
The tax will be replaced by an increased share allocated to municipalities of the local 
income tax yield. This means that a local tax is replaced by a tax share, and it points 
to less ﬁscal decentralisation. However, the property tax revenues remain at a very 
low level, and reforms could increase the tax capacity of municipalities.
The situation in Montenegro is, in broad terms, rather similar to Serbia, with a 
high proportion of own revenues. A new local ﬁnance law provides for increased own 
tax revenues from 2004 (a surtax up to 13 per cent on the personal income tax), but 
fewer self-imposed contributions and tax shares.
Local ﬁnance of Kosovo is now quite distinct from Serbia. Municipalities are 
funded by transfers managed by UNMIK. However, since 2000, municipalities 
receive own revenues from licenses and fees, and from 2003, following a pilot 
programme, UNMIK has introduced a property tax (UNMIK regulation 2003/29). 
Tariﬀs for local public utilities are voted by municipal councils. As a whole, own 
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revenues represent 20 per cent of the municipal budgets on average. 
This review of the key features of local ﬁnance in the SPCs shows that ﬁnancial 
decentralisation needs to be improved in several countries, in order to support self-
government. The experience of some countries shows also that it is possible even in 
particularly diﬃcult situations. Municipal self-government cannot develop without 
a certain level of ﬁnancial autonomy.
Municipal self-government also requires municipal property. This poses a 
challenge for the SPCs, since properties need to be identiﬁed before being transferred. 
However, the property right of municipalities is now recognised in the law of all 
SPCs, with the exception of Serbia. In this country, a law of 1995 transferred to 
the Republic all municipal properties, including municipal enterprises. In turn, 
municipalities possess only the right to use, manage and lease these properties, 
including the right to sell this usus right. This law must be repealed to comply with 
the European Charter of Local Self-Government. According to the government of 
Serbia, a new law will follow the adoption of the new Constitution of Serbia.
In the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no such law was passed, and 
municipalities should still possess their traditional property rights. The situation is 
unclear in “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” after the territorial reform 
of 1996 and in Croatia for the same reason, although municipal property continues 
to be recognised. The situation of local government property is unclear in Moldova, 
as well. According to the Constitution, public property belongs to the state or to 
“administrative/territorial units” (art. 127). Municipal councils manage municipal 
properties, whereas such a competence cannot be found in the law on district 
councils (Law No. 123-XV of 18 March 2003, art. 18(2)x, and art. 49). Provisions 
on local revenues suggest that only municipalities (territorial administrative units of 
the ﬁrst level) are entitled to public properties (see Law No. 397-XV of 16 October 
2003, art. 4).
Other countries have adopted one or several laws deemed to solve property 
issues for municipalities: Albania (Laws No. 8743/2001 and No. 8744/2001); 
Bulgaria (Law of 1 June 1996, largely modiﬁed, with a new law pending, aimed at 
facilitating investments); and Romania (Laws No. 213/1998 on public property and 
No. 3/2003 on public services providing administration for the public and private 
domain). However, the main diﬃculty in this matter regards implementation; 
eﬀective monitoring must be organised.
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III .
Democracy in Local Institutions
By themselves, decentralisation and self-government are not suﬃcient to guarantee 
greater democracy, but democracy requires decentralisation and self-government. 
The progress of democracy depends on institutions and on political behaviour. The 
latter is particularly diﬃcult to attain and requires time. Nevertheless, institutions 
have a responsibility to support the progress of democratic consciousness.
As regards political behaviour, it is beyond the limits of this report to assess 
whether or not it is in line with the new institutions. What can be concluded is that 
good laws are not suﬃcient for elections to run fairly (but, they are necessary), and 
that it is not enough to have fairly run elections (but, again, they are necessary) to 
confer political legitimacy on political elites. 
This report focuses on observations that can be made from the analysis of the 
legislation and from information on institutions. A summary of the results follows.
Generally speaking, all SPCs have adopted legislation establishing democratic 
institutions of local self-government and procedures of citizen participation. 
Legislation at times needs to be improved in order to guarantee self-government 
rights; as this is largely technical issue, it does not receive elaboration here. As well, the 
neutrality of the public service requires reinforcement. Above all, in some countries, 
ethnic divisions negatively aﬀect the functioning of local institutions. 
Elected Bodies
In all SPCs, a directly elected council rules each local government; in some countries, 
an indirect election exists only at the meso level. In Albania, members of regional 
councils are delegated by local councils in proportion to the population, and include 
all mayors (Constitution, art. 108–110). In Romania, Law No. 151/1998 on 
Regional Development established regional development councils; presently, there 
are eight development regions. The councils comprise of four representatives for each 
judete, including representatives for each category of municipality. Representatives 
are appointed for four years. However, the regional development council is not a 
local authority; it is supported by the regional development agency. 
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As regards the executive, legislation is more diverse. In Albania, Bulgaria, Moldova, 
Romania, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Serbia and Montenegro and 
the Republika Srpska, mayors are elected directly. In the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (according to the federal law on local government), Kosovo and Croatia, 
mayors are elected by councils. At the meso level, the president of the judete in Romania, 
the president of the district in Moldova and the governor of the county (župan) in 
Croatia are elected by the council. The mayor (or the president) is assisted by a board 
or deputies, elected by the council or appointed by the mayor (the president).
Regarding electoral turnout, rates in the SPCs resemble European averages, 
according a recent survey commissioned by the CDLR on strengthening of parti-
cipation at local level.6 In a survey of 25 countries, including Bulgaria, Moldova 
and Romania, 13 countries reported electoral turnout of between 40 and 59.99 per 
cent during the last three elections. Bulgaria, Moldova and Romania all fall into 
the brackets; this is also the case for Albania. Nevertheless, there is no reason to be 
satisﬁed with such a rate. Improving transparency and the quality of decision-making 
would contribute to restoring conﬁdence and increasing turnout.
The situation of elected local government oﬃcials is still a concern in a number of 
countries, and cases of forced dismissals of mayors remain. For example, on 23 March 
2004, the Assembly of Gagaouzia dismissed the mayor of Comrat. The Supreme Court 
of Gagaouzia rejected the claim to allow the law of the Republic of Moldova to pre-
vail, conﬁrming the dismissal on the grounds that the mayor was an oﬃcial.7 In short, 
this case points to the need to distinguish clearly between the situation of a public 
servant and the situation of an elected oﬃcial holding a political mandate. The situa-
tions of both require the protection of the law, but in diﬀerent ways, as each serves a 
particular purpose: the former, the neutrality and the professionalism of the public 
service; the latter, the representative quality of the elected oﬃcial holding a political 
mandate.
Democratic legitimacy, however, is not the only issue to consider. Governability 
of the local government unit is also important. It would be a major problem if, due 
to separate elections, a directly elected leader lacked a stable majority in the council—
even more so if the council had its own chairman as a political leader. Much depends 
on the degree of fragmentation of political forces; the electoral system may aggravate 
the situation. 
6 CDLR, Committee of Experts on Democratic Participation at Local and Regional Level, 
Experiences of member states with policies for the strengthening of participation at local level, 
Council of Europe, LR-DP (2004) 13 rev., 10 September 2004.
7 V. Popa and V. Furdui, General report on the situation of local autonomy in the Republic of 
Moldova, Conseil de l’Europe, Institute for Development and Social Initiatives “Viitorul”, 
Chisinau, June 2004, p.7.
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Citizen Participation
Much has been done regarding legislation to favour the direct participation of citizens 
in decision-making. In all countries of the region, legislation provides for local refe-
rendums and initiatives; diﬀerences relate to the possible subjects of such procedures, 
the conditions of initiative, and the conditions of validity. However, referenda are 
only consultative in Moldova; in Kosovo, they are currently restricted under the 
international administration. 
Although information on practice is lacking, thus making it diﬃcult to assess 
the impact of the above-mentioned legislation, the direct participation of citizens 
is rather common practice inherited from the former Yugoslavia. In “the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, for instance, the population was consulted on 
amalgamating municipalities; in Serbia, municipalities intended to raise the self-
imposed contribution. Examples in Western Europe show that the development of 
such procedures changes the practice of representative bodies, since citizens may 
challenge their decisions. Negative side-eﬀects might include making the promotion 
of change more diﬃcult, or facilitating emotional mobilisation on an ethnic basis. 
Nevertheless, and insofar as the main concern is to increase the legitimacy of institu-
tions, procedures of direct democracy may help to oﬀset low turnout at local elections.
Institutions of community self-government within municipalities (sub-municipal 
units) are typical for several countries of the region—namely, directly elected 
settlement mayors in Bulgaria, and elected community councils in Serbia. In Bulgaria, 
a new law of 2003 on the territorial administrative division lowered the threshold for 
a settlement to elect its mayor from 500 to 250 inhabitants; as a result, the number 
of such mayors increased to 2,896. In Serbia, the mesna zajednica, which is a local 
community council upon which some administrative tasks may be delegated, must 
not be confused with urban districts, or inner municipality local self-governments. 
These institutions facilitate proximity with citizens, oﬀer them a collective represen-
tation with regard to the municipality and guarantee the sustainability of wider 
municipalities. In Kosovo, it has been proposed to restore them as an alternative to 
splitting up municipalities. It has also been suggested to introduce a territorial element 
in elections to the municipal assembly, in order to create a linkage between councillors 
and the areas of the territory they represent.8
Other forms of citizen participation or protection may be provided by the legis-
lation of a particular country. Furthermore, according to the survey on strengthening 
of participation at local level, 21 out of the 26 countries reviewed have a general 
8 Working group on local government, Framework for the reform of local self-government in 
Kosovo, July 2004.
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policy framework for promoting citizen participation locally. Bulgaria and Romania 
have such a framework; Moldova does not.
However, much has still to be done to enliven democracy at the local level. 
In April 2004, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of 
Europe took stock of local democracy in South-Eastern Europe,9 listing the main 
obstacles to the development of citizen participation as: 
(i) the lack of transparency and accountability, local government often following 
the low standards of the central government, the lack of legislation on free 
access to oﬃcial documents (with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania), the 
lack of regulations on the publication of basic documents, such as budgetary 
documents; 
(ii) the low level of citizen participation in decision-making, with particular 
concern for members of national minorities and displaced persons, the need for 
reconciliation processes to overcome inter-community tensions; and
(iii) the passivity of NGOs with respect to public administrations, and the (low) level 
of media contributions to supporting democratic processes.
Neutrality of the Public Service
Neutrality of the public service is essential for guaranteeing equal treatment to all 
citizens, and for avoiding political bias in decisions. Merit-based recruitment therefore 
must be guaranteed by law. An emphasis on merit contributes to the attractiveness 
of the local public service and to improving recruitment. However, not all countries 
have yet adopted legal provisions for establishing such guarantees. 
Among the SPCs, only Albania, Bulgaria and Romania have a public service 
law that can be applied to applicants for, or the personnel of, local government 
administrations regarding competitive examinations for recruitment. The implemen-
tation of examination procedures still must be reviewed. For the remaining SCPs, 
it is urgent to establish an adequate legal framework that would hold local public 
servants to high standards in performing their tasks, and thus inspire the trust of 
citizens.
In countries with a deconcentrated state administration, public service rules 
must be developed and upheld. The heads of relevant agencies should be senior 
9 Stefan Soﬁanski, Les enjeux de la démocratie locale en Europe du Sud-Est, Congress of Local and 
Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, Chamber of Local Authorities, CG(11)7 Part II, 
11th Plenary session, 28 April 2004.
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civil servants—not politicians—insofar as they have real powers, and not only a 
representative role. Current reforms in Romania to professionalise the prefects are a 
step in this direction.
The Impact on Local Democracy of Distrust 
among Communities 
Distrust between communities negatively impacts the functioning of local institutions 
and public administration as a whole.
Distrust has provoked the fracturing of municipalities along ethnic lines, 
resulting in inchoate entities and border changes. This has happened along the Inter-
Entity Border Line in the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, between municipalities 
in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in “the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia”. Issues of interethnic discord have also hampered decentralisation in 
Kosovo; in “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, they present obstacles to 
new territorial reforms, which are considered necessary for better management. In 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Republika Srpska, the predominant 
rationale of institutional arrangements has been to decentralise powers to the smallest, 
ethnically homogeneous constituency.
As stated in the report on local and regional democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
presented in 2000 to the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council 
of Europe, “it is unacceptable that new municipalities should be founded on ethnic 
grounds”.10
The Constitutional Court of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued an 
important sentence of 1 July 2000, delineating between ethnic collective rights and 
segregation in a multiethnic state. 
In a number of cases, particularly in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the ethnic dimension hampers local government management. Not only must 
personnel be ethnically balanced, but also deputies of the head of the municipality 
are, in fact, equal partners with him or her as representatives of particular groups. 
Ethnic bargaining also aﬀects the budget. In some municipalities, three budgets exist: 
the oﬃcial budget and two informally agreed upon by the dominant ethnic groups. 
The signiﬁcant inﬂuence of ethnic political parties extends from the institutions over 
social and economic matters. Other countries are not immune to such bias. 
10 Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, Report by Claude Haegi 
and Gianfranco Martini, CG/CP(6)29 rev., p.15.
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CONCLUSIONS 
Several conclusions and recommendations can be drawn from this review, on the 
basis of the general principles and values expressed in the conventions of the Council 
of Europe, and in particular from the European Charter of Local Self-Government.
General
• Local self-government must be considered as part of the whole government 
system; it is necessary for better government, more democracy, greater 
accountability and more responsiveness in managing public aﬀairs. Central 
government should consider decentralisation as an option in diﬀerent public 
policies. The distribution of responsibilities and powers among government 
levels has to be adequate to functional needs, as the purpose of government is 
to serve civil society and citizens. These functional needs may diﬀer, not only 
from country to country, but also within a country and from region to region, 
according to public policies and time periods. Doing this, the government must 
pay close attention to the constitutional framework, to historical legacies and to 
existing communities.
• In the central government, an authority should be dedicated speciﬁcally to 
supporting the implementation of local self-government and its consideration 
by sectoral departments. Local government representatives have to be involved 
in the determination and the implementation of this policy, through their 
associations.
Territorial Reform at the Local Level
• With reference to the European average, no country suﬀers from excessive 
municipal fragmentation. Nevertheless, territorial reform may be justiﬁed for 
reasons other than the average size of existing municipalities. General reorgani-
sation, however, brings about administrative costs and political tensions. There-
fore, such reforms must be particularly well founded and well prepared, to justify 
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their undertaking by the central government. In particular, amalgamation has to 
be based on common perspectives.
• If a territorial reform is justiﬁed, merging or splitting municipalities should not 
be the only (sole) remedies to respond to functional diﬃculties or democratic 
demands. Territorial reorganisation through the merging of municipalities may 
be limited to local situations in which an excessive fragmentation results in the 
lack of ﬁnancial and human resources. It can also be pursued step by step on 
the basis of local considerations. Co-operation between municipalities could 
be a response to functional needs through the delegation of competences to 
the inter-municipal level (by law or/and inter-municipal agreement); smaller 
communities could remain while supported by the people. Conversely, inner-
municipal decentralisation, with elected organs and responsibilities delegated 
upon them, could respond to the democratic demands of the population, while 
keeping the functional advantage of larger municipalities. 
• More generally, there is too little inter-municipal co-operation; this detracts 
from ﬁnding solutions to key development issues. Municipalities should be 
encouraged to cooperate by adequate legislative and ﬁnancial provisions. This 
also would help to bring communities closer to each other.
The Regional Level
• The creation of a regional level of government is diﬃcult. It depends on the size 
and complexity of the country. Regional government should be functional. 
• Deconcentrated state government administration/agencies and local self-govern-
ment need to be able to work together in a way that protects the integrity of 
the state, while recognising the rights of local authorities. Regional levels of 
government may not be viable in smaller countries.
• The establishment (or reinforcement) of local self-government at the regional 
level should seek to enable the further decentralisation of tasks that are in excess 
of municipal capacities. It should be aimed at improving services to citizens.
• Regional self-government must be clearly related to territory and to policy areas 
where eﬃcient and eﬀective co-operation between municipalities might be 
diﬃcult to achieve. Regional functions should not encroach upon municipal 
responsibilities; on the contrary, they can be useful in supporting municipalities, 
particularly where they are specialised (e.g. land use planning, public transport, 
healthcare, training and culture). 
•
•
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• Where regional autonomy appears unavoidable due to recent events, it should 
be balanced by a functional approach aimed at improving services to citizens in 
a way that goes beyond the inward-looking representations of communities.
Cross-border Co-operation
• Cross-border co-operation is part of the European dimension of local self-
government; it is also an opportunity to restore links and trust among communities 
by the realisation of mutually beneﬁcial projects. 
• Cross-border co-operation among local self-governments (municipalities, regions 
or others) must be supported by governments, as well as by the EU. 
• All countries should ratify the Madrid Convention on transfrontier co-operation 
between territorial communities or authorities.
• International agreements between the countries of the region should promote 
and facilitate cross-border co-operation.
Distribution of Responsibilities and Powers
• Decentralisation must be seen in the context of a distribution of responsibilities 
and powers among diﬀerent government levels. Tasks should be based on an 
adequate level of resources and clear responsibilities. 
• Much remains be to be done to establish a sound distribution of responsibilities 
and to assign the necessary resources to local government. This goes beyond 
legitimate diﬀerences in approach. Practice falls short of the European standard: 
the European Charter (article 3) refers to “… a substantial part of public 
aﬀairs…”. There are inconsistencies between “delegated responsibilities” and 
“own responsibilities”. The latter needs to be more clearly established. There is 
no real “own responsibility” where there is no suﬃcient discretion for local policy 
choices. 
• The general competence of local authorities to rule local aﬀairs, other than 
responsibilities assigned by the law, should be clearly recognised in legislation.
• There are discrepancies between local government legislation and sectoral 
legislation, reﬂecting a reluctance to decentralise powers and thus impeding local 
authorities in the exercise of their responsibilities.
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Financial Decentralisation
• Despite progress made in several countries, ﬁnancial decentralisation is limited. 
Local authorities have little inﬂuence over current revenues. They should be 
granted more tax power within the framework set by law.
• Suﬃcient discretion in expenditure should be secured.
• Municipal property must be recognised and guaranteed where it is not. Properties 
related to local government functions should be transferred into municipal 
ownership. 
Ethnic Division
• Local government is well situated to build trust and overcome ethnic conﬂict. 
This applies in particular to larger multiethnic municipalities.
• Ethnic divisions can negatively impact local government and the management 
of local aﬀairs. Some municipalities are split along ethnic lines, hampering 
eﬀective administration and the sustainability of the municipality. The design 
of municipalities must avoid consolidating ethnic divisions, and promote the 
equal treatment of citizens. Speciﬁc decision-making and control procedures can 
secure the rights of minority members, as long as it is necessary.
Citizen Participation
• Citizen rights are individual and equal, and do not depend on membership to 
any community.
• There is legislation in all countries establishing democratic institutions and 
mechanisms for citizen participation (e.g. local referenda). However, this 
legislation should be supplemented by eﬀective measures to reinforce transparency 
in decision-making, free access to oﬃcial information, and accountability of 
councillors and public oﬃcials. NGOs and the media must play a more important 
role for these purposes. 
• Care should be taken to ensure that democratic legitimacy is not pursued at the 
cost of governability, especially where the fragmentation of political forces and 
the use of particular electoral systems make a stable majority in a local authority 
diﬃcult to achieve. 
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• Low electoral turnout may be oﬀset by more direct democracy. Democracy may 
be served by the use of directly elected settlement mayors or local community 
councils. These institutions facilitate close contact with citizens, improve 
representation, and support the sustainability of the municipality.
Local Public Service
• A neutral local public service requires merit-based recruitment guaranteed by 
law. Merit-based recruitment can make a local public service career attractive 
and improve recruitment. It will also increase trust between local government 
and citizens. More needs to be done in order to develop the necessary legal 
provisions.
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APPENDIX
Country profiles
Although every care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of the information 
contained in these appendices, the Council of Europe accepts no responsibility 
for factual errors or omissions.
ALBANIA
General Context and Constitutional Framework
According to the Constitution of November 1998, Albania is a “unitary and in-
divisible state” (art. 1) in which local government is based on the “principle of 
decentralisation” and exercised according to the “principle of local autonomy” 
(art. 13). The coexistence of Albanians with national minorities is integral to the 
basis of the state, which has the duty to protect all inhabitants (art. 3). Members of 
national minorities have the right to express and preserve their culture; in particular, 
they have the right to be taught in their mother tongue (art. 20). Greek-speaking 
representatives may hold the majority of seats in some communes. Albania signed 
the European Charter of Local Self-Government in May 1998. Reforms are rooted 
in three pieces of legislation (31 July 2000): the new local government act; the act 
on the special organisation of Tirana; and the act on the territorial division of the 
territory.
Part 6 of the Constitution is devoted to local government. Units of local govern-
ment are municipalities or communes and regions (qarqe); others may be created 
by law. Communes and municipalities are the basic units of local government; 
they perform all self-government duties, except those devolved by law upon other 
local government units. Self-government is exercised in the local government units 
by representative organs and by referenda. Whereas representative organs and the 
mayors are directly elected in communes and municipalities for three years, members 
of regional councils are delegated by local councils, in proportion to their population, 
and include all mayors of the region (art. 108–110). 
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Organs of local government may refer to the Constitutional Court on competence 
conﬂicts between central and local government, and to assess the compatibility with 
the constitution of normative acts of central or local organs (art. 131 and 133).
Furthermore, the government appoints a prefect in each region (art. 114). He/
she supervises the legality of regulations and decisions adopted by local government 
units, and must co-ordinate local oﬃces of central government ministries (Law No. 
8927 of 25 July 2002). Regional branches of the State Supreme Audit Institution 
(SSAI) are subordinated to the prefect. 
Territorial Organisation, Local Institutions 
and Responsibilities
Albania is divided into 12 regions (corresponding to the 12 prefectures) and 373 
basic units of local government, among which there are 65 municipalities and 309 
communes, plus Tirana. 
Communes are de facto federations of villages, although villages are by law 
subdivisions of communes. Municipalities are local government units of urban areas; 
they are subdivided into sections (lagje), and may also include villages. Only villages 
elect their own representatives; in so-called sections, there is a public oﬃcer appointed 
by the mayor. As a whole, there are more than 3,000 settlements. The population of 
Tirana has grown rapidly in recent years, from 350,000 inhabitants in 1992 to over 
600,000 at present. Tirana is divided into 11 boroughs, each with an elected council 
and mayor. The capital city has no special responsibility in law, but the law on Tirana 
provides for the distribution of functions between the city and the boroughs.
Regions are the “units in which regional policies are constructed and imple-
mented”, and “harmonised with the state policy” (Constitution, art. 110). 
The law distinguishes among own functions (art. 10), joint functions (art. 11) 
and delegated functions (art. 12), and deﬁnes and lists areas for each category. 
Some new own functions were previously performed by the district (water supply, 
local roads), or as agency functions for central government (cemeteries and burial 
services, nurseries and shelters); others are completely new (local economic develop-
ment programmes, public markets and commercial networks, supporting small 
businesses). Urban planning, land management and housing are also own functions.
Joint functions are shared with central government, which must secure suﬃcient 
material and ﬁnancial support when communes and municipalities are required to 
perform the said functions or to achieve the standard set by the central government. 
Social care, public order and environmental protection are listed as joint functions; 
others may be added by law. 
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For delegated functions, all costs have to be borne by central government. 
Educational facilities below the university level and primary healthcare are qualiﬁed 
as delegated functions. 
Several local governments may join together for one or several functions, 
including the creation of a new corporate body funded by the parties (art. 14). 
Own functions of regions are: (i) “the construction and implementation of 
regional policies and their harmonisation with state policies at the level of the 
region”; (ii) “every other function given by the law”; and (iii) functions delegated by 
constituent local governments or by central government. 
Local Finance
Since the Local Government Act of 31 July 2000 (art. 19), municipal budgets include 
all incomes and all expenses, together with loan payments. As a result, the budget 
practice surrendered the distinction between the so-called “conditional budget” 
and “independent budget”. The former was delegated by central government, as 
an aggregate of expenditures included in the budgets of the various ministries. The 
law retains the distinction between conditional and unconditional transfers. Among 
conditional grants, so-called “pass-through” transfers are as high as half the total local 
government revenues. These transfers are for the payment of wages in pre-university 
education and primary health sectors, and for the payment of social beneﬁts to 
poor households. However, for national accounts, they are ascribed to the respective 
ministry budgets. This means that the payment of these wages by local governments 
is a pure agency function.
Nevertheless, the scope of local government discretion in ﬁnancial matters has 
increased signiﬁcantly during the last few years, especially after the Local Government 
Act of 2000 and the ﬁnancial package laws of 2002. Major changes include:
• the introduction of an unconditional transfer in 2001, which has increased every 
year by substituting former conditional transfers, and has been based on an 
distribution formula since 2002. This has had an equalisation impact since the 
local tax reform implemented in 2003; 
• earmarked grants are maintained for capital expenditures, but still raise trans-
parency and equity problems; and
• according to three laws of 12 December 2002, full authority of local governments 
turned into local taxes (as of 2003) for fees, rate setting authority of local govern-
ments (within ±30 per cent of an indicative tax rate) for the property tax on 
buildings, the agriculture and land tax, and the local small business tax. The full 
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revenues of other taxes are allocated to local governments with spending discretion 
(simpliﬁed proﬁt tax, vehicle registration tax, immovable property transfer tax).
The following table summarises the present situation of local ﬁnance in Albania 
(in millions of leks).
2000 2001 2002 2003
Total local expenditures (TLE) 32,846 38,177 40,724 46,654
Total local expenditures ( per cent GDP) 6.19 6.25 6.01 6.24
Total local government current revenues without 
conditional pass-through transfers and earmarked grants
10,199 12,289 15,834 19,425
Conditional pass-through transfers ( per cent TLE) 59.6 61.0 56.1 49.7
Earmarked grants ( per cent TLE) 31.1 11.8 7.6 9.6
General purpose grant ( per centTLE) 0.0 18.0 25.7 17.0
Own taxes (rates set by LG) ( per cent TLE) 2.5 3.2 3.0 12.2
Shared taxes ( per cent TLE) 0.1 0.1 0.1 5.6
User charges and fees ( per centTLE) 2.7 3.1 3.9 2.6
Other revenues ( per cent TLE) 4.0 2.8 3.6 3.3
Source: Based on data provided by A. Hoxha (with J.H. Pigey), Fiscal decentralisation in SEE countries. 
Case of Albania, Stability Pact Conference, September 2004.
The transfer of properties to local government is based on two laws of 2001. 
According to these laws, immovable properties serving for the execution of own 
local responsibilities will be transferred in full ownership to the respective local 
governments. Those related to delegated tasks will be used by the respective local 
governments without charge, while remaining in state ownership. However, the 
initial inventory, which is necessary to carry out the transfers, is far from complete. 
In 2002, city halls were transferred, and from 2003, properties related to local 
government own functions began being registered, thus permitting their transfer.
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
General Context and Constitutional Framework
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a case of ethnic decentralisation in a state, which 
was organised as result of a peace settlement. This settlement has been imposed and 
guaranteed by the international community. 
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The International Guaranty
BiH consists of two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) 
and Republika Srpska (RS), which are separated by the Inter-Entity Boundary Line 
(IEBL). The Constitution of BiH and the IEBL are parts of the Dayton Agreement 
of 14 December 1995. The High Representative monitors the implementation of the 
peace settlement, in line with UN Security Council resolutions; since March 2002, 
he/she is appointed by the Council of the European Union. 
The Constitution of BiH
The Constitution of BiH establishes only central institutions with very limited compe-
tences. However, it also establishes a Constitutional Court (art. VI), with three judges 
appointed by the President of the European Court of Human Rights. All government 
functions and powers not expressly assigned to the institutions of BiH are those of 
the Entities. The Constitution allows for the transfer of further responsibilities to 
BiH, but only subject to agreement of the Entities (art. III). Remarkably, BiH has no 
defence capabilities; only the Entities have the responsibility to organise the defence 
of their territory and maintain their own armies (Constitution of the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, art. III.1; Constitution of Republika Srpska: art. 68, 1°, 2° 
and 3°, art. 104–107).
As a result, most domestic matters are within the competences of the Entities, subject 
to the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution of BiH. These include the right for 
refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes of origin, and to have their 
properties restored to them or to be compensated for the loss thereof, in accordance 
with Annex 7. There is no reference to the internal organisation of either Entity.
State Structure in the Entities
The territorial organisation of each Entity is regulated by its own Constitution.
The Constitution of Republika Srpska presents the Republic as a unitary state 
(art. 2), vested with all state functions and powers apart from those explicitly 
transferred to BiH by the Constitution of BiH (art. 3). Local self-government is 
one of the basic principles of the constitutional arrangements (art. 5). The National 
Assembly must determine the territorial organisation of the Republic, and adopt 
development and urban plans (art. 70). There is only one level of self-government: 
the municipality. However, the law may entrust local government tasks to a city, 
uniting several municipalities (art. 102).
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The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Constitution of 1994), on the 
contrary, consists of federal units or “cantons” (art. I.2), which are supposed to result 
from the exercise of their sovereign rights by the “constituent peoples” of BiH in 
the territories of the Federation (Preamble). There are 10 cantons, each with its own 
Constitution, and with legislative and taxing powers.
Again, the Constitution divides responsibilities between the Federation and 
the cantons (chapter III), leaving most responsibilities to cantons. The exclusive 
competence of the Federation is very limited—namely, defence and energy policy, 
and also planning, reconstruction and land use at the federal level (art. III.1). Some 
matters are a common responsibility—in particular, health, social welfare policy and 
the use of natural resources (III.2). There is no clear regulation about relationships 
between republican and cantonal laws. Each canton is responsible for those functions 
not granted to the Federation, such as those pertaining to police forces, education, 
culture, housing, zoning, radio and television, the implementation of welfare policy 
and the provision of welfare services (III.4). Judges are also appointed by the president 
of each canton (art. V.11). In fact, most capacities and responsibilities seem to be in 
cantons’ hands. 
A canton may confer its responsibilities to a municipality or city in its territory. 
In particular, it may delegate functions concerning education, culture, tourism, local 
business, charitable activities, and radio and television. It is “obliged to do so if 
the majority of the population in the municipality or city is other than that of the 
Canton as a whole” (art. V.2). 
The Ethnic Issue
In the RS, as in the FBiH, the only rationale behind current institutional arrangements 
and the division of responsibilities is to secure ethnically homogeneous government 
units. There is a tendency to decentralise to the smallest ethnically homogeneous 
constituency, a demonstration ad absurdum of subsidiarity. 
The Constitutional Court of BiH issued a sentence (1 July 2000, “constituent 
peoples’ decision”) that declares that only BiH is a sovereign state. This sentence 
delimits between ethnic collective rights and segregation in a multiethnic state; at the 
same time, it serves to consolidate the ethnicisation of institutions. 
The sentence led to an agreement under the auspices of the High Representative for 
its implementation (27 March 2002). The agreement secures an equal representation 
of ethnic groups for safeguarding their respective “vital interests” in the legislature, 
in parliamentary procedure, and in the distribution of key political functions. Equal 
representation is also required among public authorities, including courts, in the 
FBiH and Republika Srpska (IV). 
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Territorial Organisation and the 
Distribution of Responsibilities
Territorial Structure and Institutions of Local Self-government
The Inter-Entity Boundary Line, which, after some adjustment, follows the cease-
ﬁre lines, raises rather diﬃcult issues of government. Numerous municipalities of 
RS are isolated from their government (in Banja Luka), and areas are divided by 
the IEBL into isolated municipalities. Distrust now prevents them from seeking co-
operation.
As of 1999, BiH had 3.8 million inhabitants, compared to 4.5 before the onset 
of conﬂict. Of these, 60 per cent lived in the FBiH, and 40 per cent in RS; nearby 
3 million people were forced to leave their homes during the war. According to 
estimates, 21 per cent of the population in the FBiH and 31 per cent in RS are 
displaced persons. 
There are at present 80 municipalities in the 10 cantons of the FBiH, and 63 
municipalities in RS, with no middle tier; the idea to create six or eight regions has 
been abandoned. The Brcko District (44,500 inhabitants) is now an autonomous 
local government unit of BiH, instead of a municipality. 
The delimitation of cantons displays striking disparities: from 41,000 inhabitants 
in Bosnia-Podrinje to 609,000 in Tuzla. Four cantons have less than 100,000 
inhabitants; others have more than 200,000. 
As regards municipalities, the legacy of rather larger municipalities (characteristic 
of the former Yugoslavia) remains, with the exception of the division of settlements 
by war.
In both Entities, cities are local government units formed by two or more 
municipalities that are territorially and economically linked (Constitution of the 
FBiH, art. VI.A; Local Government Law of Republika Srpska, art. 3). There are two 
cities in the FBiH: Mostar (104,000 inhabitants) and Sarajevo (270,000 inhabitants 
with 4 very autonomous municipalities), and one city in RS: Banja Luka, the capital 
city (208,000 inhabitants). The city level is rather weak, and dependent on transfers 
from constituent municipalities.
In RS, there is a new law on local self-management as of 1999 (Oﬃcial Gazette, 
Law No. 35/99, as modiﬁed 20 and 51/01). Citizens directly elect their municipal 
assembly and the municipality head for a four-year mandate. The head of the 
municipality may be removed by the assembly or by referendum, with 20 per cent voter 
support. Partly resuming the Yugoslav tradition, the law provides for the creation of 
local communities with their own elected assembly by the statute of the municipality, 
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and for local referendums, including the building of facilities and their ﬁnancing (art. 
77 and 78). Supervising the activity of municipal bodies, the government may refer 
illegal acts to the Constitutional Court of the RS, or take over a function in the case 
of default of the competent municipal authority. In case of violation of rights and 
liberties, the National Assembly may dissolve a municipal assembly. However, there 
is no speciﬁc court procedure to challenge such government decisions. In practice, 
municipalities are in daily contact with the relevant ministries. 
In the FBiH, there are provisions on municipalities in canton constitutions. 
A rather short federal law was passed in 1995, as a framework for canton legislations. 
A new local government law is being prepared, with more detailed provisions. Between 
1995 and 2000, all cantons passed their own local self-government legislation; there 
is much variation in the distribution of functions and of resources, and even more 
variation in practices. Generalising is thus extremely diﬃcult. However, on the basis 
of the present federal law, mayors are not elected directly, but by the municipal 
assembly. In practice, the canton government is in daily contact with municipalities; 
by contrast, the Federation has little contact with municipalities, and the Ministry of 
Justice is speciﬁcally responsible for local government. 
From 2000, the organisation of elections passed to national and local authorities. 
The general elections of 2002 were organised and run by BiH authorities; the muni-
cipal elections of October 2004 were to be totally organised and funded by BiH. 
The ethnic dimension impacts local government management signiﬁcantly. Since 
the staﬀ must be ethnically balanced, deputies of the head of the municipality are, 
in fact, equal partners with him or her as representatives of particular groups. Ethnic 
bargaining also aﬀects the budget. In some municipalities, three budgets exist: the 
oﬃcial budget, and two informally agreed upon by the dominant ethnic groups. The 
inﬂuence of ethnicity will likely increase in RS in the near future.
The Distribution of Responsibilities
Although the situation is rather confused in legal terms, because of discrepancies 
among cantonal laws in the FBiH and due to unclear legal provisions, the distri-
bution of expenditure (2000) shows that the level of cantons and RS are most 
important. In the consolidated budget of BiH, central government counts for 
only 1.3 per cent of the total expenditure. Such a weak central government has no 
equivalent in the world. Thus, the FBiH represents 71.0 per cent, RS 27.3 per cent 
and Brcko 0.4 per cent. 
If we consider the distribution of expenditure among government levels in both 
Entities, it appears that municipalities show a rather low level of expenditure.
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Government levels Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina 
(in %)
Republika Srpska 
(in %)
Entity level 25.2 60.4
Cantons 34.2 —
Municipalities 7.9 8.0
Public funds 
(pensions, health insurance, unemployment insurance)
32.6 31.6
TOTAL 100 100
Source: World Bank, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Creating an Eﬃcient Decentralized Fiscal System”, 
June 2003.
A major diﬀerence between the FBiH and RS is that in the latter, the Entity has 
a comprehensive competence for education, health and social protection, whereas 
these matters (including higher education) are assigned to cantons in the FBiH. 
In both Entities, municipalities are only in charge of assigned responsibilities; 
there is no general competence of local self-government for local aﬀairs. In general 
terms, responsibilities of municipalities can be summarized as follows: child care, 
primary and secondary school buildings, employment agencies, social care, culture, 
sports (“local needs of citizens”); housing and urban planning; municipal utilities 
(sanitation, sewage treatment, water supply), usually performed by own enterprises; 
public order; tourism; and the management of municipal properties. 
Most institutions with substantial personnel expenses are ﬁnanced and run by 
the canton, or central government in RS. A common diﬃculty with public utilities 
is recovering charges; this results in an invisible debt.
Existing laws do not determine clearly the responsibilities of cities with respect 
to constituent municipalities. It is up to the statute of the city, adopted by the city 
assembly, to divide tasks. In reality, decisions, as well as revenues, of city authorities 
are very much dependent on the constituent municipalities.
There are important regional disparities between cantons and municipalities in 
both Entities, especially regarding key functions like education, social assistance and 
housing.
Local Finance
Typical for BiH is that the State only has the power to legislate on custom duties, 
whereas all other tax powers rest with the Entities. Customs revenues are assigned 
•
•
•
 
 
 
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
d
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
i
c
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
l
o
c
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
 
l
e
v
e
l
62 • • •
also to the Entities. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska 
maintain two distinct tax and ﬁnance systems. 
Both Entities contribute to ﬁnancing the state: two-thirds from the FBiH; and 
one-third from RS. In both Entities, lower government levels have very limited 
taxing powers.
In the FBiH, cantons legislate on a few own and municipal taxes (property 
tax, property transfer tax, some fees), and on tax sharing with their respective 
municipalities. However, cantons have no control over rates and bases of the most 
important taxes (sales tax, personal income taxes, proﬁt tax), which are subject to 
federal legislation. 
In the FBiH, tax sharing between cantons and municipalities is based on: 
(average sharing rates in parentheses, canton/municipalities): payroll tax (place of 
work, 80/20); citizen income tax (place of residence, 20/80); sales tax (on turnover, 
70-80/30-20); property tax (20/80); property transfer tax (20/80); and road tax 
(motor vehicles; 55/45). Cantons have the power to regulate the two property taxes 
and, in part, the citizen income tax.
In RS, tax sharing between the Republic and municipalities is based on (sharing 
rates in parentheses, Republic/municipalities): payroll tax (74/26); citizen income tax 
(74/26); sales tax (74/26); property tax (0/100); and property transfer tax (0/100). 
The yield of property taxes is low in both Entities, as there is no regular assessment 
of property values, and there is a low level of enforcement.
Additionally, there are several local taxes over which local authorities wield some 
discretionary powers, representing in average 10 per cent of municipal revenues. 
Local non-tax revenues may be signiﬁcant in urban areas (rents, concession fees, 
ﬁnes, charges and registration fees on vehicles). In general, these revenue sources are 
regulated by the cantons or by the Republic; municipalities also have some powers 
on their level. Part of the revenue is assigned to cities.
As a whole, tax shares represent 82.9 per cent of municipal revenues in the FBiH, 
and 80.9 per cent in RS. The main source of revenues is the personal income tax in 
municipalities of the FBiH (43.2 per cent) and the sales tax in municipalities of RS 
(55.5 per cent).
There are large horizontal ﬁscal disparities between municipalities in both 
Entities. By contrast, there is no stable system of transfers either in the FBiH or in 
RS. Sharing rates have been subject to discretionary variations. 
There is an agreement between policy makers and the international community 
to introduce VAT in BiH in 2006. At that time, the sales tax will be suppressed. 
Since it is not possible to maintain a tax derivation system for local budgets with 
the VAT, the ﬁnance system of Entities, cantons and municipalities will have to be 
reconsidered.
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BULGARIA
General Context and Constitutional Framework
According to the Constitution of 1991, Bulgaria is a unitary state of local self-
government; however, autonomous territories are ruled out (art. 2). Self-government 
rights are guaranteed by the Constitution. Municipal councils may refer to the 
Constitutional Court (art. 150.1).
All citizens are entitled to study their mother tongue if it is not Bulgarian, and to 
develop their own culture (art. 36 and 54).
The territory is divided into municipalities (obshtina) and regions (oblast) (art. 
135.1). However, only municipalities are self-governments, as the basic territorial 
administrative unit (art. 136.1); the region is only a central government constituency 
(art. 142), but the regional administration is a legal person.
Territorial Organisation and Local Institutions 
Bulgaria has a relatively small number of large municipalities, comprising of one or 
usually several settlements. There are 264 municipalities, with an average of 30,000 
inhabitants. The basic legislation is the Law on Local Self-Government and on Local 
Administration of 17 September 1991, as revised in 1995 and modiﬁed several times 
subsequently. Council and mayors are directly elected.
Municipalities are divided into administrative units with their own elected organs, 
ensuring inner municipal decentralisation. Three larger cities are divided into urban 
districts (Soﬁa, Plovdiv, Varna). Settlements with more than 250 inhabitants (as a result 
of a law of 2003) elect their own mayor (in total 2,896). Voter turnout is highest for 
the election of settlement mayors. A new law on local elections (2003) is aimed at 
facilitating participation among young people and those having diﬃculties moving.
The territory is additionally divided into 28 regions (on average, with 285,000 
inhabitants). Regional administrations are charged with the regional development 
policy and the local implementation of the state policy. These administrations 
are headed by a governor, appointed by the government, who is at the level of an 
undersecretary of state. As such, he/she is invited to the Council of Ministers. The 
governor must co-ordinate all state ﬁeld services in the region.
A law of 1999 on regional development has established a development council in 
each region, to assist the governor as an advisory body. Members are mayors and one 
representative of each municipal council; the governor has the chair.
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The Distribution of Responsibilities
Most services to the population are provided by municipalities either as own 
responsibilities or as delegated responsibilities ﬁnanced by the state. The distinction 
is not always clear, but it has been a leading principle of the local ﬁnance reform since 
2001. Delegated functions are funded from the local share of the personal income 
tax, an equalisation state grant as a revenue supplement with respect to expenditure 
needs where income tax revenues are too low, and targeted grants for delegated 
functions. Local tasks are funded from own revenues and an equalisation grant.
During the last few years, the state has taken over several tasks, which have exceeded 
the scope of municipal responsibility. These include social care, healthcare and teachers’ 
salaries, now funded from the central budget. Conversely, the state budget decreased its 
participation in housing and municipal services. As a result, the share of local budgets 
in the GDP dropped from 8.1 per cent in 2000 to 6.5 per cent in 2003; their share in 
the consolidated public expenditure decreased from 19.2 to 16.8 per cent.
Municipalities carry out the following tasks: civil register; local public order; pre-
school, elementary and secondary education, part of vocational education; sport and 
leisure, primary healthcare and local hospitals; social welfare and the management 
of most social institutions; local cultural institutions; water supply, sewerage, waste 
disposal; local roads; heating; subsidies to local public transport and local public 
enterprises; town planning; social housing; oversight of retail trade; and delivering 
some licenses.
State administrations and subordinated bodies or enterprises at the regional level 
perform the following functions: security and ﬁre protection; road security; higher 
education and part of vocational education; regional and specialised hospitals; some 
social institutions; job insurance; national heritage; state enterprises for water supply 
and sewerage, electricity and gas supply; airports.
Local Finance
Municipal budgets have become less dependent on resources assigned by the state—
namely, tax shares and state grants. State transfers dropped from 75.3 per cent of the 
total municipal revenues in 2000 to 58.4 per cent in 2004 (forecast), mainly because 
of the suppression of some tax transfers. Conversely, the share of own resources 
has increased, but along with a diminishing trend in municipal expenditure. Own 
resources are expected to reach 39.4 per cent in 2004 (17.5 per cent in 2000).
Primary local taxes are the property tax, inheritance duties and property transfer 
taxes (10.1 per cent in 2004). Charges and fees are expected to yield 14.8 per cent, 
and others (such as property revenues), 14.5 per cent.
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CROATIA
General Context and Constitutional Framework
According to its Constitution, Croatia “is a unitary and indivisible democratic and 
social state” (art. 1). The right of citizens to local self-government was recognised 
(art. 128). With its revision in 1997, the Constitution provided for two levels of 
self-government: (1) municipalities (općine) and districts or cities (gradovi); and (2) 
counties (županije). With the revision of 2000, the new article entitles citizens to 
“local and regional (područnoj) self-government”. Laws on local government have to 
be voted by the majority of members of Parliament (art. 82). 
Self-government rights are guaranteed by the right of any local authority to 
challenge any government or legislative act violating self-government rights established 
by the Constitution (art. 128). According to the constitutional revision of 2000, 
counties are deﬁned as “units of regional self-government”; the state administration 
must be organised by law on the basis of the new article 116 of the Constitution. 
Regional self-government refers only to functional requirements: the management of 
aﬀairs of regional signiﬁcance, taking in account eﬃciency and economy (art. 134). 
Additionally, the Constitution provides for a special status for the capital city, Zagreb 
(art. 133).
Article 15 of the Constitution guarantees minorities equal rights, including the 
right to express their nationality, to use their language and script, to express cultural 
autonomy, and to a distinct representation in Parliament and in local assemblies.
The legislative bases of local self-government were established by several laws of 
29 December 1992. Amendments in 1996 to a law on the elections of local councils 
provide for proportional representation of ethnic or national minority groups in the 
council, when group constituents surpass 8 per cent of local voters or, in accordance 
with the local statute, when they represent more than 8 per cent of the population 
at the national level. The ﬁrst election of representatives of minority groups to local 
councils took place on 18 May 2003. 
Although the European Charter of Local Self-Government was ratiﬁed in 
1997, decentralisation remained rather formal during Tudjman’s rule. Following 
parliamentary elections of January 2000, the government has undertaken local 
government reforms, and several pieces of legislation were adopted in 2001. The 
government programme of 2000–2004 provides for extensive decentralisation 
among its strategic priorities; it is planned to be carried out before the next local 
elections in May 2005.
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Territorial Organisation and Local Institutions
Croatia is divided into 20 counties plus Zagreb (which has the rank of a county) 
and, at the lower level, 123 cities and 427 municipalities. Additionally, a prefect 
is appointed by the central government in each county; he/she is in charge of 
supervising local government acts. The average population of a county is 240,000 
inhabitants; for a city, 20,353; and for a municipality, 3,627. Zagreb has about 
900,000 inhabitants. Self-government is organised on the basis of the same model 
at the ﬁrst and second levels. The council or assembly (skupština) is directly elected 
by the citizens for a four-year term, according to the proportional representation 
ballot system. The council elects a mayor (a governor, župan) and, according to the 
number of inhabitants, deputy mayors (deputy governor) and members of a board 
(poglavartsvo), vested with executive functions. The executive may be recalled by the 
council. A direct election is now contemplated. As in other countries of the former 
Yugoslavia, transition gave rise to dividing the large socialist municipalities, thereby 
multiplying the number of municipalities ﬁvefold (101 municipalities with uniform 
status in Croatia in 1989). 
A reform introduced by the Local Government Act of 1999 has been to separate the 
prefect, as a state representative appointed by central government, and the governor, 
as an executive of the county, for the purpose of regional self-government. 
The review of individual administrative acts is subject to the law on general admin-
istrative procedure, and administrative courts may review second instance decisions. 
Zagreb, the capital city, is subject to a special law provided by the Constitution. 
Since the law of 1999, the mayor of Zagreb is exclusively elected by the city council, 
and city oﬃces are accountable to the mayor. Furthermore, the new Act on the City 
of Zagreb of 11 August 2001 provides that the structure of city oﬃces is decided by 
the municipal assembly. The heads of these oﬃces are appointed by the executive 
board of the city when they are in charge of self-government matters, but with the 
agreement of the competent minister when they are in charge of state delegated 
matters (art. 13 and 14). The law on Zagreb provides for city districts as a form 
of local self-government, but these are not self-government units, and the city 
management remains centralised.
The new article 134 of the Constitution oﬀers an open deﬁnition of the res-
ponsibilities of local and regional self-governments based on the principle of sub-
sidiarity. However, there is no general competence of self-governments within their 
jurisdictions. The performance of delegated state duties by local or regional self-
governments is possible on the basis of article 116 of the Constitution. 
These provisions are the basis for the devolution of new responsibilities in the 
competence of local and regional self-governments laid down by the Local Govern-
p
r
o
c
e
e
d
i
n
g
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
o
u
t
h
-
e
a
s
t
e
r
n
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
r
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
 
m
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
i
a
l
 
c
o
n
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
 
 
 
•
•
•
67• • •
ment Act of 33/2001. Self-government responsibilities at the municipal level are 
those which respond directly to citizens’ needs: civil registry; area and urban planning; 
municipal activities (infrastructures provided to the population by the municipality, 
such as public lighting, water supply, sewerage, street maintenance); child care; 
primary healthcare; pre-school and primary education; cultural and sporting activi-
ties; consumer protection; environment protection; ﬁre protection; and civil defence. 
Self-government responsibilities of counties are: education; health service; area and 
urban planning; economic development; traﬃc and traﬃc infrastructure and the 
development of networks of educational, health, social and cultural institutions (not 
transferred). In both cases, the sector legislation sets out the tasks to be carried out 
by municipalities and cities, and by counties. Cities over 30,000 inhabitants are 
allowed to take over the responsibilities of counties, with the exception of the 
development of the network of educational, health, social and cultural institutions 
(art. 21). Additionally, municipalities (cities) and counties may perform state tasks 
delegated by central government, only with state budget funding (art. 23). 
Cities, municipalities and counties are free to co-operate with local and regional 
self-governments of other countries within the ﬁeld of their competence and under 
usual supervision. Local government units may establish common organs or services 
to perform jointly some self-government tasks on their territories (Local Government 
Act of 1999, art. 54); their co-operation and the delegation of certain tasks may also 
be contractual (art. 67). The implementation of the reform started on 1 July 2001, 
with cities having the ﬁscal capacity necessary to support the new tasks. Transfers 
cover: elementary and secondary education; social care centres and homes; and 
hospital investment maintenance. To 32 city budgets, these transfers cover elementary 
education. 
Local Finance
Article 137 of the Constitution lays down the basis of the ﬁnancial autonomy of 
local and regional self-governments and of an equalisation between them. Units of 
local and regional self-government have the right to their own revenues, which they 
can dispose of freely in their jurisdiction. Revenues must be proportional to their 
responsibilities provided by the Constitution and by law. The state should assist 
ﬁnancially weaker units of local and regional self-government in conformity with 
law. Before the 2001 reform, local government expenditure was about six per cent 
of GDP and 10.4 per cent of the general consolidated government budget; it should 
reach 7.5 per cent of GDP after the reform. Local ﬁnance is regulated by Act on 
Financing Local Government of 117/1993, several times amended, and lastly by Act 
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59/2001 to adjust local ﬁnance to the transfer of new responsibilities on counties and 
cities. A new budget act, passed in 2003, introduced public expenditure planning 
programmes.
Local ﬁnance is based mainly on tax sharing and various non-tax revenues; the 
share of grants is relatively low. Pursuant to the provision from that law, a unit of 
local self-government collects revenues from: own revenue sources (revenue from 
its own assets, county and municipal taxes, ﬁnes, charges and fees), shared taxes 
(income tax, proﬁt tax, tax on real-estate transactions, gambling tax) and grants. 
Unfortunately, recent disaggregated data are not available. 
Own tax revenues are negligible. As an exception, bigger cities have the possibility 
to levy a surtax on the personal income tax (rate: from 10 per cent in municipalities 
up to 18 per cent in Zagreb). However, only 12 cities have used this option. It is 
contemplated to introduce a property tax as an own municipal revenue source.
The equalisation grant has been replaced by targeted grants from an equalisation 
fund, supporting the transfer of new responsibilities, and by special support to 
backward areas. To ﬁnance transfers resulting from the Local Government Act of 
2001, legislation provides for additional shares from the personal income tax yield. 
Additionally, equalisation grants have been allocated to counties and cities that could 
not cover additional expenses with the additional personal income tax share. In 
total, the expenditure increase of circa 1,500 million kunas has been covered by 693 
million kunas from additional personal income tax shares, and 819 million kunas 
from equalisation grants. Furthermore, in special state care areas, municipalities 
receive up to 90 per cent of the local personal tax yield (and even 100 per cent in 
islands), and up to 90 per cent of the local proﬁt tax yield. 
 
MOLDOVA
General Context and Constitutional Framework
A former republic of the USSR, Moldova became an independent state on 27 August 
1991. 
According to the Constitution of 29 July 1994, Moldova is a “unitary and in-
divisible state” (art. 1), and its territory is “inalienable” (art. 3). The Republic is the 
commonwealth of all citizens, but the state recognises and guarantees the citizens’ 
right to express and develop their ethnic, cultural or religious originality (samobytnost’ ) 
as well as their own language (art. 10). Article 13 distinguishes among the state 
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language (Moldovan), Russian and other languages used on the territory of the 
Republic, which are recognised and protected by the state. 
The Constitution recognises two autonomies: Gagaouzia, and parts of the east 
bank of the Dniestr. Although the regional autonomy of Gagaouzia had already been 
recognised by the Constitution, revisions of 25 July 2003 gave a clear base for both. 
Both have diﬀerent characters. Gagaouzia is a distinct region where the population, 
speaking a Turkish dialect, has been claiming autonomy from the time of Moldovan 
independence. The east bank of the Dniestr is predominately Russian, industrialised 
and home to several military units. There has been de facto autonomy (and de facto 
government) for many years on the east bank of the Dniestr.
Article 111 is devoted to the “autonomous territorial formation” Gagaouzia, 
with own status established by an organic law. This is qualiﬁed as a form of self-
determination of the Gagaouzes, and at the same time “an inalienable component” of 
the Republic. Through its representative organs, it rules all political, economical and 
cultural matters within the limits of its competences. It possesses its own budget, but 
it is not vested with legislative power. However, Gagaouzia is entitled to legislative 
initiative (art. 73). Natural resources comprise the basis of the development of the 
territory, although they remain under the Republic’s ownership. The organic law11 
on the special status of Gagaouzia was adopted on 23 December 1994, and the basic 
law of Gagaouzia was adopted by its parliament in 1998.
Meanwhile, the situation of the east bank of the Dniestr still requires clariﬁcation. 
According to article 110.2 of the Constitution, “special forms and conditions of 
autonomy may be granted to settlements (naselenyj punkt) of the left bank of the 
Dniestr, though a particular status established by organic law”. It may be inferred 
from the reference to an organic law that the type of autonomy would be similar to 
that of Gagaouzia, but its geographical extent is unclear. The terminology does not 
refer to speciﬁc administrative units, and the formulation does not imply that the 
totality of the territory of the left bank would be concerned. This formulation has 
been taken over from the local government law of 1998. The organic law has not 
been adopted yet.
Lastly, the Constitution determines the basic principles of local self-government: 
local autonomy; decentralisation of public services; election of local government 
organs; and participation of citizens in the management of local public aﬀairs. 
Autonomy is referred to as the organisation and activity of local government organs 
and to the settlement of the community’s aﬀairs; it may not damage the unitary 
character of the state (art. 109).
11 Must be adopted by the majority of the elected members of the parliament, after two readings at 
least (Constitution, art. 74).
•
•
•
 
 
 
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
d
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
i
c
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
l
o
c
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
 
l
e
v
e
l
70 • • •
Territorial Organisation, Local Institutions 
and Responsibilities 
Moldova has a two level local self-government system: the municipal level and the 
district (raion) level. Gagaouzia is divided into municipalities only, and is at the 
same level as a district from a territorial viewpoint. The capital city, Chisinau, is 
subject to an organic law, and is vested with district rights. Another city, Balti, is also 
assimilated to a district. A new law on local government has recently been adopted 
(Law No.123-XV of 18 March 2003).
Moldova has 443 municipalities. Legislation distinguishes between towns and 
villages, but this distinction has no legal consequence for the institutions, the respons-
ibilities or the budget. They all form the ﬁrst level of territorial-administrative units.
The second level of territorial administrative units are the 32 districts (without 
Chisinau and Balti). The present administrative division of the country is determined 
by a law on the administrative territorial structure (Law No. 764-XV of 27 December 
2001). This law revoked the territorial reform of 12 November 1998, which had 
divided the country into 10 counties (judete), according to the Romanian model. 
A draft law on the capital city has been prepared; it should divide the capital city 
into smaller municipalities, and curtail the powers of the mayor.
Councils at both levels are directly elected; mayors are also directly elected, 
whereas district presidents are elected by district councils. 
Deconcentrated ﬁeld services of the ministries are established at the district level, 
or for several districts. There are eight chancellery oﬃces for the supervision of local 
government acts (art. 70).
The local government law of 18 March 2003 sets out lists of responsibilities 
for both levels, distinguishing own and delegated competences. Own competences 
are subject only to legality oversight; delegated competences are subject also to 
supervision on the merits of decisions (art. 69). Legality oversight is obligatory 
only on local government acts within the ﬁeld of delegated competences and for 
a limited list of local government acts in the ﬁeld of own competences (art. 71-
72). Within the framework of the legality oversight, if the local authority does not 
comply with representations made by the chancellery oﬃce, the latter must refer to 
the administrative court (art. 75).
Own competences of municipalities include (art. 10): local economic develop-
ment and town planning; local roads; and municipal services including local public 
transport, social assistance, social housing, schools, cultural institutions, libraries, 
markets and fairs, sport, green areas, environment protection and estate allotments.
Delegated competences include (art. 12): social protection, public hygiene and 
public order.
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For districts, own competences include (art. 11): local economic development 
and regional planning; regional roads; building of health and school premises of 
district importance; upper secondary schools; social welfare; maintenance of social 
and health institutions; public transport at district level; municipal services at district 
level; and cultural and sport institutions at district level.
Delegated competences of districts include (art. 13): social protection; healthcare; 
public order; vocational education; and specialised education.
Competences can be modiﬁed only by law (art. 14).
Local Finance
Local ﬁnance is governed by Law No. 397-XV of 16 October 2003.
Financial decentralisation is based on the district level. Municipal budgets 
depend to a large extent on the district budget, which decides on their participation 
in the share of general state revenues allocated to the district, and on their share 
in the property tax. Districts also decide upon own additional budgetary transfers 
to municipal budgets (art. 4). In Moldova, ﬁnancial decentralisation seems to be 
limited at the district level. 
Municipal budgets are further ﬁnanced by some local taxes, fees and revenues from 
municipal properties, duties for delivering certain licenses or patents for enterprises. 
In addition, they receive a share of the income tax revenue from households and legal 
persons.
Despite Law No. 523/1999 on public property, the inventory of goods belonging 
to the state must be completed in order to make possible property transfers from the 
state to districts and municipalities. 
ROMANIA
Constitutional Framework and Territorial Structure
The Constitution of 8 December 1991 was revised by the Constitutional Law of 19 
October 2003, approved by referendum. This revision provides for the accession to 
the European Union (new art. 148) and to the North-Atlantic Treaty (new art. 149).
In particular, the revision strengthened the formulation of democratic principles 
in several new provisions. Romania is a unitary state (art. 1), but the “Romanian” 
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character of the state has been replaced by the “unity of the Romanian people” and 
the solidarity of their citizens (art. 4.1).
However, the evolution of Romanian legislation has increasingly emphasised 
ethnic links, partly to comply with international expectations to guarantee national 
minority rights. While the Romanian language is the oﬃcial language (art. 13), 
national minority rights are recognised (art. 6). In territorial-administrative 
units where at least 20 per cent of the inhabitants belong to a national minority, 
these groups are entitled to use their mother tongue in their relations with local 
government administration (Law No. 215/2001 on Local Government, art. 17). 
Recent constitutional revisions refer to the “signiﬁcant weight” of citizens belonging 
to a national minority (new article 119.2). Furthermore, the electoral law of 68/1992 
guarantees a seat in the National Assembly and in the Senate for any representative 
organisation (or groups of organisations), which has obtained ﬁve per cent of ballots. 
As a result, organisations claiming minority rights are multiplying: of 18 registered 
organisations in 2000, 15 were represented in Parliament. Magyar-speaking people 
are the most signiﬁcant (7.1 per cent of the population), followed by the “Roms” 
with two per cent, and all others with less than one per cent.
The Constitution recognises the principle of local self-government. According 
to article 119.1, as revised in 2003: “public administration is based in territorial 
administrative units on the principles of decentralisation, of local self-government 
and of deconcentration of public services”. 
The territory is divided into municipalities (comune) or towns (oras), some of 
which may be declared cities (municipe) (art. 3.3); the latter may be subdivided into 
urban districts (art. 120.3, and Law No. 215/2001, art. 18). At a higher level, the 
territory is also divided into 41 counties (judete) outside of Bucharest, as stipulated 
in Law No. 2/1968. The judet is both a local self-government unit and a constituency 
of the state administration.
Bucharest is subject to special provisions of Law No. 215/2001; it is a municipe 
divided into six sectors. It is also vested with the rights and the responsibilities of a 
judet.
The notion of region has appeared recently in relation with the regional 
development policy and the support received from the EU. According to Law No. 
151/1998, eight regions have been delimited by a series of agreements between 
county councils. They are neither new territorial administrative units nor legal 
persons. They correspond to the level NUTS II for the EU. Regions are linked to a 
regional development agency for programme implementation.
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Institutions and Distribution of Responsibilities
Institutions
Regarding institutions, three levels must be distinguished: the municipal level, the 
judete and the regions.
At the municipal level, councils and mayors are directly elected. County councils 
are also directly elected, but council presidents and his/her deputies are elected by 
the council. Councils are elected by proportional representation. Local elections are 
regulated by the new Law No. 67/2004. 
Local co-operation is provided by Law No. 215/2001, but collaboration is rare. 
Local councils may decide to co-operate or join with other legal persons in Romania 
or abroad to perform services or carry out common projects, or with other local 
government units to promote common interests. County councils can also co-operate 
with municipal councils. This includes cross-border co-operation and participation 
in international associations.
In each judete, the government appoints a prefect, who represents the government, 
has authority upon deconcentrated ﬁeld services of central government and carries 
out the supervision of local governments. A prefect may refer an act to the court, 
if he/she thinks it is unlawful; this claim suspends the act’s execution. After three 
annulling judgments within six months, the prefect may propose to the government 
to dissolve the council. The constitutional revision of 2003 established article 
122: to assert the authority of the prefects over deconcentrated ﬁeld services; to 
refer the powers of the prefect to an organic law; and to emphasise that there is no 
subordination between the prefect on the one hand, and the municipal and county 
councils, mayors and county council presidents on the other. A new law on prefects 
is being prepared with the purpose to strengthen the professionalisation of prefects 
as civil servants. This aim is also increase their capacity to lead deconcentrated state 
services and to co-operate with local self-governments.
In each county, there is an advisory commission chaired by the prefect, a president 
of the county council, mayors and heads of deconcentrated services. The commission 
is consulted on the yearly economic development programme.
A new framework law on decentralisation is also being prepared.
At the regional level, there is a regional development council with four repre-
sentatives for each judet: the president of the county council, and one representative 
for each category of municipality. The chairman and his/her deputies are elected for 
one year; they cannot represent the same county.
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Distribution of Responsibilities
According to the Constitution, local councils are vested with a general competence 
to rule local aﬀairs (art. 121.1). Furthermore, county councils must coordinate 
municipal councils, insofar as some municipal services are also of interest to the 
whole county.
Municipalities are in charge of: gas and water supply; sewerage; heating; public 
transport; local roads; housing; waste disposal; green areas; education (including 
teachers); primary healthcare; town planning and building permits; various licenses; 
and civil register (Law No. 215/2001, art. 38).
Counties maintain: water supply; sewerage; public transport; county roads; child 
care; regional development and planning; services and enterprises at county level; 
and support to municipalities (Law No. 215/2001, art. 104).
Since the Law on Regional Development of 1998, responsibilities regarding 
regional development are to be exercised within newly created regions, especially as 
regards investments and infrastructures.
Furthermore, Law No. 270/2003 on hospitals and Law No. 99/2004 on public 
medical units of local and county interest have increased the competence of local 
government in these ﬁelds.
The development programme of each county is submitted to the advisory com-
mission by the prefect.
As it appears, the delimitation of responsibilities by government level and by self-
government tasks and state functions is not quite clear. 
Local Finance
The level of municipal expenditure has increased signiﬁcantly in the last few years 
(about four per cent GDP in 2000; 8.5 per cent in 2003); half is carried out by 
towns. Most budget-funded tasks are covered directly by the state budget, but most 
local revenues of local budgets are under state control. 
It is reported that following recent reforms, the degree of ﬁnancial autonomy of local 
authorities increased from 20 per cent to 50 per cent. Indeed, a major reform was the 
introduction of a general personal income tax in 2000, 63 per cent of which (and recently 
the totality) was assigned to municipal and judete budgets. Tax collection was transferred 
to local authorities as well, thus increasing the tax collection rate. However, this is only 
a temporary gain; on the whole, there is no local tax power on the personal income tax. 
Real own revenues can be raised from numerous taxes (in ﬁrst place a property 
tax) and fees, but for a rather small part of the total revenue (15 per cent in 2000).
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Equalisation is based on the income tax revenue; 29 per cent of the personal 
income tax is assigned to the equalisation fund. 
Municipalities receive targeted grants for heating, and a number of subsidies for 
speciﬁc purposes. In particular, these speciﬁc purposes are: for investments partially 
funded through external loans; for child care and disabled persons; for general urban 
planning; for housing; for local roads; and for water supply.
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO
NB: No statement of this proﬁle can be interpreted as a position regarding the future 
of Kosovo.
General Context and Constitutional Framework
Constitutional Developments with Regard to Local Government 
and Territorial Organisation
The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, proclaimed on 4 February 2003, is a 
successor to the former truncate Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 1992. It is based 
on a Constitutional Charter, leaving nearly all domestic aﬀairs in the jurisdiction of 
member states (Serbia and Montenegro). Human and minority rights are guaranteed 
at the union level.
In Serbia, the Constitution of 1990 still prevails; a new Constitution is being 
elaborated. Serbia includes two autonomous provinces, which were recognised by 
the Federal Constitution of 1974 (art. 2): Kosovo and Vojvodina. In the federal 
organs of the former Yugoslavia, these provinces enjoyed practically the same rights 
as the member republics. This autonomy was removed in 1989. According to the 
Constitution of 1990, both autonomous provinces are “forms of territorial autonomy” 
included in the Republic of Serbia (art. 6). They no longer participate in decision-
making at the federal level (see art. 80 of the Federal Constitution of 1992). 
As a result of war, Kosovo (full name: Kosovo and Metohia) is under UN interim 
administration in application of Resolution 1244 of the Security Council of 10 June 
1999 (see below). 
War in Kosovo gave rise to claims for more autonomy in Vojvodina as well; these 
claims were reﬂected in a declaration of 29 January 1997. Parties and groups based 
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in Vojvodina (68 of 120 seats) later won the majority of seats in provincial elections. 
However, the population of the province is mainly Serbian (more than 1.3 million 
inhabitants of a total population of 2 million); there is also a signiﬁcant Magyar 
population (approximately 300,000).
Regarding local government, in the former Socialist Federative Republic of 
Yugoslavia, local government was based on very large municipalities vested with 
general competence. The dissolution of Yugoslavia resulted in strong centralisation 
in Serbia and Montenegro as in other newly independent republics, but by contrast, 
there was no proliferation of local government jurisdictions. Rather, the territorial 
pattern has remained unchanged. One aspect of this centralisation process has 
been the division of the entire territory of the Republic of Serbia into 29 districts 
by government decree in 1992, and the creation of a district state administration. 
This administration has taken over a number of tasks previously carried out by 
municipalities, and supervises municipalities. (See Law on the Territorial Division 
of Serbia, Oﬃcial Gazette of Serbia, No. 47/1991, with subsequent modiﬁcations; 
and Law on the State Administration, ibid. No. 20/1992, with subsequent modi-
ﬁcations.)
This centralisation process removed the republics from the socialist conception 
of self-government and brought local government closer to West European standards 
as laid down in the European Charter of Local Self-Government. A decentralisation 
reform has been undertaken recently both in Serbia and in Montenegro. 
The Republic of Serbia
In the Republican Constitution of 1990, chapter 6 deals with territorial organisation.
Autonomous provinces (autonomne pokrajne) are formed in accordance with 
particular national, cultural and other characteristics of their area, and their territory 
is determined by law. 
The Statute of Vojvodina, adopted in 1991, as the highest legal act of the province, 
determines the competences and the organs of the province; it is subject to approval 
by the National Assembly. The province possesses rule-making power to perform its 
responsibilities, but no legislative power in devolved matters (art. 109). A law on 
particular responsibilities of the autonomous province of Vojvodina (Oﬃcial Gazette, 
No. 6 of 7 February 2002) details and extends (as made possible by art. 109) the 
responsibilities of the province and its right to regulate them by ordinances in a series 
of matters. Several responsibilities shall be performed as delegated responsibilities. 
The province has no competence on the organisation of local government but the 
right to be consulted before any change in territorial organisation (law of 2002, art. 
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59). This territorial autonomy can be qualiﬁed as a form of regional decentralisation, 
which can be compared (from a legal view point) with Wales. 
However, a new statute, signiﬁcantly called a “basic law”, is being prepared by the 
provincial assembly. On 23 October 2003, the assembly decided to submit a draft 
to the public. This draft is indeed a claim for much larger autonomy: the provincial 
assembly should have legislative power (art. 3) and organise the judiciary (art. 119 sq); 
the competence of the province would include practically all domestic aﬀairs (art. 80 
sq), including the organisation of the social security (under republican law, however) 
and local government (art. 145 sq). Furthermore, the provincial assembly would in-
clude two houses. One house would be a council of communities, the members of 
which would be elected by respective ethnic communities (thus requiring citizens to 
be registered as members of ethnic communities); the other would be elected by all 
citizens. Only the latter would exercise legislative powers, but the government would 
be elected by a common session of both houses. 
Chapter 6 applied to Kosovo, which is at present under the authority of UNMIK.
According to article 7 of the Serbian Constitution, “the municipality is a territo-
rial unit in which local self-government is exercised”, and Belgrade is a separate 
territorial entity. Article 113 determines matters of municipal competence, and 
refers to the law and the statute of the municipality for other aﬀairs. It is unusual for 
a Constitution to determine the competence of local government, and even more 
to refer to the statute of the municipality. According to article 115, the statute may 
include “other questions of interest to the municipality”. The law may establish a 
municipality as a city when its territory includes several municipalities or towns (art. 
117). Article 118 provides for the status of the City of Belgrade, which includes city 
district municipalities, to which part of the responsibilities of the city are assigned 
by the city statute. 
Whereas local government laws of 1991 and 1999 aimed at centralisation, the 
new local government act of 14 February 2002 entails a new course, oriented towards 
decentralisation, and is generally in line with the European Charter of Local Self-
Government. Municipalities are governed by a municipal assembly, as the represen-
tative body, and a president, as the executive body. Both are directly elected for 
a four-year term. The assembly elects a municipal council, the function of which 
is to co-ordinate its activity with the president and to supervise the municipal 
administration; the president appoints a deputy (art. 30, 40, 43). The law resumes 
the institution of mesna zajednica from the former Yugoslavia, as the lowest level of 
local self-government (for a village, a city district or neighbourhood) (art. 73–76). 
The municipal assembly may delegate assets and functions to mesna zajednica, which 
may be the owner of assets funded by voluntary contributions of its inhabitants 
approved by a local referendum (art. 73). The law provides for the representation of 
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communities in ethnically mixed municipalities (art. 63), and organises the direct 
participation of citizens in decision-making (citizens’ initiative, referendum, meeting, 
art. 65–69). However, by a law of 1995, municipalities are deprived of properties; all 
properties were transferred to the Republic, except for the usus.
Lastly, the law provides for the oversight of municipalities (art. 105–112) and 
the guarantee of self-government rights (including with damages) by courts: the 
Constitutional Court or the Administrative Court, to be established in 2004. Until 
the latter is functioning, and depending on the case, the Supreme Court is consulted 
(art. 122–124). The new law is to be applied upon the next local elections (art. 130).
The Republic of Montenegro
The Republic of Montenegro adopted a new Constitution on 12 October 1992.
As in Serbia, municipalities are the sole level of self-government; government 
districts were not introduced in Montenegro. The territorial division of the Republic 
has remained unchanged since the law of 1990 on the division of the Republic into 
municipalities. 
Local government reforms have only recently been adopted: laws on Local 
Self-Government (Oﬃcial Gazette, Law No. 42/2003 and Law No. 28/2004), on 
Financing Local Self-Government (Law No. 42/2003), and on the Election of 
Mayors (Law No. 42/2003). A law on the territorial division of the Republic is still 
pending. The local government act closely resembles the Serbian law, but displays 
some noteworthy diﬀerences. It details the substance and the legal regime of diﬀerent 
types of municipal properties; there is no municipal council between the municipal 
assembly and the mayor; municipal institutions are based on the principle of a strict 
division of authorities between the assembly and the mayor (both directly elected); 
and the mayor may appoint deputy mayors with the approval of the assembly. A 
chief administrator is appointed as a professional by the mayor with the approval of 
the assembly. The Constitutional Court concentrates the judicial review of decisions 
or enactments violating self-government rights. The bill on territorial division is a 
step toward facilitating the division of existing municipalities.
Territorial Organisation and Local Government Tasks
 
Regarding territorial organisation, Serbia and Montenegro still have much in 
common. Therefore, it is convenient to present separately the territorial organisation 
and the tasks. 
p
r
o
c
e
e
d
i
n
g
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
o
u
t
h
-
e
a
s
t
e
r
n
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
r
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
 
m
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
i
a
l
 
c
o
n
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
 
 
 
•
•
•
79• • •
The Territorial Organisation
The following table summarises the territorial organisation for the whole of Serbia 
and Montenegro.
Republics and provinces
Population
(millions)
Size
(km²)
Number of 
districts
Number of 
municipalities
Serbia (2002)
 of which Vojvodina (2002)
7.8
2.0
88,361
21,506
30
7
190
45
Montenegro 0.65 13,812 — 21
With the creation of districts, regions (regioni) were suppressed. They were the 
constituency of co-operation between municipalities.
Generally, municipalities are rather large units: on average more than 50,000 
inhabitants in Serbia (but only 45,000 in Vojvodina), only 31,000 in Montenegro. 
By the late 1990s, there were 10 municipalities with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants 
in the entire Yugoslav Federation, four of which were in Montenegro. 
Belgrade also performs the functions of a district; the capital city has 1.6 million 
inhabitants, and is divided into 16 city municipalities. Each municipality possesses 
its own assembly, tasks and budget. Niš, Novi Sad, and Kragujevač are the largest 
urban areas; the ﬁrst two each comprise individual municipalities, and are cities 
according to the new local government act. Inner city municipalities must not be 
confused with mesna zajednica, which is a form of local self-government below the 
municipal level (for example, there are 66 in Kragujevač). 
In Montenegro, a law of 1993 transferred the capital to Cetinje, a small historical 
city of about 20,000 inhabitants; Podgorica, with more than 150,000 inhabitants 
(previously Titograd) is the only sizeable signiﬁcant urban area. By law, Podgorica is 
the main city (glavni grad), whereas Cetinje is the capital (prestonica); additionally, 
there are 19 municipalities. Local government law is generally applicable to the 
capital and to the main city; a new law is being discussed for the latter.
Local Government Tasks
According to the new local government act, the main responsibilities of municipalities 
(as own tasks) in Serbia are: housing (building and maintenance); local public utilities 
(heating, public transport, water supply, sewerage, waste collection and disposal, 
green areas, public lighting); town planning; pre-school education; local roads and 
streets; culture and sport infrastructure of local scope; primary healthcare subject to 
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further legislation; and building maintenance. Municipalities are also responsible for 
the costs of running primary and secondary schools, although salaries are paid by the 
state. The same sharing of responsibilities prevails for social care, but municipalities 
may add to the legal obligations at their own cost. Altogether, this should represent 
5.6 per cent of GDP. This appears to be a quite good level, considering that salaries 
for education and social care are paid by the state budget, and that primary healthcare 
has not actually been transferred. According to data for the ﬁrst semester 2003, the 
investment expenditure is slightly in excess of 24 per cent of the total expenditure of 
municipalities; 14 per cent is through subsidies to various organisations.
The implementation of the law of 2002 on particular competences of the 
autonomous province of Vojvodina resulted in the eﬀective transfer of a number 
of tasks from districts to the province, especially for education and healthcare, 
distinguishing between those devolved in the own competence of the province, 
and those only delegated by the Republic to the provincial authorities. In 2003, 
from a total expenditure of 14.1 billion dinars, more than 10 billion was devoted 
to all degrees of education, from primary education to university level, including 
personnel expenses. The second budget line is the development fund of the province, 
nearing 1.8 billion dinars. The province has no authority over municipalities. The 
application of the law of 2002 raises the question of the future of the districts in this 
province. 
Lastly, in Montenegro, the tasks of the municipality were regulated by the 
local government act of 1995 and the law of 1992 on the transfer of public service 
aﬀairs to municipalities. The latter delegated a number of tasks from the Republic 
to municipalities, on a per ministry basis, and provided for further transfers by 
subsequent laws. The new local government act of 2003 oﬀers a revised list of 
responsibilities. This makes it necessary to update numerous sectoral laws of the last 
few years, which are not always in accordance with the new scope of local government 
responsibility. A major novelty is the introduction in the law of the principle of the 
general clause. Otherwise, there is little diﬀerence between Serbia and Montenegro 
in the material competence of municipalities. 
Local Finance
As regards local ﬁnance, Serbia and Montenegro are not at the same stage. Serbia has 
a working system of local ﬁnance, although some elements must be improved; in 
Montenegro, local ﬁnance is waiting for a reform.
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The Republic of Serbia
Attention must ﬁrst be paid to the autonomous province of Vojvodina. According to 
the law of 2002 on particular competences of the autonomous province, the assets 
and personnel (taken from district oﬃces) necessary to the competences transferred 
or delegated to the province were transferred under the authority of the province 
from the end of 2002. There is still no regulation on revenues of the province. The 
budget is funded mainly by transfers from the Republic, based on the cost of the 
functions transferred. On total revenues of 14.1 billion dinars, more than 10.4 are 
from transfers from the Republic. The estimate of own revenues is less than 3.2 
billion dinars, which come mainly from a share of the income tax (2.6 billion dinars) 
and from a share of the property tax (0.5 billion dinars); they are not really own 
revenues.
Regarding municipal revenues (including municipalities of Vojvodina), a major 
reform has been introduced from 2002 by the new law on public revenues and 
expenditures (late 2001), the new local government act and the new law on budget 
(both of 26 February 2002). As a result, municipal revenues increased from 34.3 
billion dinars in 2000 to 63.1 in 2002 and 66.6 in 2003 (modiﬁed budget of the 
Republic in 2002: 217.7 billion dinars). 
Municipal ﬁnance will be heavily aﬀected by the tax reform introduced in 2004, 
the implementation of VAT and income tax reform. These will curtail the ﬁnancial 
autonomy of municipalities.
“Original” (own) revenues comprise about 41 per cent of the total revenues 
(without debt) in 2003. Original revenues consist of own taxes, including the power 
of the municipal assembly to vary rates. This level of ﬁnancial autonomy based on 
own tax revenues is an exception, and not only in transition countries. The most 
important change has been the local payroll tax paid by enterprises on their salary 
fund, at a maximum rate of 3.5 per cent. All municipalities immediately voted for 
the highest rate, and the yield was expected to provide 20 per cent of total revenues 
in 2003. The next largest own revenues in order of importance are: fees for the use of 
construction land; fees for the development of construction land; and incomes from 
the lease of property in the disposition of municipal governments (although the owner 
is the Republic). Self-imposed contributions (under two per cent of total revenues) 
are taxes that local governments can impose on their citizens through referendums 
for speciﬁc programmes and investments. These contributions are entirely free from 
national government limits and are widely used by Serbian local governments (71 
per cent of municipalities in 2002), almost every year.
Additionally municipalities receive a share of several taxes collected on their 
territory but controlled by the state, for an amount equal to 43 per cent of total 
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revenues (“unlimited shared taxes”). Municipalities receive eight per cent of the sales 
tax (cities receive eight per cent and Belgarde, 15 per cent) and, since 2002, 100 per 
cent of several taxes on income. Reforms have also increased the local government 
shares of a number of other taxes. Namely, the local government share of the property 
tax grew from 25 per cent to 100 per cent and the share of the tourist tax increased 
from 80 per cent to 100 per cent. As well, shares of the agricultural tax, the property 
transfer tax (with a higher tax rate, collected on the transfer of any valuable property, 
not only immovable) the gift and inheritance taxes, and the tax on income earned 
from the leasing of property all grew from 50 to100 per cent. 
Lastly, so-called “limited shared taxes” are tax shares determined yearly by a 
special law and allocated to municipalities on the basis of need. This has amounted 
to between 12 per cent and 18 per cent of total municipal revenues from 2000 to 
2003 (16 per cent). Resources are a share of the tax on wages, and an additional share 
of the sales tax.
With the introduction of VAT, the sales tax, which yielded about 30 per cent 
of municipal revenue though diﬀerent channels, disappeared on 1 January 2004. 
As VAT cannot be shared on the basis of the local yield, the revenue is replaced by 
state budgetary transfers. Then, the government abolished the payroll tax paid by 
enterprises (20 per cent of municipal revenues in 2003) and this revenue source was 
replaced by an increased share (30 per cent) in the newly reformed income tax. 
The property tax, although assigned to municipal budgets in full, is controlled by 
the Republic and is under-collected (only 40 per cent according to estimates). 
Equalisation has not worked well, due to the lack of clarity applying legal criteria 
in the distribution of limited shared taxes. The introduction of grants to compensate 
the loss of the sales tax and the increased share in the income tax should oﬀer 
opportunities to improve equalisation.
The Republic of Montenegro
The new law on ﬁnancing local self-government (Oﬃcial Gazette, Law No. 42/2003) 
provides an own tax basis to municipalities. 
From this year, basic competences of municipalities are funded through three 
main sources: own tax revenues, tax shares and an equalisation grant. Own tax 
revenues yield 15.9 million Euro from 24.6 million Euro (ﬁrst semester 2004), 
shared or ceded revenues yield 4.9 million Euro and the equalisation grant, 3.8 
million Euro.
Own taxes are: the surtax on the personal income tax (close to 29 per cent of own 
tax revenues, ﬁrst semester 2004); the real estate tax (close to 14 per cent); local taxes 
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(close to 13 per cent); various compensations related to land use, land development 
and road building (for a total of 29 per cent); and various small other taxes.
Shared and ceded tax incomes are primarily the share from the personal income 
tax: 78 per cent of these revenues, with 10 per cent of the total local yield of this 
tax for municipalities and the capital city, and 15 per cent for cultural and historical 
centres. Next are the tax on property transfers (20 per cent, 50 per cent of the yield) 
and some other small receipts.
The equalisation fund receives 10 per cent of the total yield of the personal 
income tax and provides grants divided into two parts. The ﬁrst (90 per cent) is 
allocated on the basis of equalisation criteria weighted by the law; the second is 
targeted at “stimulating” municipalities. A special committee (with ﬁve representatives 
of municipalities among seven members) is responsible for the allocation of grants 
from the equalisation fund.
Additionally, municipalities receive transfers from the budget of the Republic for 
tasks imposed upon municipalities.
KOSOVO
The Province of Kosovo under UN Interim Administration
On the basis of Resolution 1244, the Secretary General of the UN established an 
interim administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), headed by a standing representative 
(SRSG).
From 2000, UNMIK undertook to establish self-government institutions of 
the province. The main step was the promulgation of the “Constitutional Frame-
work for Provisional Self-Government” (UNMIK 2001/9 of 15 May 2001). This 
framework recognises collective rights of ethnic communities (chapter 4). It provides 
for a legislative assembly, a president and a government (Provisional Institutions 
of Self-Government, PISG). The assembly was elected at the end of 2001. 
A multiethnic government, headed by an Albanian leader and with Serbian 
members, was inaugurated on 12 June 2002. Subsequent general elections are to be 
held late in 2004.
Laws adopted by the assembly must be promulgated by the SRSG. The legislative 
procedure includes a conciliation procedure at the initiative of representatives 
considering whether a provision to be adopted would violate vital interests of their 
community (section 9.1.39). 
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According to the constitutional framework, municipalities are “basic units of local 
self-government” (art. 1.3). The ﬁrst local elections took place on 28 October 2000, 
with a turnout close to 80 per cent; Rugova’s party (DLK) won 21 municipalities of 
the 27 in which elections could be organised. The SRSG had promulgated a regulation 
on self-government in municipalities of Kosovo (UNMIK 2000/45 of 11 August 
2000). This legislation is still in force. It is based on former Yugoslav legislation, 
with some signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Municipalities are under the strict supervision of 
the SRSG (section 47), who has a representative in each municipality (section 48), 
with the municipal administrator appointed by him/her. Furthermore, municipal 
boundaries are a reserved competence of the SRSG. The ﬁrst local elections were held 
for a two-year mandate (UNMIK 2000/39); the second were held for a four-year 
mandate (UNMIK 2000/45 and 2002/11) on 28 October 2002, but the turnout 
was much lower (54 per cent). UNMIK has worked to overcome ethnic divisions 
in municipalities; it succeeded in November 2002 to restore a uniﬁed municipal 
administration in Mitrovica. 
Municipalities perform tasks set out by the UNMIK regulation. The central 
authority (e.g. the SRSG) may delegate other tasks and exercise supervision. He/she 
is also the appeal authority regarding claims against municipal decisions.
The municipal assembly is elected according to a proportional system. The 
assembly elects the president, as the executive authority, and his/her deputy from 
its members; communities who are not in the majority are entitled to another 
deputy. As in Serbia, the participation of lower local self-government entities of 
villages or city districts or neighbourhoods in the management of local government 
aﬀairs, including the delegation of tasks to them, is recognised. However, there is no 
referendum, and citizens’ initiatives can only be petitions to the municipal assembly. 
Alternatively, the regulation provides for the creation of a community committee 
and a mediation committee: the ﬁrst prevents discrimination; the second solves 
litigation disputes related to alleged discriminations. As well, a community oﬃce 
must be created in municipalities with a signiﬁcant minority. It is under debate 
whether to create municipal sections with own organs, budgets and councils for 
minority communities.
The next step is the transfer of responsibilities from the UNMIK to local 
authorities. For this purpose, a joint council of UNMIK and of the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government of the province was established in March 2003. The 
Presidential Statement of the Security Council of 30 April 2004 called for “more 
eﬀective local government through devolution of central non-reserved responsibilities 
to local authorities”. According to this orientation, a local government reform is being 
prepared by a Working Group on Local Government chaired jointly by UNMIK and 
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. According to the Framework for the 
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Reform of Local Self-Government in Kosovo published by this Working Group (July 
2004), “the local government reform process is based on a ﬁrm commitment by all 
parties to a multiethnic Kosovo”. The Framework states that municipalities are too 
large, and favours either smaller municipalities or the delegation of competences to 
sub-municipal units; it provides for a wide array of responsibilities to be transferred. 
As a ﬁrst step, it recommends to begin with “pilot projects”. The Framework also 
recommends amending the electoral system, in order to introduce a system of open 
lists, giving more inﬂuence to the inhabitants, and a territorial element to create a 
linkage between councillors and the areas that they represent.
However, ongoing violence still demonstrates the fragility of the recent 
institutional achievements. This “unilateral decentralisation” was also criticised in 
2003 by the Minister of Justice of the Serbian Government. 
Municipal Boundaries and Tasks
In Kosovo, municipal territories and boundaries are a reserved responsibility of 
the SRSG. Villages, settlements and urban quarters are recognised by section 5 of 
Regulation 2000/45; tasks and resources may be delegated to them by the municipality. 
They are equivalent to mesna zajednica in Serbia. The Framework for the Reform of 
Local Self-Government in Kosovo proposes to strengthen these sub-municipal units.
In Kosovo, municipalities have more tasks, but these tasks are conditioned by 
central regulation and funding, and subject to sharing the responsibility with the 
municipal administrator appointed by the SRSG. In principle, the subject matters of 
municipal competence are very similar to those of Serbian municipalities. However, 
the personnel of education and primary healthcare are managed by the municipal 
authority, and salaries are recorded in municipal budgets. The Framework for the 
Reform of Local Self-Government in Kosovo (July 2004) provides for the devolution of 
numerous matters upon municipalities.
Local Finance
Mainly budgetary transfers from the central authority ﬁnance municipal budgets. 
Nevertheless, some own resources do exist and UNMIK established the basis for a 
new local tax system. 
Municipalities receive ﬁnancial transfers based on objective criteria, including 
an assessment of ﬁnancial needs, of expected resources and of spending priorities 
established by the central authority. Part of these transfers may be designated for 
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speciﬁc activities, and part should be undesignated (UNMIK Regulation 2000/4, 
section 38).
According to the same regulation, own revenues are limited to licenses and fees, 
income from municipal assets and ﬁnes (section 39). However, a property tax has 
been introduced; municipal assemblies must to vote upon the rate (between 0.01 
and one per cent of the market value). The rate may vary according to the categories 
of property laid down by law (UNMIK 2003/29). The tariﬀs of local public utilities 
must be voted by the municipal assembly.
‘THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC 
OF MACEDONIA’
General Context and Constitutional Framework
The Constitution adopted in 1991 provides for the legal basis of local self-government. 
According to article 8 (par.1), local self-government is a citizen’s right. Local 
government units are municipalities (art. 114); Skopje, the capital city, is a separate 
unit of local government subject to a special law (art. 117). As well, neighbourhoods 
may be established by municipalities as a form of local self-government (art. 114). 
Municipalities are ﬁnanced from own sources determined by law and revenues 
transferred by central government; in practice, these eﬀectively do not exist. Local 
powers are subject to court revision, but local authorities are entitled to call for the 
Constitutional Court in order to protect their own rights. 
The Ohrid Agreement of 13 August 2001 secured the representation of ethnic 
minorities in the institutions of the Republic, and brought about a revision of the 
Constitution, adopted in November. These amendments made all citizens of the 
Republic subjects of the sovereignty, whatever their ethnic origin, introduced a 
double majority vote on key issues in Parliament in order to secure minority rights, 
and provided for further decentralisation with the devolution of a wide array of 
responsibilities to municipalities (amendment XVII).
The Constitution has two features regarding local government which are distinct 
from other countries. First, a basic law on local government is provided and must be 
passed with a two-thirds majority of deputies in the National Assembly, including 
the majority of those belonging to communities which are not of the majority 
(art. 114). Secondly, article 115 determines the areas in which citizens participate 
in decision-making on matters of local importance: it is quite unusual to set out 
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the responsibilities of local government in the Constitution of a unitary state. As 
a result, changes are quite diﬃcult to make due to the circumstances surrounding 
the adopting of the Constitution. Other responsibilities may be determined by 
law. The new Local Government Law of 2002 has extended the responsibilities 
of municipalities. According to the Constitution, municipalities perform their 
responsibilities independently, only subject to legality oversight. Central government 
tasks may be delegated, but in this case a law is not required.
According to data of 1997, Macedonians represented 66.4 per cent of the 
population and Albanians 23.1 per cent. Turks comprise fewer than four per cent, 
and other groups are even less numerous. New surveys will likely yield diﬀerent 
results. The Constitution tries to cope with this diversity. According to article 7, 
Macedonian, written in the Cyrillic alphabet, is the oﬃcial language. Minorities are 
entitled to use their language and alphabet for oﬃcial communication with local 
government units, in which minority members are a majority.
On the basis of constitutional provisions, an important legislation package was 
passed in 1995–1996: on Local Self-Government, on Territorial Division of the 
Republic of Macedonia and Determining of the Territory of the Municipalities, on 
the City of Skopje, on Local Elections (in 1996), and a Law on Regulating the 
Relations between the New Units of Local Self-Government and the Units of Local 
Self-Government from Which They Derive. No local ﬁnance law has been passed, 
but some provisions in the Law on Budgets of 1993 and the local government law 
have been partly implemented.
The local government reform started with the Strategy of Reform adopted by 
the government in November 1999. However, reforms actually began with the 
Ohrid Agreement of August 2001, including provisions on the development of local 
self-government. A new local government law was adopted on 24 January 2002; 
other pieces of legislation, in particular the local ﬁnance law and the new territorial 
division law, were passed during the summer of 2004. The last of these is particularly 
important, since the IMF stated in its report of May 2002 that a new territorial 
division was a prerequisite for the ﬁnalisation of the new Law on Local Government 
Finance; ﬁscal decentralisation will not be introduced before that. 
Territorial Organisation, Local Institutions 
and Responsibilities
“The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” is divided into 123 municipalities; 
Skopje is a special local government of seven municipalities. This is a one-tier system 
of local government. The Law on the Territorial Division of the Republic established 
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this territorial organisation from 1996. Previously, there existed only 34 large 
municipalities. These constituencies still exist as the seats of the territorial branches 
of various government administrations (state regional oﬃces). This territorial reform 
was thought to be necessary to establish self-governed municipalities.
The territorial pattern is characterised by the signiﬁcant size of Skopje (554,000 
inhabitants, or a quarter of the total population), the existence of mountainous areas 
and striking diﬀerences between municipalities. Municipality populations vary from 
500 to 120,000 inhabitants; 46 municipalities are under 5,000 inhabitants, and 
four are under 1,000 inhabitants. This territorial pattern has been heavily criticised, 
generally considered to be inadequate. A new law on territorial division, adopted 
on 12 August 2004, foresees that the number of municipalities will drop from 123 
to 80 and then to 76 by 2008. Local elections of November 2004 are planned to 
establish new municipalities. The purpose of the reform is indeed to give minority 
Albanians more power in certain areas, with probably 16 municipalities under the 
control of minority Albanians. This law is also facing strong opposition; referendums 
on amalgamations held in January and February 2004 revealed that, in a number of 
cases, opposition to larger municipalities arose for ethnic reasons. Later on, the new 
law on Skopje will have to be adopted.
According to article 14 of the local government law, municipalities may establish 
joint administrative authorities, agencies and other administrative bodies. In 
addition to administrative co-operation, municipalities may also join funds in order 
to accomplish common interests and perform common tasks that fall within the 
municipal responsibilities.
According to article 82 of the above-mentioned law, neighbourhoods are sub-
municipal self-governments established by the council. Certain tasks of direct interest 
to the local population may be delegated to neighbourhoods, with an elected decision-
making body (art. 84 and 86). Local oﬃces as a kind of one-stop information and 
delivery oﬃce can be established in neighbourhoods. 
Each municipality is managed by a council, elected by way of proportional 
representation; mayors are also directly elected. However, in Skopje, some councillors 
(14 among 39) are delegated by the seven municipalities (subject to revision on the 
basis of the new law on Skopje).
According to article 20 of the law, municipalities have a general competence in all 
local matters. They have the right to perform in their territory activities of local scope 
that are not excluded from their competence or do not fall under the competence of 
state authorities. In accordance with amendment XVII to the Constitution, resulting 
from the Ohrid Agreement, the enumerative, comprehensive and detailed list of 
municipal responsibilities (art. 22) includes: social welfare services; child protection; 
education; healthcare; urban and rural planning; communal activities (comprising e.g. 
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water supply, drainage, public hygiene, waste administration, public transportation, 
construction and maintenance of local roads); local economic development; and 
sport and recreation.
However, municipalities do not yet have these broad-ranging responsibilities; 
these must be devolved to them by speciﬁc laws. According to the Operational 
Programme of the Government, more than 50 laws require adoption, among which 
more than 40 concern the transfer of competences. Some have already been adopted, 
others are in the process.
Local Finance
As municipalities have no stable or proper ﬁnancial basis, local ﬁnance presents a 
signiﬁcant dilemma.
Municipalities receive taxes on property transfers, inheritance taxes, the property 
tax (real estate and immovable assets), and various other minor taxes, as well as fees. 
Although no precise detailed data is available, tax revenue is very weak. Furthermore, 
municipalities are entitled to a share of the VAT, a grant for delegated state tasks, 
subsidies for backward areas, investment subsidies. There is no equalisation scheme. 
Transfers are also very low. This results from fact that resources are allocated on the 
basis of expenditure estimates, and that expenditures are at a low level, since most 
responsibilities devolved to municipalities have not yet become a reality. 
This predicament is expected to change with the implementation of reforms. 
A new law on ﬁnancing municipalities is to be adopted in August 2004.
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I . INTRODUCTION
The Issues
Decentralisation to regional and local levels of self government can contribute sub-
stantially to both political and economic stability. Politically, it is a method of diluting 
the concentration of power, providing some autonomy for disaﬀected minorities and 
improving the accountability of local public services.
Though less often discussed, decentralisation can also promote economic stability. 
By severing regional and local budgets from that of the State it becomes possible to 
introduce a hard budget constraint and eﬀective ﬁnancial discipline at all levels. It 
can also improve the eﬃciency of public expenditure, simply because it substitutes 
the local accountability of representative bodies for the very weak accountability of 
deconcentrated state agencies. It also provides incentives for the eﬀective exploitation 
of local revenue sources, replacing the disincentives inherent in the former centralised 
and politically biased methods of local budget funding. 
These advantages can only be realised, however, if political and administrative 
decentralisation is placed within an eﬀective framework of ﬁscal decentralisation. How 
far this is the case in eight countries covered by the Stability Pact is the subject of this 
report, which summarises surveys of the individual states (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and “the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia”) commissioned by the Local Government and Public Service Reform 
Initiative of the Open Society Institute.
In particular the report covers the following aspects of ﬁscal decentralisation:
(1) the extent to which regional and local authorities are assigned responsibility for 
signiﬁcant proportions of public expenditure, and the adequacy of the resources 
allotted to them for this purpose
(2) the eﬀectiveness of the mechanisms for minimising the impacts of disparities 
between local resources upon the quality of local services
(3) the degree of discretion conferred on regional and local authorities to determine 
their spending priorities and levels of revenue.
The ﬁndings of the survey in respect of these three dimensions will be reviewed 
in turn. Speciﬁc details in respect of individual countries are given in the Country 
Proﬁles at Part V.
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Bosnia Herzogovina is omitted from this survey. It was not possible in the time 
available to secure suﬃcient information on its complex structure to include in 
this comparative framework, and legislation on a permanent framework of ﬁscal 
decentralisation is still under consideration.
General Reforms
A number of the Stability Pact members have recently initiated general reforms of 
their ﬁscal decentralisation systems which are at various stages of implementation. 
These are mentioned here by way of introduction:
• Albania: National Strategy for Decentralisation, 2000, implemented by the Local 
Government Law of 2000.
• Bulgaria: publication of the Fiscal Decentralisation Conception in 2002, imple-
mented through the 2002 Local Taxes and Charges Act and 2003 State Budget 
Law.
• Croatia: adoption of a ﬁscal decentralisation programme in 2001.
• Moldova: Law on Local Public Administration, 2003.
• Montenegro: Law on Financing Local Autonomy, 2003 (implemented in 2004).
• Romania: Law on Local Public Administration, 2001, and substantial amend-
ments to the Law on Local Public Finance in 2002. Law of 2004 approving 
Government Ordinance 45 of 2003 on local public ﬁnances. 2004 Framework 
Law on Decentralisation.
• Serbia: 2004 legislation replacing sales tax with VAT which will necessitate major 
changes in local government ﬁnance.
• “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”: the Law on Local Government, 2002 
and adoption in 2004 of new laws on Local Government Finance and Territorial 
Organisation. The latter two laws are due to come into force in 2005.
This survey is, therefore, looking at a rapidly changing scene. Most, though not 
all, the changes can be regarded as progressive, but few have reached maturity.
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II . EXPENDITURE AND REVENUE ASSIGNMENTS
Assignments
Local government systems (including county and municipal levels in Croatia, 
Moldova and Romania) are generally responsible for local physical infrastructure, 
commonly known as “communal services” and including street maintenance, clean-
ing and lighting, refuse collection, parks, public transport, cemeteries and sports 
facilities, together with local regulatory tasks such as urban planning and civil 
registration. They manage what remains of the public housing stock. With the 
exception of Albania, they also generally own the major utility services, water supply 
and sewerage, heating and energy supply. The eﬀect of the latter on local budgets 
is reduced by the fact that the utility services are largely funded by user charges or 
subsidised by social security beneﬁts. In South Eastern Europe these competences are 
normally described as “own” or “autonomous” functions.
The biggest diﬀerences between local government systems, both worldwide and 
in the Stability Pact countries in particular, lie in their degree of responsibility for the 
personal social services: education, healthcare, and social security and welfare. The 
divisions of responsibility between state budgets, local budgets and insurance funds 
for teachers salaries, medical care and social beneﬁts basically determine diﬀerences 
in the size of local budgets.
In South Eastern Europe these personal service competences are normally 
described as “delegated”, although some elements such as pre-school education and 
welfare services (as opposed to ﬁnancial payments) may be classiﬁed as autonomous 
functions. Local governments in Bulgaria, Croatia, Moldova and Romania have 
extensive responsibilities for schools, healthcare and social welfare (including income 
support in Moldova and Romania). Such delegation is as yet small in Serbia (except 
for kindergartens and school building maintenance), Albania and Montenegro. The 
Macedonian Local Government Law assigns social sector responsibilities to local 
governments but subject to phased implementation under IMF conditionality. 
Assignment of these tasks in the basic local government legislation often requires 
amendment of sectoral laws for implementation, a process which may lead to delay 
and dilution.
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Adequacy of Funding
Clearly the assignment of public service and spending responsibilities to self govern-
ment is only empowering if matched by allotment of adequate revenues. Adequacy is 
diﬃcult to deﬁne and measure because it depends partly on what public policy regards 
as the legitimate balance between public and private sectors, but also overwhelmingly 
on what is aﬀordable within current economic constraints. 
Nevertheless adequacy can be measured by three tests
(1) How do the resources allocated to local authorities to manage devolved or 
delegated services compare with previous levels of state budget expenditure on 
them?
(2) Are the resources suﬃcient to meet the standards of service mandated by national 
laws and regulations?
(3) How far do the resources assigned to local responsibilities beneﬁt from upturns 
in the national economy and public revenues as a whole?
The eight country studies show the following signiﬁcance of local government 
budgets in 2003:
Table1: Local and General Government Budgets
Countries Government
expenditures 
in percentage 
of GDP
Local expenditures
in percentage 
of GDP (%)
Local expenditures 
in percentage of 
general government 
expenditures (%)
Albania 27 6.7 23
Bulgaria 38 6.5 16
Croatia 49 7.5 15
Moldova 25 7.2 29
Montenegro 42 5.8 14
Romania 32 8.5 25
Serbia 25 5.6 25
“The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia”
27 1.8 7
Comparison can be made with the following EU member states (2000 DEXIA 
data):
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Table 2: European Union Comparisons
Country Government
expenditures 
in percentage 
of GDP (%)
Local expenditures 
in percentage 
of GDP (%)
Local expenditures 
in percentage of general 
government expenditures 
(%)
Hungary (1998) 47.7 13.9 25
Poland (1999) 41.7 12.1 29
Denmark 52.3 30.6 58
France 52.8 10.0 19
Italy 46.1 13.5 29
Sweden 60.5 23.9 39
By these comparisons levels of local government funding in the Stability Pact 
countries look low in relation to both GDP and public expenditure as a whole, the 
disparity being greater in relation to GDP. There are a number of explanatory factors 
such as the role of health insurance funds in ﬁnancing healthcare independent of local 
budgets, the payment of teachers salaries by the State Budget (Croatia), and the lower 
administrative costs resulting from the inheritance of relatively large jurisdictions 
from the former Yugoslavia, together with a single tier of local government in Albania, 
Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and 
only two elsewhere.
 More fundamentally the low ratios of total public expenditure to GDP in all 
but two of the states indicate the general eﬀect of disorder and/or radical political 
and economic change on tax ratios and the overall funding of public services. Local 
governments may be underfunded but not necessarily more so than government 
as a whole. Aggregate funding of local government expenditure may be adequate 
but poorly distributed; it does not ensure that all local governments can perform 
their responsibilities; issues concerning the equity and transparency of local budget 
funding will be discussed in the next section.
The recent bout of local government legislation has stabilised local government 
funding to some extent and the country reports make less reference to “unfunded 
mandates” than may have been the case four or ﬁve years ago. Stabilising reforms 
have been of two kinds. The ﬁrst consists of the assignment of substantial shares of 
personal income tax (PIT) to the funding of local delegated services (100 per cent in 
Bulgaria, Moldova and Romania); in “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” 
and Romania a share of Value Added Tax (VAT) has also been allocated to a central 
pool to augment local funding of these services. PIT is a relatively large, stable and 
buoyant revenue source although the equity of its assignment does depend upon 
allocation to the employee’s place of residence rather than work, not the case in a 
number of countries. 
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Secondly, a number of states have mechanisms for adjusting local budget 
revenues assigned for funding delegated services (chieﬂy PIT) to the estimated costs 
of these tasks according to centrally prescribed normatives. In the case of Bulgaria, 
Croatia and Moldova these adjustments are made by a State budget subsidy, in 
Romania by the general equalisation fund. These payments should ensure that local 
governments can at least operate the delegated services at nationally prescribed 
minimum standards, however high or low those may be. In Moldova and Romania 
this mechanism has been undermined in some cases by failures to adjust normatives 
to local cost disparities (e.g. the higher unit costs of rural education), to increase 
the cost estimates to take account of all rises mandated by the government, and 
by non-transparent distribution of the equalising funds by the upper tier of local 
government.
It is clear that responsibility for the social sector, for education and healthcare in 
particular, and to a lesser extent for social welfare, is both constrained and constraining. 
It is constrained by the inevitable intervention of national government in prescribing 
patterns and levels of local expenditure; nothing will stop ministers of education 
making pay deals with teachers’ unions. It is constraining in that, however funded, 
the burden of regular current expenditure makes heavy demands on local budgets 
and robs them of much room for manoeuvre in coping with other community needs. 
Nevertheless local publics attach high priority to these services, schools in particular, 
and local accountability tends to favour and improve them.
Standards of “own” or “autonomous” functions, by contrast, gain little protection 
from intergovernmental ﬁscal arrangements and their quality and quantity depend 
largely on local taxes and charges which reﬂect diﬀerences in the size and prosperity 
of municipal jurisdictions. Strategies generally put faith in the eventual reform of 
property taxation for improvements in their support, but these are so far a matter of 
aspiration rather than achievement.
Although recent legislation has generally removed the worst inadequacies and 
instabilities of local government funding (or should do in “the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia” when im-plemented) many local governments are still 
encumbered by the debts incurred during the pre-reform period. This is particularly 
the case in Bulgaria and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. How far new 
arrangements give them the budgetary latitude to clear these obligations is far from 
certain.
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III . CORRECTION OF DISPARITIES
Disparities 
Taking South Eastern Europe as a whole, the distribution of revenue between local 
authorities is probably a greater problem than aggregate funding of local government. 
To the extent that local budgets are funded by local revenues or origin-based revenue 
shares (as opposed to other intergovernmental transfers), there are bound to be 
considerable disparities in potential expenditure on services due to diﬀerences in 
wealth and economic activity. These are particularly evident in countries where the 
capital city is economically dominant; Tirana receives 43 per cent, Skopje 50 per 
cent and Chisinau 60 per cent of local revenue raised within their respective states.
Even intergovernmental transfers may reﬂect historic inequalities in the geo-
graphical distribution of state budget resources. Moreover the costs of providing 
services are not uniform. Low population density can add signiﬁcantly to the cost of 
a service like education, whereas large settlements may well incur higher per capita 
costs in the case of road and traﬃc management or refuse disposal. The relatively 
large local government jurisdictions can also pose accountability issues where diverse 
geographical and ethnic communities are combined.
The following table shows the range of per capita revenues before and after 
receipt of intergovernmental subsidies: (Montenegro is excluded as the revenue base 
is new in 2004).
     
Table 3: Range of Local Government Revenues: 
Ratio of Highest to Lowest per Capita Incomes
Country From own sources and origin 
based revenue shares
From all sources
Albania 11 : 1 2 : 1
Bulgaria 20 : 1 7 : 1
Croatia  5 : 1 4 : 1
Moldova Unknown 8 : 1
Romania 65 : 1 9 : 1
Serbia  5 : 1* 2 : 1*
“The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia”
50 : 1 Unknown
* Refers to quartiles not individual authorities.
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Equalisation
These disparities emphasise the critical importance of equalisation systems. In the 
case of physical infrastructure there is often a convergence between high levels of 
economic activity leading to above average revenues on the one hand, and higher 
service costs. Some disparities between local budgets may well be reasonable and 
acceptable. This is less the case with the personal social services, however, where 
public policy (and often the national constitution) expects the public to enjoy more 
or less equal standards of service regardless of location and economic circumstances. 
A combination of serious local revenue and cost disparities and signiﬁcant social 
service responsibilities demands an eﬀective equalisation mechanism.
Equalisation may be achieved vertically, i.e. through the criteria for distribution 
of intergovernmental transfers, or horizontally through the partial redistribution of 
local revenues, or by some combination of the two. To some extent the old style 
matrix systems of ﬁnancial relations between state, regional and local budgets which 
operated in most of the former Socialist states aimed at a combination of vertical 
and horizontal equalisation. It was seriously ﬂawed, however, by an absence of 
normative calculation and its reliance on annual negotiation resulting in nepotism, 
inequity and severe disincentives to revenue mobilisation and budgetary discipline. 
Most of the former Socialist states are in various stages of progress away from this 
former framework of intergovernmental ﬁnance to a system which is more equitable, 
transparent and normative. 
Among the Stability Pact members the personal social services, where delegated 
to local government, are basically ﬁnanced by origin-based shares of PIT (plus shares 
of corporate income tax in Moldova). These are clearly unequal in their distribution, 
and legislation recognises the need to bring their yields up to the minimum costs 
of national standards of provision. This is attempted by way of a speciﬁc equalising 
subsidy in Bulgaria, Croatia and Moldova. In Romania teachers salaries and income 
support are subsidised by transfers from a dedicated portion of VAT receipts, while 
all municipal expenditures are supported by the distribution of an equalisation fund 
comprising 29 per cent of PIT. 
There are much more varied approaches to equalising the funding of own or 
autonomous expenditures. Albania (with the lowest disparities in per capita revenue 
from all sources) applies two mechanisms, a block grant biased towards smaller and 
poorer jurisdictions and a horizontal redistribution from authorities with per capita 
revenues over 35 per cent of the national average to those more than 35 per cent below. 
Croatia also distributes a block grant according to spending need and ﬁscal capacity, 
while also awarding higher shares of PIT to Areas of Special National Concern 
(largely deﬁned by war damage) and mountainous areas. The new Macedonian 
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Law assigns three per cent of VAT to an equalisation fund, but the formula for its 
distribution remains to be deﬁned. Montenegro has allotted 10 per cent of PIT to 
an equalisation fund, 90 per cent of which is distributed according to spending need 
and ﬁscal potential, and 10 per cent to reward increases in collection of local taxes 
and charges. Romania has a general equalisation fund comprising 29 per cent of 
PIT, and Serbia allocates additional origin-based shares of Sales Tax for vertical and 
horizontal equalisation.
All countries practise some form of equalisation, although Bulgaria and Moldova 
restrict its coverage to delegated services. The eﬃcacy of the varied arrangements 
is constrained by a number of factors, however. Firstly, there is a tendency to 
prescribe general distribution criteria without numerical weightings, leaving scope 
for non-transparent application, particularly where this is left to a higher level of 
elected government, as in Moldova and Romania. Any room for negotiation tends 
to dilute the equalising impact, because of the political pressure to give everyone 
a share whatever they qualify or not. Adjustment by giving diﬀerential tax shares 
as in Serbia is an imprecise instrument which can be undermined by diﬀerences 
between estimated and actual collections. Thirdly, measuring own revenue potential 
by actual collections leads to potential disincentives and distortions, but ﬁnding a 
more objective basis of calculation is technically challenging.
IV. LOCAL DISCRETION
For the political and economic beneﬁts of decentralisation to be realised, three 
further conditions need to be met:
(1) Self-governments need signiﬁcant discretion to allocate expenditure in accordance 
with local preferences and priorities. The imposition of national standards and 
policy requirements should not be so strict as to preclude local initiative and 
judgment.
(2) Self-governments should have freedom to vary the rates of the taxes and charges 
which accrue to their budgets. This may be restricted by ceilings but should 
nevertheless be suﬃcient to provide scope for varying levels of expenditure and 
enhance the sense of public accountability of local oﬃcials. Intergovernmental 
transfers should not be so dominant as to discourage the use of such discretion.
(3) Intergovernmental transfers should be allocated by transparent and stable criteria 
which free recipients from political dependence on state oﬃcials or higher levels 
of local government for resources and encourage local care and foresight in their 
use. 
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Discretion on Expenditure 
Local government discretion over expenditure on the delegated services of education, 
healthcare and social welfare is squeezed between the standards and normatives 
stipulated by the State and the rights to self-management conferred by law on 
institutions such as hospitals and teachers (and, one might add, the ungovernable 
nature of doctors and teachers). Whether expenditure normatives actually govern 
local budgetary allocation or only the calculation of transfers varies from state to 
state. They are often taken to have more directive force than is legally the case. Such 
administrative powers as the appointment of school or hospital directors probably 
confer more local power over these tasks than ﬁnancial discretion.
There are few restrictions on current spending on own or autonomous functions 
other than national stipulation of salary levels. Local discretion has been enhanced 
in countries like Albania where a variety of earmarked grants has been consolidated 
into block grants. Capital investment expenditure, on the other hand, is still widely 
dependent on project by project awards of grants by the State.
Although not strictly an issue of ﬁscal decentralisation, delay in some cases 
in transferring the ownership of property used by local public services to local 
government is a practical impediment to their eﬀective management.
Discretion on Revenue
The following table shows the percentage of local government revenues in 2003 over 
which the local authority had some discretion in deﬁning the rates:
Table 4: Percentage of Local Government Revenue Subject to Local Rate Setting
    Country Per cent
Albania 14.8
Bulgaria  25.0
Croatia 38.0
Moldova 22.3
Montenegro 29.0
Romania 21.0
Serbia 21.2
These comparisons need to be treated with caution since the discretion may in 
some cases be subject to tight limits and the ﬁgures may include a small amount of 
revenue from nationally prescribed fees.
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Croatian and Montenegran local governments have the power to surcharge 
PIT (within limits); this right has provided the foundation of the highest degrees 
of ﬁscal decentralisation exercised within the European Union (plus Norway and 
Switzerland). PIT has proven to be the only tax base which is technically capable 
both of assignment to local government and of supporting a substantial percentage 
of local government expenditure including expensive personal services. Although 
modest in current contribution to local budgets (about 10 per cent in Croatia), such 
surcharging rights can always be enhanced in a ﬁscally neutral manner by substitution 
for existing PIT shares. 
Bulgarian and Serbian local governments have no taxing powers (through 
constitutional limitation in Bulgaria). In the other six countries they have power to 
vary the rates of local taxes, usually within limits (±30 per cent of a norm in Albania, 
±50 per cent in Romania); these taxes are mainly on real estate or motor vehicles. 
They tend to comprise a minor portion of the local budget and have substantial 
yields only in the larger towns. There are declared hopes, however, in most countries 
of increasing local discretion over property taxation coupled with a major overhaul 
of its assessment base. Whether these will be achieved and, if so, to what extent and 
how soon, is a matter for speculation. It is worth noting that the highest yields of 
property taxation in central and eastern Europe are one per cent of GDP in Poland 
and 0.9 per cent in Romania; they are owed not to full-scale ad valorem assessment 
but to the freedom and encouragement given to municipalities to adjust tax rates 
annually slightly above the rate of inﬂation. More signiﬁcant representation of inter-
local variations in property values in the multipliers applied to square meterage could 
probably improve the assessment base substantially within existing frameworks 
without the costs and complexities of market value assessment. 
Local governments generally enjoy substantial freedom to levy rates of fees and 
charges, though these are supposed to be anchored to costs. This discretion tends to 
be exercised energetically, particularly in cities and where the costs fall on businesses 
rather than on voters. A Serbian report has suggested that the number and scale 
of administrative fees is excessive and a disincentive to enterprise. Certainly local 
revenue generation can be predatory and should not be simplistically regarded as ipso 
facto beneﬁcial.
Stability and Transparency
The country proﬁles show progress in deﬁning the revenue base of local governments 
in permanent rather than annual budget legislation. This has introduced a welcome 
element of stability and transparency. Year-on-year uncertainty is still attached to the 
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annual recalculation of expenditure normatives governing delegated service subsidies 
and equalisation. 
Discretionary funding, where it remains, is a major threat to local autonomy, 
since having to beg for money from higher levels of government weakens the 
independence and authority of locally elected leadership. The non-transparency of 
equalisation fund distribution has already been highlighted.
The other major ﬁeld for patronage remains the award of capital investment 
grants. Experience in central Europe suggests that this may be curtailed or mitigated 
by preparation for accession to the European Union and a growing role for its funds 
in this sphere. Subjecting the distribution of capital funds to objective criteria is 
technically more diﬃcult than in the case of current transfers; the example of Bulgaria 
in allocating an overall investment grant quota to each local government subject to 
approval of its project application, is particularly interesting in this respect.
V. COUNTRY PROFILES
Albania
Assignments
Local governments are responsible for the customary range of communal services but 
the intended devolution to them of water utilities is at an early stage of implementation. 
Delegated functions in the ﬁelds of education, health and social welfare are largely 
of an agency nature, ﬁnanced by earmarked payments from ministry budgets, but 
further devolution is under active preparation.
Major reforms in ﬁnancing local expenditures have been introduced in 2003, 
the previous reliance on conditional grants being largely replaced by a combination 
of assigned taxes on property, small businesses and agricultural land, the full yields 
of state taxes on simpliﬁed proﬁts and vehicle registration, and formula-based 
unconditional grants. 
Adequacy
Over the decade 1993 to 2003 overall government expenditure in Albania declined 
from 50 to 27 per cent of GDP leaving all public services severely underfunded. 
Local government expenditures declined substantially from 1992 to a low of 18 per 
cent of state budget expenditure in 1998 and 6 per cent of GDP in 2002. However, 
recent reforms have reversed this decline with local budget expenditures reaching 
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23 per cent of public expenditure in 2003 and the prospect of further increases. 
The full eﬀect of these will only be apparent in 2004 but provisional data indicate 
an upward trend in local budget revenue.
Equalisation
The 2002–3 reforms introduced two equalisation mechanisms: ﬁrstly a more equit-
able formula system of allocating unconditional grants (beneﬁting smaller and poorer 
authorities in particular), and secondly an element of horizontal redistribution cal-
culated on 35 per cent of the diﬀerence between per capita revenues from taxes on 
small business, simpliﬁed proﬁt and vehicle registration and the national average.
Discretion
Recent reforms have greatly increased local discretion and transparency. The contri-
bution of earmarked grants to local budget revenue has been reduced from 85 per 
cent in 1998 to 20 per cent, replaced by a combination of unconditional grants, 
local taxes and revenue shares over which local governments have full spending 
discretion. 
From 2003 local governments have had discretion to set the rates of taxes on 
agricultural land, property (buildings) and small business within a range of ±30 per 
cent of an indicative rate. 
Unconditional grants and revenue shares are distributed by transparent formulae. 
The volumes and formulae are still governed by annual state budget rather than 
permanent legislation, but have not so far been varied to local government detriment. 
Government ministries still exercise considerable discretion over the funding of the 
delegated services, education, healthcare, social welfare and public order, and the 
distribution of grants for capital investment.
Key challenges include the devolution of responsibility for personal social services.
Bulgaria
 
Assignments
Bulgarian municipalities have full responsibility for communal services and utilities, 
plus extensive responsibility for pre-school, primary and secondary education, social 
welfare and healthcare. Most educational expenditure is executed through normative 
transfers to schools, while healthcare is partially funded by compulsory health 
insurance.
The costs of the “delegated” functions (education, social assistance, healthcare 
and culture) are calculated by a normative formula and covered by assignment of 
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100 per cent of PIT by origin and a general complementary subsidy which covers 
any estimated shortfall. Estimated PIT revenue surplus to the delegated service costs 
reverts to the State Budget, but not yields in excess of the estimate. “Own” functions 
(communal services and utilities etc) are covered by local taxes on property, property 
transfers, inheritance and gifts, vehicles and road use, together with fees and charges. 
They also may attract State capital investment grants.
Adequacy
The delegated functions are primarily funded by a reasonably stable and buoyant 
PIT, and the capacity to fund mandated standards should be ensured by the com-
plementary subsidies, providing the normative costings are accurate. The adequacy of 
funding for autonomous functions depends on the vagaries of the local revenue basis 
and therefore varies widely. The National Association of Municipalities considers 
that these services are frequently underfunded.
Equalisation
As already described, a complementary subsidy closes any gap between PIT and the 
estimated normative costs of the delegated tasks. There is no mechanism for correcting 
disparities in the basket of own revenues devoted to autonomous functions.
Discretion
Municipalities have wide discretion in allocating expenditure on own functions; 
over 80 per cent of current budget transfers are unconditional. Tight constraints are 
applied, however, to funding schools; staﬃng levels are centrally prescribed as well as 
salaries and funds have to be handed over to individual school management under a 
set formula related to pupil numbers.
Local tax rates and liability for them are determined by national legislation since 
all taxing power is reserved to Parliament by the Constitution. Municipalities have 
no discretion in this respect, but the 2002 Local Taxes and Charges Act conferred 
wide powers on them in respect of fees and charges.
Revenue sharing and intergovernmental transfers are determined by permanent 
legislation, but the expenditure normatives governing the calculation of the comple-
mentary subsidy are deﬁned in the annual state budget law, and therefore subject 
to frequent change. Investment subsidy quotas are allocated to individual local 
governments by formula, but their use requires project by project approval.
Key challenges include the legal ban on municipal discretion over local tax rates, 
and the disparities in the local revenues supporting autonomous functions.
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Croatia
Assignments
Decentralised responsibilities have increased substantially since reforms in 2001. 
Local governments at either county or municipal level have added primary and 
secondary education, social welfare and healthcare to their existing responsibilities 
for communal services and utilities. Between 1999 and 2003 local government 
expenditure increased from 11.1 per cent to 15.2 per cent of general government 
expenditure and from 6.1 to 7.5 per cent of GDP. These increases have been limited by 
the fact that local governments have not assumed responsibility for the remuneration 
of school and healthcare staﬀ..
Local government units taking over the newly devolved functions have received 
added percentage shares of PIT and are also eligible for equalisation fund payments 
that meet any gap between the income tax shares and the standard normative costs 
of the extra responsibilities. Autonomous functions are funded by basic shares (by 
origin) of personal and corporate income taxes, and a variety of taxes on real estate, 
consumption, gifts, inheritance and vehicles together with fees and charges.
Adequacy
Linkage to income tax should ensure reasonably buoyant funding for these functions 
in relation to the growth of the national economy. Equalisation funds should ensure 
that mandated standards of delegated tasks can be ﬁnanced. Overall local government 
balances have improved considerably since 2001 suggesting that the new funding 
basis for local government responsibilities has been adequate.
Equalisation
As already explained, an equalisation fund evens out capacity to meet minimum 
spending targets in respect of education, healthcare and social welfare. For other 
types of expenditure there are two types of equalisation: ﬁrstly additional shares 
of personal and corporate proﬁt taxes for Areas of Special National Concern and 
mountainous areas, and secondly, a current expenditure grant distributed according 
to mixed criteria relating to per capita revenues and spending needs. Grants reduce 
revenue disparities only to a very limited extent and their allocation only partially 
correlates with objective factors such as regional GDP or tax revenue. A number of 
reasons have been suggested in the country report including some generosity in the 
classiﬁcation of Areas of Special National Concern and mountainous areas which 
receive extra tax shares, and the absence of any numerical formula for applying the 
statutory criteria governing the distribution of current grants. 
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Discretion
Local government units have general freedom in allocating funds for current expendi-
ture, despite the existence of spending norms for decentralised services. Grants for 
capital expenditure are earmarked by sectoral ministries for speciﬁc investments.
The bulk of local tax revenue consists of shares of national revenues speciﬁed 
by Parliament. However, authorities have, and increasingly exercise power to impose 
surcharges of up to 10 per cent on personal income tax. They are free to determine 
rates of charges for local utility services and some minor taxes on local property and 
consumption.
Rates of revenue sharing are prescribed by law and therefore transparent. However, 
the government has considerable discretion in designating Areas of Special National 
Concern which attract extra revenue shares and in allocating both the current and 
capital investment grants.
Key challenges include the development of more precise criteria for the distribution 
of equalisation funds. 
Moldova
Assignments
By SEE standards, local governments (rayon and municipal) have wide respons-
ibilities including education and social beneﬁt payments. These account for the 
relatively high percentages of government expenditure and GDP. However, the 
demarcation of social sector tasks between rayon and municipal administrations is 
unclear and healthcare is partially funded by compulsory health insurance.
Delegated tasks are ﬁnanced by the assignment of personal and corporate income 
taxes by origin to rayon and municipal budgets together with a grant to meet any 
shortfall estimated according to normative costs. “Own” functions have to be ﬁnanced 
by assigned real-estate taxes, minor local taxes, fees and charges.
Adequacy
The combination of assigned income taxes and equalising subsidies should provide a 
stable base for the delegated services. However, this depends on the accuracy of the 
normative costings; these have been unfair in not recognising the inevitably higher 
unit costs of rural schooling and have ignored extra costs imposed by governmental 
directives, notably a 20 per cent teaching salary increase in 2003. The adequacy of 
general municipal revenues has also declined as a result of the major cost implications 
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of the 2003 territorial reorganisation which re-established 33 rayons, and increased 
the number of municipalities by one-third. This was also accompanied by directives 
increasing municipal establishments. Reforms have also deprived local governments 
of the beneﬁts of shared revenue yields exceeding the estimate, which provided both 
incentives and funds for capital works.
Equalisation
As already mentioned, a subsidy is intended to cover the gap between assigned taxes 
on income and the normative cost of delegated services. The only equalisation of 
own revenues and expenditures relates to some horizontal redistribution of revenues 
which exceed the expenditure normatives by more than 20 per cent
Discretion
Expenditure normatives in respect of the staﬃng of the delegated services severely 
constrain budgetary choice, particularly in smaller rural jurisdictions where education 
costs are dominant. A series of governmental decisions, particularly on territorial 
reorganisation and staﬃng has also imposed serious burdens on local budgets. 
Local governments have discretion whether to levy local taxes and, if so at what 
rates. The largest of these optional taxes are on spatial improvements and business 
registration with potential mainly in Chisinau and other large towns. 
The structure of revenue shares and transfers is determined by permanent laws, 
but expenditure normatives are deﬁned by annual law. The distribution of the shared 
taxes and equalisation transfers for delegated functions is determined by the rayon 
administration annually involving considerable negotiation, particularly over the 
estimated yields of assigned taxes.
Key challenges include the separation of rayon and municipal budgets and remov-
ing rayon discretion over municipal entitlements to revenue shares and equalisation 
subsidies.
Montenegro
Assignments
Cities and municipalities are responsible for the normal range of communal services 
and utilities but not for the social sector services.
Under a new law eﬀective in 2004 they receive taxes on real estate, alcoholic con-
sumption, inheritance, gifts and visitors, plus 10 per cent of PIT (by origin) and 50 per 
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cent of property transfer tax. They also receive fees and charges and have the right to 
levy a surcharge of up to 13 per cent on PIT (15 per cent in two cities). They are eligible 
for grants from an Equalisation Fund comprising a further 10 per cent of PIT. 
Adequacy
There is no experience on which to judge the new funding base introduced in 2004. 
In the absence of delegated social sector responsibilities there is no normative element 
of spending need in the distribution of revenues, but the major role of PIT shares 
and surcharges should provide a stable and reasonably buoyant base barring major 
economic decline.
Equalisation
As already mentioned 10 per cent of PIT is allocated to an equalisation fund from 
2004. 90 per cent of this is to be allocated according to indices of ﬁscal eﬃciency and 
budget expenditure, details of which are not available, while the remaining 10 per cent 
will reward municipalities achieving the largest percentage increases in own revenue.
Discretion
The new Law on Financing Local Autonomy appears to confer wide discretion on 
municipalities although this has not been tested by experience. They have complete 
freedom of budgetary allocation between their deﬁned competences; these do, 
however, exclude what other countries in the region regard as delegated tasks.
From 2004 municipalities may levy and determine the rates of taxes on real 
estate, consumption of drinks, visitors, business registration, gifts and inheritance. 
Implementation is partially delayed by the absence of existing machinery for assess-
ment and collection, but developing this is presumably a matter of time. Crucially, 
they may impose a surcharge of up to 13 per cent on PIT (15 per cent in two cities).
Rights to raise revenue and to receive tax shares are deﬁned by permanent 
legislation. The remaining uncertainty attaches to the distribution of the equalisation 
fund, but its aggregate size has been deﬁned (10 per cent of PIT) and allocation will 
be made by a Commission for Local Autonomy.
Key challenges will emerge from the current year’s experience of implementing 
the new Law.
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Romania
Assignments
Local authorities (judets and municipal) have a full range of local public service 
responsibilities including education, minimum income support and other social sub-
sidies such as heating vouchers. Unusually, some utilities are operated at judets rather 
than municipal level.
They receive PIT (partly by origin and partly through equalisation), local taxes 
on real estate, vehicles, hotels and entertainment, fees and charges. They also receive 
grants towards teachers salaries and income support (partly ﬁnanced by a share of 
VAT), and are eligible for state budget capital investment grants. 
Adequacy
The increasing allocation of PIT (now 100 per cent) and an approximately 25 per cent 
share of VAT to local government support, together with a full tranche of local taxes, 
fees and charges, has provided a buoyant base for local budget expenditure which 
has doubled as shares of public expenditure and GDP since 1999. This framework 
is adequate in aggregate, but its impact on individual local budgets is marred by 
unstable and arbitrary allocations of equalisation funding by judets to municipalities. 
Further weaknesses are the frequent changes in mandated expenditure and the highly 
discretionary distribution of capital investment funds. 
Equalisation
Twenty-nine per cent of PIT is allocated to an equalisation fund which is allocated by 
formula to judets for onward distribution to municipalities. No numerical weightings 
are attached to the distribution criteria, which are in any case frequently ignored 
by the judets; as a result the distribution is highly discretionary and the per capita 
disparities in municipal revenue in fact are enhanced rather than reduced by the 
equalisation funds.
Discretion
Government directives govern the numbers and salary levels of administrative and 
teaching staﬀ and the calculation of minimum income support. Otherwise local 
governments have substantial freedom to determine their expenditure, although this 
is frequently constrained by the cost implications of these directives.
Local government has power to set the rates of taxes on real estate, motor vehicles 
and hotels within 50 per cent above or below statutory norms and to adjust them 
annually for inﬂation. Annual adjustment has helped to push property tax yields to 
relatively high levels by CEE and SEE standards.
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Revenue shares and the aggregate size of the equalisation fund (29 per cent of PIT) 
are deﬁned in permanent legislation. However, the distribution of the equalisation 
fund between municipalities is determined by judets in a non-transparent manner. 
The allocation of government subsidies for investment is also highly discretionary. 
The frequency of changes in the directives over educational and social welfare 
expenditures also inhibits budgetary planning.
Key challenges include the elimination of discretion in the distribution of equalisa-
tion funds and improving the distribution of capital investment subsidies.
Serbia
Assignments
Cities and municipalities have wide responsibilities for communal services and uti-
lities, but in the social sector only for pre-schools and the maintenance of primary 
and secondary school buildings.
Their largest revenues have been from shares by origin of Sales Tax (eight per cent 
in municipalities, 10 per cent in three cities and 15 per cent in Belgrade), additional 
shares of sales tax awarded annually for equalisation purposes, ﬁve per cent by origin 
of Wages Tax, various taxes on real estate, fees and charges. 
Adequacy
Given the slenderness of social sector responsibility, a 25 per cent share of public 
expenditure by local government units is substantial and buoyant. However, this 
is heavily weighted in favour of the cities by their disproportionate shares of sales 
tax, and smaller municipalities are less amply funded. Sales tax shares disappear in 
2005 with the replacement of the tax by VAT; the government apparently intends 
to replace this revenue to local governments principally with an enhanced share of 
wages tax. The challenge will be to distribute this more equitably.
Equalisation
Additional shares of Sales Tax have been awarded in the annual Tax Sharing Law 
for purposes of both vertical and horizontal equalisation. Although the cities get 
a lower percentage share than the poorer municipalities, it yields higher per capita 
sums when applied to their superior tax base, and may have the eﬀect of increasing 
rather than diminishing the revenue disparities when yields signiﬁcantly exceed the 
estimates.
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Discretion
Local government expenditure is subject to little prescription except for national 
control over salary levels. A major constraint, however, is the absence of municipal 
rights to ownership of the property they use for public services. Legislation is expected 
to grant such rights but is delayed by diﬃculties in deﬁning its scope.
Local governments do not have power to set the rates of any tax, although exercis-
ing wide discretion over fees and charges. Legislation to reform property taxation is 
expected in the near future including local discretion over tax rates within prescribed 
limits.
Annual tax sharing laws determine the local government shares of sales and 
wages taxes. The basic shares remain reasonably stable, but the annual allocation of 
additional shares (nominally for equalisation purposes) is the result of a negotiated 
process of dubious equity. The abolition of sales tax presents an opportunity to 
substitute a more stable and transparent alternative.
Key challenges include the replacement of sales tax shares as the major local 
revenue source and the assignment to local governments of discretion over some 
local tax rates.
“The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”
Assignments
Former systems of functional decentralisation were disrupted by the 1996 split 
of 34 local government units into 124 and by civil war. The 2002 Law on Local 
Government assigns a wide sphere of responsibility to local government including 
education and social welfare, but under IMF conditionality responsibility for services 
will be delegated in two stages, with staﬀ emoluments last. Meanwhile the share of 
local budgets in public expenditure remains extremely low.
The new Law on Local Government Finance assigns the levy of various taxes on 
property to local government units together with three per cent of PIT (by origin) 
and access to an equalisation fund equal to three per cent of VAT. Delegated services 
will also attract sectoral block grants. 
Adequacy
Arbitrary distribution of revenue shares among the 34 former municipal areas and 
the current 124 authorities, together with vicarious public expenditure restrictions 
and reliance on earmarked sectoral transfers has, generated great instability for 
municipal ﬁnance. The news laws on territorial organisation and local government 
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ﬁnance should create a more a secure and buoyant framework, but the adequacy of 
funding of the delegated functions will depend on the calculation of sectoral block 
grants still in progress. 
Equalisation
“The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” has no equalising mechanism at 
present, but the new Local Government Finance Law allocates three per cent of 
VAT to an equalisation fund. It requires the government to prepare a distribution 
formula in consultation with the local government association but stipulates that 
50 per cent must be allocated purely according to population. It states that Skopje 
should be treated separately, but it is not clear how far this will exclude the city from 
beneﬁt.
Discretion
Municipalities are currently dependent to a substantial extent on earmarked grants 
from sectoral ministries. It is intended that these should be replaced by sectoral block 
grants which will increase spending discretion within, but not between sectors.
Under the new Law municipalities will gain the right to set the rates of property 
taxes within statutory limits, fees and charges.
At present municipal revenues are subject to unpredictable and non-transparent 
decisions over the distribution of tax shares within the previous 34 municipal areas, 
the allocation of shared tax yields in excess of previous public expenditure caps and the 
allocation of earmarked sectoral grants from national budgets and dedicated funds. 
Transparency and stability should be substantially improved by implementation of 
the new Law since rights to own and shared revenue are prescribed permanently 
together with the volume of equalisation funding. However, the formulae for 
calculating equalisation transfers and sectoral block grants remain to be deﬁned and 
will also be important in securing stability and transparency.
Key challenges are presented by all aspects of implementing new legislation, 
in particular the calculation of sectoral block grants and the distribution of the 
equalisation fund.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The country studies on which this Report is based highlight encouraging progress in 
the promotion of ﬁscal decentralisation in South-Eastern Europe over the last four 
to ﬁve years. In several countries strategies have been adopted and implementation 
has, to varying degrees, taken place. More responsibility for local public services 
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has been devolved in most of the countries covered and progress has been made in 
making their funding more stable and transparent. Insofar as local services remain 
underfunded, the weakness applies to public expenditure as a whole and derives 
principally from wider economic circumstances.
Individual local governments do not necessarily beneﬁt equally from improve-
ments in the aggregate funding. Weaknesses remain, particularly in the distribution 
of equalisation funds whose importance is accentuated by the major role played by 
origin-based revenue sharing in the systems of intergovernmental transfers. Capital 
investment funding is another ﬁeld in which greater regularity is much needed.
From a rapid survey and a brief report it would be inappropriate to formulate 
detailed recommendations of universal relevance. A major reform of local government 
funding will be needed in Serbia to replace local sharing of Sales Tax. Otherwise most 
eﬀort is needed in most of the eight countries to implement legislation already in place.
A few generalised priorities can be suggested, however. These include:
(1) complete budgetary separation both between national and local government and 
between tiers of local government; where this is not in force, intergovernmental 
transfers being distributed directly to each level
(2) transparent and precise procedures for the distribution of equalisation funds
(3) more transparent arrangements for the allocation of grants for capital investment
(4) greater local discretion in the imposition of local taxation principally through 
extending powers to surcharge PIT (in substitution for shares) and local setting 
of property tax rates
(5) care to ensure that ﬁscal assignments, whether of tax shares or subsidies, are 
promptly and fully adjusted to reﬂect any national policy decisions which 
impose major additional costs on local budgets
(6) incorporating the system of intergovernmental transfers and the levels of revenue 
sharing in permanent legislation, where this is not already the case
(7) assigning shares of PIT to local government jurisdictions where the payers live 
rather than work.
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The Challenges and objectives 
for the development of 
effective democratic 
local government
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Challenge: Understanding local government
The vision of what local government might be is often unclear to oﬃcials and elected 
representatives at national, regional and local levels, and to local people themselves. 
A shared vision is hard to ﬁnd.
Reforms are not integrated in an agreed overall strategy.
Speciﬁc Objectives
• Strong local government should be seen as a key element in the stability and 
sustainable development of the region and be recognised as such by all state 
bodies. A national debate on the beneﬁt of decentralised governance should be 
stimulated.
• A comprehensive strategy should be developed, based on a clear deﬁnition of 
the role of local and regional government shared by all stakeholders (govern-
ment, parliament, local authorities...).
Challenge: Assignment of competences 
Experience shows that the most frequent shortcomings of basic legislation are related 
to the following situations:
Responsibilities
– Unclear distribution of responsibilities between central, regional and local 
government.
– Inadequate decentralisation of functions relating to policy implementation at 
local level.
– Undetermined and/or unrealistic scope of local government mandatory functions.
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Speciﬁc Objectives
Speciﬁc targets are set which should guide the drafting of new legislation, including 
the following:
Responsibilities
• Reduce overlapping responsibilities and, whenever possible, assign exclusive 
competences to the local authorities;
• Increase local government responsibilities in the provision of utilities and 
basic social services at the local level;
• Fix clear boundaries to mandatory tasks, avoiding long lists of ‘broad’ 
responsibilities which are assumed to be mandatory as a whole;
• Set clear standards in service provision, which should be consistent with the 
resources available.
Challenge: Assignment of resources 
Experience shows that the most frequent shortcomings of basic legislation are related 
to the following situations:
Resources
– Inadequate assignment of resources by central government to local government 
(including property, ﬁnance, staﬀ) resulting in unachievable mandates and poor 
service delivery.
– Little room for manoeuvre both in raising own revenues at the local level and in 
allocating available resources. 
– Imbalances between local authorities in diﬀerent areas and insuﬃcient equalisation 
(causing great disparities in development potential and accentuating migration 
trends).
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Speciﬁc Objectives
Speciﬁc targets are set which should guide the drafting of new legislation, including 
the following:
Resources
• Ensure that all properties needed for the delivery of local services are transferred 
to local government.
• Increase the local government share of public expenditure, consistent with 
their responsibilities.
• Improve the local taxation system, especially land/property taxation, which 
should become a pillar of this system, and ensure the conditions for its eﬀective 
enforcement.
• Consolidate, whenever possible, earmarked grants, to increase both the room 
for manoeuvre and the eﬀectiveness in the allocation of resources.
• Increase the level of equalisation to achieve a target level [at least 80 per cent] 
within a given timeframe.
Challenge: Implementing legislation
In some countries, important changes in basic laws on local government fall short of 
implementation or remain ineﬀective because there is insuﬃcient will at the national 
level and because there are inconsistencies in the legal framework.
Speciﬁc Objectives
• Conduct an in-depth analysis of the local government legal framework to 
identify possible internal inconsistencies and point to changes required in 
basic and sectoral legislation.
• Plan legislative reforms in a rational and comprehensive manner and back 
them up with timely implementation measures.
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Challenge: Professional structure for elected and appointed oﬃcials
The legal status of local elected representatives does not encourage the emergence of 
a local political elite.
The legal status of local government staﬀ does not encourage a professional career.
Speciﬁc Objectives
• Enhance the status of local elected representatives and set out clearly what is 
expected of them.
• Enhance the professional status of local government staﬀ and set out standards 
for their recruitment, training and promotion.
Challenge: Relationship between state authorities and local government
Deconcentrated state administration may not support in practice the development 
of local self-government.
Excessive administrative supervision by central government may leave insuﬃcient 
scope for local initiative or for the development of local responsibility/accountability.
Speciﬁc Objectives
• Reassess and redesign the role of state representatives at local and regional 
level and the operation of state ﬁeld agencies to foster joint action by public 
authorities and support the exercise of devolved powers by local government.
• Ensure that supervisory mechanisms and procedures have a clear rationale 
and are established by law.
• Reduce automatic control of local decisions which do not directly aﬀect the 
national interest and do not entail sizeable costs.
Challenge: Institutional dialogue
There is a lack of institutional dialogue and insuﬃcient recognition of local govern-
ment as a partner.
The national association of local authorities may not have suﬃcient capacity for 
eﬀective dialogue with the government.
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Speciﬁc Objectives
• Facilitate the strengthening of independent national associations of local 
authorities.
• Develop mechanisms of continuous dialogue to ensure full involvement of 
local government representatives in the reform process.
Challenge: Transparency and accountability
Standards on transparency, accountability and public ethics are not developed.
  
Speciﬁc Objectives
• Set minimum standards for transparency and communication with local 
communities by law.
• Establish standards of public ethics at local level and processes for their 
enforcement.
• Establish mechanisms for the participation of local people at critical points in 
the aﬀairs of local authorities.
• Develop national and local audit processes.
Challenge: Local economic, social and environmental development
Local development aﬀects the quality of life of local people. But local authorities may 
lack the necessary powers to take the action needed or they may fail to use existing 
powers. They may not have the vision or the initiative to see what is possible. They 
may lack speciﬁc expertise.
The challenge of local development requires a joint approach by the local 
authority and other stakeholders. But there may not be a culture of partnership.
Understanding local development begins with dialogue with local people and 
organisations about their needs. But communications with the local community 
may be weak.
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Speciﬁc Objectives
• Encourage local authorities to:
 – create local forums of senior representatives of the public, private and 
 voluntary sectors to consider local development challenges and ﬁnd shared 
 solutions;
 – prepare local development policies and strategies, based on local needs 
 analyses, to harness the energies of local stakeholders towards development 
 programmes;
 – work with neighbouring local authorities and with district/regional autho- 
 rities to prepare regional development strategies and programmes.
• Introduce provisions and funding mechanisms to enable local authorities to 
play a stronger role in local development.
• Commission guidance in local economic, social and environmental develop-
ment for local authorities.
• Encourage best practice programmes and relevant training (e.g. project design 
and management) to help local authorities improve their approach to local 
development and learn from each other.
• Encourage better use of information and communications technology by local 
authorities to support local development.
Challenge: Leadership and strategic management
The longer-term vision of the community and of the role of the local authority is 
usually unclear.
Local oﬃcials and elected representatives are not fully engaged in the core work 
of their local authority.
The local authority fails to engage civil society in partnership in the development 
of the community.
The local authority fails to communicate eﬀectively internally and externally.
The local authority fails to use training eﬀectively to improve performance.
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Speciﬁc Objectives
• Work hand in hand with the national association and oﬀer concrete political 
support, ﬁnancial incentives and technical/logistical assistance to their 
initiatives designed to:
 – assess leadership and strategic management in each local authority against 
 an agreed Benchmark as a platform for an Improvement Programme;
 – introduce a requirement that each local authority should draw up a 3–5 year 
 Strategic Plan, and monitor its implementation through annual performance 
 reports against annual plans;
 – Introduce models and standards for the eﬀective management of the human 
 resources and ﬁnance functions in every local authority;
 – Develop training and communications strategies in each local authority;
 – Facilitate the development of partnerships between local authorities and 
 with civil society;
 – Support the development of information and communications technology 
 in each local authority.
Challenge: Service provision
The quality, quantity and accessibility of service provision vary considerably within 
and between countries.
Insuﬃcient use is made of examples of good practice to promote widespread 
improvements.
There are few systematic programmes to deliver better performance.
National associations may not have the capacity themselves to introduce capacity-
building programmes for local authorities.
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Speciﬁc Objectives
• Work hand in hand with the national association and oﬀer concrete political 
support, ﬁnancial incentives and technical/logistical assistance to their ini-
tiatives designed to:
 – introduce Best Practice Programmes in priority internal and external service 
 areas;
 – explore the introduction of innovative approaches to service provision 
 learnt from other countries;
 – introduce Fundamental Performance Reviews to identify strengths and 
 weaknesses in particular services as a platform for service improvement;
 – introduce Performance Management Programmes for all main services with 
 clear objectives, performance indicators and targets to guide service im-
 provement.
Challenge: Training
Training is not suﬃciently available to all staﬀ and elected representatives.
Training is frequently of low quality, not focusing on priorities and failing to use 
interesting and interactive methodologies.
Much training investment is wasted by not making best use of existing capacity, 
by not building on examples of good training practice, by frequent turnover of staﬀ, 
by lack of co-ordination and co-operation between training providers.
There are insuﬃcient qualiﬁed trainers.
Training budgets are often insuﬃcient to achieve impact.
Training is excessively supply-driven rather than demand-led. 
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Speciﬁc Objectives
• Oﬀer concrete political support, ﬁnancial incentives and technical/logistical 
assistance to the National Association for the development of a National 
Training Strategy based on a comprehensive Training Needs Analysis in col-
laboration with all major stakeholders.
• Contribute to the identiﬁcation or establishment of the appropriate institu-
tional arrangements for delivering the National Training Strategy.
• Play an active role in ensuring that the National Training Strategy is used to:
 – Develop training priorities;
 – Develop standardised curricula in core topics;
 – Make arrangements for course accreditation where appropriate;
 – Assist training providers in raising their standards and co-ordinating their 
 approach;
 – Ensure provision of suﬃcient qualiﬁed trainers;
 – Increase the range of training methodologies in use (e.g. use of media, 
 best practice, etc);
 – Develop training capacity within each local authority;
 – Increase national and local resources devoted to training;
 – Ensure longer-term sustainability in the provision of training.
Challenge: Understanding of democracy and community participation
A deeper understanding of local democracy and community participation is needed 
among both local authorities and local people.
There are insuﬃcient mechanisms for citizen participation and the role of civic 
society is undervalued.
A lack of clarity in the legislative framework and the over-regulation of certain 
procedures do not encourage local authorities to use existing mechanisms of 
community participation and hinder innovation and experimentation.
Local democracy and community participation at local level have not suﬃcient 
proﬁle within the education programmes.
Social networks need to be developed.
The role of women and youth needs to be better recognised and enhanced.
Communication within multiethnic communities is often inadequate.
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Speciﬁc Objectives
• Prepare, in co-operation with the national association, publish and disseminate 
a Guide to Local Democracy, setting out the rights and obligations of local 
and central government and the opportunities for community participation.
• Support the organisation of local and regional forums to develop a common 
understanding of democratic participation among local authorities, political 
parties, NGOs and the media.
• Encourage local authorities to establish an active communication policy, 
tailored to the community’s needs and expectations.
• Launch, in co-operation with the national association, targeted programmes 
for local authorities to promote “best practice” on citizen participation.
• Support the creation of “learning networks” of local authorities engaged in 
experimentation and innovation.
• Encourage local authorities to work with civil society to deliver more eﬀective 
services for local people, and support those that launch initiatives to develop 
a common longer-term vision of the community.
• Promote civic education in schools and universities and through local cultural 
events in a way that fosters participation.
• Help develop and implement training programmes for citizens’ groups.
• Support the more dynamic NGOs, especially those active in promoting the 
participation of women and youth in local politics and decision-making and 
in developing mutual understanding within multiethnic communities.
Challenge: Transfrontier co-operation
Legal framework
– The legal framework for cross-border co-operation between territorial commu-
nities or authorities is unclear or non-existent.
– The conclusion of cross-border agreements or the establishment of cross-border 
co-operation bodies is subject to previous authorisation by central government.
– Euroregions or similar forms of co-operation cannot work due to inadequate 
legal framework and funds.
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Capacity-building
– Local authorities lack the necessary capacity for implementing cross-border co-
operation initiatives and assessing their eﬀectiveness.
– Cross-border co-operation is hampered by lack of funds for social and economic 
development.
– Prejudices and mutual indiﬀerence prevail between communities across the border.
Practical arrangements
Visa requirements and lack of adequate cross-border facilities limit the number of 
contacts, the volume of exchanges and the working opportunities for would-be cross-
border commuters. 
Speciﬁc Objectives
• Ratify the Madrid Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation.
• Remove the legal and administrative obstacles to cross-border co-operation 
in accordance with the “check-list” of measures established by the Council of 
Europe.
• Introduce domestic legislation to enable local authorities to conclude agree-
ments with local authorities of neighbouring countries having similar com-
petences and establish joint bodies, with adequate legal capacity.
• Provide information, guidance and assistance to local authorities wishing to 
engage in cross-border co-operation.
• Use National Training Strategies for local authorities’ staﬀ and elected repre-
sentatives to promote cross-border co-operation.
• Ensure that local ﬁnance regulations and equalisation mechanisms cater for 
the speciﬁc needs of border areas.
• Encourage schools, the media and youth movements to establish partnerships, 
exchange experiences, arrange mutual visits and present the “neighbour” in an 
objective way.
• Promote the learning of the neighbour’s language in schools; enable local 
authorities’ staﬀ and elected representatives to learn the neighbour’s language 
to help implement cross-border projects. 
• Negotiate bilateral and multilateral agreements aiming at the suppression of 
visas, the use of identity cards, the improvement of cross-border facilities, and 
the opening of the labour market to their neighbours.

MEMORANDUM 
OF UNDERSTANDING
on Commitments of the Ministers 
responsible for Local Government 
of South-Eastern Europe
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We, the Ministers:
a.  Meeting in Zagreb, Croatia, on 25–26 October 2004 under the auspices of the 
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and the Council of Europe,
b. Having regard to the European Charter of Local Self-Government, opened for 
signature by Council of Europe member states on 15 October 1985, and to the 
European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial 
Communities or Authorities, opened for signature by Council of Europe member 
states on 21 May 1980;
c. Acknowledging the validity of the principle of subsidiarity, by which public respons-
ibilities should be exercised—and public services delivered—at the level closest to the 
people where this is eﬃcient and eﬀective; 
d. Bearing in mind that central government has the right and the duty to create the 
proper framework for eﬀective democratic local government, including (i) a sound 
legal basis and ﬁnancial arrangements to empower local authorities, and (ii) a 
constructive relationship between the diﬀerent levels of public authority;
e. Recognising the importance of strengthening the capacity of both local and regional 
authorities in order that they may continually improve the leadership they give to their 
communities, the public services they provide to their citizens, and the opportunities 
they create for citizen participation in local government;
f. Recalling that local people have the right to be informed, to be consulted, and to 
participate in decision-making in local aﬀairs;
g. Considering the critical value that civil society can bring to local governance;
h. Understanding the role that local authorities can play in building bridges between 
communities separated by national borders;
i. Recognising the diverse challenges that still face local government in South-Eastern 
Europe:
 1. Reaﬃrm the importance of, and our commitment to, fully implementing 
the principles of the European Charter of Local Self-Government;
 2. In order to achieve this objective, will establish Work Programmes for 
Better Local Government in our respective countries, preliminary drafts of 
which were presented at the Conference, based on the Council of Europe’s 
Template;
 3. Will ﬁnalise our respective draft Work Programmes in co-operation with 
the Council of Europe and other interested stakeholders, with a view to 
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bringing them to the attention of the 14th Conference of European Ministers 
responsible for Local and Regional Government (Budapest, 24–25 February 
2005), and commit ourselves to their implementation;
 4. Aﬃrm our will to work in partnership with our respective national Associations 
of local authorities in the implementation of our Work Programmes;
 5. Agree to meet in order to assess the progress made in the implementation of 
our respective Work Programmes for Better Local Government in eighteen 
months, at a follow-up conference to be held in Skopje;
 6. Welcome the assistance of national and international partners, and commit 
ourselves to contributing positively to any subsequent regional initiatives 
that promote active learning and mutual support. 
Done at Zagreb, 26 October 2004
 Ben Blushi Aleksandar Geštakovski
 Borjano Krišto Zoran Lončar
 Antun Palarić Slaven Pekić
 Marius Constantin Proﬁroiu Željko Šturanović
 Pantelei Tiltu Kristin Wambold-Liebling
Final Declaration
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1. The Conference on “Eﬀective Democratic Governance at Local and Regional 
Level” has met in Zagreb, Croatia, on 25–26 October 2004 at the invitation 
of the Foreign Minister of Croatia, under the auspices of the Stability Pact for 
South-Eastern Europe and the Council of Europe. 
2. The purpose of the Conference has been to review the current state of local 
government in the Stability Pact beneﬁciary countries, to promote the drafting 
of Work Programmes for Better Local Government aimed at fostering local 
democracy, decentralisation and capacity-building, and to encourage partnership 
between state authorities at the central and decentralised levels and the respective 
associations of local authorities.
3. At the close of the Conference, the Ministers or State Secretaries responsible 
for Local Government of Albania, Croatia, the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Moldova, the Republic of Montenegro 
(Serbia and Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia (Serbia and Montenegro), 
Republika Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Romania, “the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia” and the representative of UNMIK/ Kosovo have signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding committing themselves to the implementation 
of their respective Work Programmes for Better Local Government.
4. Representatives of States and International Organisations participating in the 
Stability Pact process have attended the Conference in order to express support for 
the reforms of local government institutions in South-Eastern Europe, reaﬃrm 
their commitment to the democratic development and further stabilisation of the 
region and take part in exchanges of experience and the launching of initiatives 
designed to sustain the reform and stabilisation process.
5. The Conference has enabled Ministers and other participants to enter into 
a dialogue with representatives of civil society, with the Association of Local 
Democracy Agencies (ALDA) and with associations of local authorities of South-
Eastern European countries and their umbrella organisation, NALAS,1 on their 
respective expectations and agendas for local government reform. The preparatory 
work and input of NALAS to the Conference has been highly appreciated.
6. At the close of the Conference, the participants:
 (i) Reaﬃrm their belief that reinforcing democracy is a precondition for 
social, economic and environmental development in South-Eastern 
Europe;
1  The Declaration presented by NALAS is appended.
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 (ii)  Underline that the eﬀorts to create reliable democratic institutions must 
not be conﬁned to the national level, and that democratic principles 
must be applied right down to the grass-roots level, taking account of 
the conclusions of the conference “Strengthening Local Government 
and Democratic Participation in a Changing World”, held in Oslo on 30 
September–1 October 2004;
 (iii) Acknowledge the signiﬁcant steps accomplished by all the Stability Pact 
beneﬁciary countries towards the establishment of a democratic system at 
local level, and the progress made towards endowing local authorities with 
adequate powers and resources;
 (iv)  Are conscious that local government reform is an ongoing process for 
all countries, and that the sustainable development of eﬀective local 
democratic institutions at local and regional level in South-Eastern Europe 
requires further eﬀorts and renewed political commitment;
 (v) Recall the importance of transfrontier co-operation between territorial 
communities or authorities as a means of promoting mutual understanding 
and sustainable development and fostering reconciliation and stability, 
support already existing regional cross-border networks and welcome the 
proposal to establish an Adriatic Euroregion;
 (vi) Accordingly agree on the following criteria for local government reform:
  a. The distribution of competences and resources between central, 
regional and local government, the relationship between the various 
tiers of government and the freedom of association of local authorities 
must conform to the principles and objectives of the European Charter 
of Local Self-Government, in particular providing local governments 
with substantial discretion in the management of local public services 
and an equitable distribution of the ﬁnancial resources to support 
their eﬀective delivery; 
  b. The development of strong institutions at national level, including 
representative associations of local and regional authorities, must be 
supported, so that they can better contribute to eﬀective democratic 
local and regional government;
  c. Dialogue and consultation between state, regional and local repre-
sentatives must be institutionalised, so that the needs of local and 
regional government can be properly articulated and taken into 
account in the development of the policy, legislative and institutional 
framework;
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  d. The capacity of the ﬁeld agencies of the State to work together and 
collaborate with local authorities with a view to stimulating local 
development must be enhanced, and State representatives at local and 
regional level must be given a clear facilitating role to this end;   
  e. The capacity of both local and regional authorities must be developed 
so as to enable them to provide responsive leadership, ensure eﬀective 
provision of services, promote community involvement in local and 
regional policy- and decision-making and engage in cross-border co-
operation;
  f. State and local authorities must engage civil society in actions aimed at 
developing local democracy, strengthening the cohesion and solidarity 
of local communities and creating a new administrative culture in the 
region;
 (vii) and welcome 
  a. the signing by the Ministers responsible for Local Government in 
South-Eastern Europe of a Memorandum of Understanding with 
commitments to ﬁnalise and implement Work Programmes for Better 
Local Government;
  b. the initiative of the associations of local authorities in the region to 
prepare complementary work plans designed to improve the capacity 
of local authorities to deliver eﬀective democratic governance;
  c. the intention expressed by a number of countries—through their 
national agencies for international development—and International 
Organisations to support the implementation of the Work Programmes 
for Better Local Government;
  d. the readiness of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to 
prepare regional initiatives that contribute to the eﬀectiveness of the 
Work Programmes for Better Local Government;
 (viii)  Request the Government of Croatia to report on the Zagreb Conference 
and the follow-up measures taken by States and International Agencies 
to the 14th Conference of European Ministers responsible for Local and 
Regional Government (Budapest, 24–25 February 2005) with a view 
to making the reform of local government in South-Eastern Europe a 
centrepiece of democratic transformation in Europe;
 (ix)   Request the Stability Pact and the Council of Europe to further consider 
the idea of establishing regular review meetings with the participation of 
State, regional and local authorities;
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 (x) Note the intention of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” to 
convene at Skopje in eighteen months another conference to review the 
measures taken at both national and regional levels in order to implement 
the Work Programmes for Better Local Government and the regional 
initiatives arising out of them;
 (xi) Thank the Government of Croatia for the hospitality and excellent 
organisation of the Conference.
p
r
o
c
e
e
d
i
n
g
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
o
u
t
h
-
e
a
s
t
e
r
n
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
r
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
 
m
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
i
a
l
 
c
o
n
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
 
 
 
•
•
•
143• • •
NALAS—Network of Associations 
of Local Authorities of South-East Europe
South-East Europe Regional Ministerial Conference
Eﬀective Democratic Governance at Local and Regional Level
(Zagreb, 25–26 October 2004)
NALAS Declaration
We,
the Associations of Local Authorities from South-East Europe gathered in the 
Network of Associations of Local Authorities of South-East Europe, committing 
ourselves to a better daily life for all citizens, a more balanced development respectful 
of the unity of our respective countries, and convinced that strong local government 
is needed for that purpose, have the honor to draw Governments’ attention to the 
following issues regarding eﬀective democratic governance at local level in South-
East Europe (SEE):
Vision and Leadership
There is a necessity for permanent dialogue between us and central governments, in 
order to gradually obtain a shared vision of what local government might be with the 
ultimate goal to promote strong local democracy.
This vision should develop into an overall and consistent strategy determining 
concrete actions and provisions in various ﬁelds (training, capacity building, re-
sources, communications, partnerships, etc…).
The organisation of regular SEE Forums on local issues should be supported, 
with a view to developing a common understanding of local governance among 
central governments, political parties, local authorities, NGOs, media and other 
stakeholders.
NALAS proposes to receive from the governments gathered in Zagreb the 
mandate to explore the eventuality of writing a Guide Book to Local Democracy in 
South-East Europe.
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Local Self-government
There is a need to ensure a clear distribution of responsibilities between local, regional 
and national governments as well as an adequate assignment of resources.
National debates on the beneﬁt of decentralised government should be stimulated; 
regular co-operation mechanisms between local and national stakeholders should be 
deﬁned and organised.
We strongly encourage central governments to work hand in hand with 
Associations of Local Authorities and oﬀer political support, ﬁnancial incentives and 
technical assistance to their initiatives. 
Legislation
Legislation should be designed and implemented in close co-operation with the local 
government and their Associations in order to meet the standards contained in the 
European Charter of Local Self-Government. We call on all parties that have not yet 
signed and ratiﬁed the Charter to do so rapidly. 
NALAS commits itself, under the framework of the Stability Pact for South-
East Europe and of the Council of Europe, to collaborate with all central authorities 
involved to promote a set of regional standards of local services that can help local 
authorities drive up the quality of service delivery . 
It is a high priority for NALAS to ensure coherent legislation regarding local self-
government, to eliminate the existing inconsistencies and to clarify the competences 
of respective levels of government (from central to local), following the overall 
objective of reaching a higher degree and a better quality of decentralisation.
An improvement in decentralisation will be realised by expanding local authorities’ 
competencies on all activities in which citizens have a direct interest and that can be 
eﬃciently dealt with at local level (principle of subsidiarity).
Local political systems, in particular local elections, should, as far as possible, not 
only allow citizens to elect their representatives, but also make the latter accountable 
to the former for their work in local parliament and government. Possibilities for 
local referendums, at the initiative of a group of citizens, should be expanded.
Legislation should be adequately designed to help municipalities run their 
community responsibly, cost-eﬀectively, openly and in accordance with the will of 
the citizens. It will also have the goal to promote the participation of all citizens in 
local aﬀairs including minorities or communities.
It is necessary to vest, whenever possible, the local authorities with exclusive tasks 
and to ﬁx clear limits to mandatory tasks, all this being accompanied by adequate 
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ﬁnancing distinguishing clearly respective activities and ﬁnancial sources for local, 
regional and central authorities.
Law should enhance the status of local elected representatives and deﬁne clearly 
what is expected from them.
Transfrontier Co-operation
Further to the existing cross border co-operation we believe that local democracy 
and transfrontier co-operation are strongly connected and therefore we encourage 
central and local governments to actively participate in relevant Programmes and we 
call on all parties that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the European Outline 
Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or 
Authorities and its two Additional Protocols.
We welcome the initiative taken by the Congress and its President, to convene 
a meeting in Termoli on 8–9 November, with a view to creating a Euro Region of 
the Adriatic Sea. We also believe that such an initiative can also be taken in other 
geographical areas such as the Black Sea.
Resources
It is important to pursue the objective of ﬁnancial autonomy of local government 
through more ﬁscal decentralisation. It is thus a priority to accelerate local ﬁnance 
reform and ﬁscal decentralisation, so that municipalities can plan, implement and 
ﬁnance their activities on the basis of their own budget and ﬁnancial resources.
Municipal ownership is obviously a big issue and it proves necessary to ensure 
that all properties needed for the delivery of local services are transferred to local 
authorities. It is essential to adapt the legislation on ownership to the standards of 
the European Charter of Local Self-Government.
It is the responsibility of the central government to reduce the imbalances 
between local governments and to improve ﬁnancial equalisation.
 
Capacity
NALAS should be backed by the International Community and donors to increase 
its capacity to be a qualiﬁed partner of the SEE national governments in the 
implementation of regional initiatives, responding to the needs of more than one 
country, in the ﬁeld of local democratic governance.
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Committing themselves to the development and implementation of their 
respective Work Programmes, the Associations of Local Authorities express their 
determination to increase their capacity to provide services to their members and 
to be eﬃcient and reliable partners of their central government on local aﬀairs, 
deserving both to be consulted and listened to. 
National authorities should work hand in hand with independent associations 
of local governments, to contribute to an improvement in the quality of the services 
the Associations are providing to local authorities and citizens. This co-operation will 
beneﬁt from adequate support, ﬁnancial incentives and logistical assistance.
National authorities should co-operate with associations of local authorities in 
the development of a national strategy for the training of local civil servants and 
elected representatives, based on a careful and comprehensive evaluation of the needs 
in this ﬁeld and incorporating extensive use of exchange of good practice as well as 
all possible forms of collaboration with all relevant stakeholders.
Central governments should ensure that suﬃcient resources are available for the 
training of local civil servants.
The associations of local authorities should not only be allowed to open and run 
their own training schools, but the certiﬁcates that these schools deliver should also 
be fully recognised by the national authorities. 
Since it aﬀects the quality of life of local people, local sustainable development 
should be considered as a national priority. In collaboration with the associations of 
local authorities, all possible measures and incentives should be examined to enhance 
the role of local authorities in local development and improve their relations with 
enterprises and potential investors.
NALAS commits itself to collaborating with all central authorities involved to 
promote a set of standards of local services that can help local authorities drive up 
the quality of service delivery .
Partnerships
A comprehensive national decentralisation strategy should make all possible room for 
dynamic partnerships between all stakeholders (including local citizens/civil society), 
and be based on a clear deﬁnition of their respective roles.
Satisfying mechanisms of on-going dialogue should be developed between central 
government, local authorities and their associations in all matters dealing with local 
aﬀairs and local reforms in accordance with article 4, paragraph 6 of the European 
Charter of Local Self Government .
It is up to local authorities to enhance citizens’ participation, especially that of 
women and youth. The associations are fully committed to assisting them to perform 
p
r
o
c
e
e
d
i
n
g
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
o
u
t
h
-
e
a
s
t
e
r
n
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
r
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
 
m
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
i
a
l
 
c
o
n
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
 
 
 
•
•
•
147• • •
that task. It is up to the central authorities to establish the adequate framework and 
mechanisms to favour and develop citizens’ participation.
Transparency
Transparency and accountability should be core objectives of local government 
reform and ﬁscal decentralisation.
National law should set standards for transparency, communication and 
accountability. This eﬀort of transparency will also concern the allocation of funds to 
the local authorities by the central government. Such allocation should correspond 
to a limited number of criteria clearly deﬁned by national legislation. 
Since it is also often a priority to ﬁght corruption and increase transparency 
and accountability at local level, we underline the necessity of ensuring a real 
implementation of the European Code of Conduct on the political integrity of local 
and regional elected representatives, adopted by the Congress of Local and Regional 
Authorities of the Council of Europe in 1999.
Transparency requires equal treatment of all local authorities regardless of their 
political aﬃliation, and excludes political or ﬁnancial pressure exerted on them based 
on discretionary power.
We invite the Ministers responsible for Local Self-Government, who signed the 
Memorandum of Understanding at the Zagreb Ministerial Conference in Zagreb 
on 26 October, to closely co-operate with the Associations of Local Authorities 
in controlling and evaluating the implementation of the Work Programmes for 
Better Local Government and to adopt a 10 year Programme for decentralising 
public powers in SE Europe. This Programme should be implemented by each 
country and monitored by annual conferences jointly promoted by the Ministers 
and NALAS. 
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Level held in Zagreb, Croatia, on 25–26 October 2004. The 
Conference was a joint initiative of the Council of Europe 
and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, held at the 
invitation of the government of Croatia.
The Conference brought together the Ministers responsible 
for local government in the Stability Pact countries. Other 
countries, international agencies and organisations involved 
in the Stability Pact process also attended. 
Its purpose was to review the current state of local 
government in the Stability Pact beneficiary countries, 
to promote the drafting of Work Programmes for Better 
Local Government aimed at fostering local democracy, 
decentralisation and capacity-building, and to encourage 
partnerships between state authorities at the central and 
decentralised levels and the respective associations of local 
authorities. 
The Conference resulted in Ministerial commitments to local 
government reform based on Work Programmes setting 
out priorities for action. It also led to constructive dialogue 
between Ministries, Associations of Local Authorities and 
the donor community.
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